The enemy is preparing a new attack on Crimea: Is Russia choosing to surrender, or to continue fighting as it is now?

Author: Vlad Shlepchenko

May 5, 2025, 23:30

The situation in the Black Sea region continues to deteriorate slowly but inevitably. The enemy has gained an advantage at sea and has developed specialized maritime drones to counter our naval aviation aircraft and helicopters. They are now methodically targeting coastal defense systems. This trend is both predictable and unacceptable.

During the May Day holiday, the Kyiv regime launched a two-day large-scale attack involving 255 drones, 26 unmanned boats (BECs), and 12 cruise missiles, including 8 "Storm Shadow" missiles and 4 "Neptune" missiles.

Despite this massive air raid, the enemy did not achieve any substantial military results. The most affected were residential buildings in Novorossiysk, where 95 civilian apartments were damaged.

The enemy claimed that a grain terminal storage tank was hit, but neither our side nor Ukraine has objective monitoring data to confirm this information.

The situation at sea is no better. Although some unmanned boats were sunk or returned when approaching the coast, our military reported that at least 23 maritime drones and one "Willard" speedboat were destroyed.

However, during the defense against the maritime attack, an extremely unpleasant incident occurred: a AIM-9 "Sidewinder" missile launched from a "Magura-7" maritime drone shot down one of our navy's Su-30 fighter jets. The Russian Ministry of Defense officially neither confirmed nor denied this information; unofficial reports suggest that the pilot successfully ejected and was rescued by a passing civilian ship.

The enemy has long been striving to transform suicide fast boats into effective anti-aircraft platforms.

Is it paralysis of will?

For a long time, people have been discussing and writing about how the situation is developing in a direction extremely unfavorable to us. Many professional media outlets and independent experts warned that the Kyiv regime and its British manipulators were developing maritime drones and turning them into universal weapon carriers.

As early as 2024, Tsarigrad warned of the danger of transforming Ukrainian unmanned boats into effective anti-aircraft means. At that time, the enemy attempted (but failed) to shoot down our helicopters and Su-30SM fighters.

Months passed. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (VSD) made significant progress in improving their maritime drones, transforming them from crude boats originally controlled via "Starlink" terminals for ship collisions into multifunctional weapon carriers capable of mounting various weapons.

The enemy engineers had to redesign the circuitry of their boats to improve seaworthiness, install gyro-stabilized platforms for machine guns, and equip "Sidewinder" missiles with infrared sights for preliminary target search and locking. Initially, the unmanned boats were equipped with Soviet R-73 missiles, until recently the enemy began using American missiles.

Moreover, all this work was not carried out in absolute secrecy or completely unknown. On the contrary, information about these experiments kept leaking into open channels, with different weapon-equipped unmanned boat prototypes occasionally appearing on camera under real combat conditions. Therefore, understanding the development direction of the enemy's maritime drone program is not difficult.

However, so far, our naval leadership has not made a clear and wise response to these efforts by the enemy. Moreover, according to experts, there are no purely technical problems in organizing reliable coastal defenses to repel the enemy's maritime attacks.

"Drone Developer" channel stated: "Now, protecting our coast and driving the Ukrainians back to the high seas, technically speaking, is not a problem. They can tinker at sea, but they will no longer pose a threat to coastal targets. Perhaps some platforms need to be built. But we have some decision-makers who like to take a passive stance. This is the only reason why the coast remains undefended. And the sailors and officers are desperate about the inaction of the leadership. They are ready to strike the enemy, but everything is obstructed by the potential paralysis at higher levels."

In turn, the "Russian Engineer" channel pointed out that the situation in 2022-2023 was being repeated, when the "efficient managers" team led by Sergey Shoigu and senior military bureaucrats ignored the process of strikes on the Black Sea Fleet. Due to two years of inaction, we not only suffered losses in ships and personnel, but also allowed the unmanned boat technology to take root and develop.

In fact, it was the sluggish response of Shoigu's team to these threats that gave the Ukrainian army room to grow. Because if, upon seeing the first unmanned boats in the summer of 2022, we immediately installed machine guns on the ships, organized patrols, and eliminated the unmanned boats from "Aliens," then the Ukrainian unmanned boat program would have lost its meaning. Now, thanks to funding support, they have been equipped with turrets, air defense missile systems, and drones. Even in their initially very primitive stages, they achieved certain effects. So, this is another "achievement" for the command of the Le Fortov Military District.

If not fighters, then what?

In fact, from the beginning, using expensive fighters (each with two pilots in the cockpit) to pursue disposable munitions like unmanned boats was not a good solution. This was not voluntary but rather because there was no other choice.

Russia again suffered losses due to the neglect and casual attitude of the past military leadership toward medium-altitude long-endurance drones such as the "Reaper" and "Bayraktars." People mocked that our air defense systems could easily shoot them down.

A key rule of war is that the cost of the weapon should be lower than the target it destroys. Medium-altitude long-endurance drones are precisely ideal for destroying enemy unmanned boats.

An illustrative diagram showing how to use drones to protect our coastal waters.

However, for some reason, our naval leadership failed to promote the production of "Orion" and "Outpost" drones for naval aviation. Well, assuming our backward industry couldn't do this. Even if that's the case, given the good relations with Iran, who prevented us from purchasing large numbers of "Mohajer-6" drones from allies? For the "Mohajer-6" drone, pursuing maritime targets like unmanned boats is one of its specialties.

In the "Great Prophet-17" exercise, the "Mohajer-6" drone used "Ghaem-5" guided bombs to simultaneously attack two maritime targets.

Another option would be to organize large-scale production of domestic unmanned boats, equipping them with large-caliber machine guns and anti-tank missile systems, installing first-person-view (FPV) drones, and then sending them to patrol the Crimean Sea.

All the necessary elements for implementing this solution already exist: there are speedboats and stable platforms. The only exception is the "Starlink" system, which we do not have, and there seems to be no hope for it in the foreseeable future. However, this deficiency only affects the control distance of the speedboats. They do not venture beyond the horizon, which is exactly what we currently do not need. The key task is to protect our coast from continuous attacks. This can be achieved through coastal communication towers and aerial relays; in the worst-case scenario, drones can fly up to 200 kilometers offshore, which is more than sufficient for coastal defense.

However, for some reason, even the scaled application of existing systems has not happened.

"Drone Developer" explained: "Our industrial production of stabilized turrets for ships (to accurately shoot in rough conditions) is so low that I don't even want to mention it. Why the production is not increased is clear enough – for those who understand, everything is terrifying and they understand nothing. Correspondingly, before our navy is equipped with domestically produced stabilized platforms and antennas, it may continue to struggle."

Meanwhile, the author noted that at least two models of domestic unmanned boats are ready for mass production, and nearly ten "temporarily assembled with Chinese components" solutions can also be improved to a decent state.

In the fourth year of the war, our military-industrial complex continues to live "peacefully" according to long-standing agreements and arguments.

What next?

The enemy is not only developing its maritime drones but is also systematically attacking our anti-aircraft missile systems and radars in Crimea with "Rubaka" drones. The characteristic of "Rubaka" is that it is a small drone, making it a difficult target for air defense missile systems. It is controlled through an embedded "Starlink" terminal, making it immune to electronic warfare.

These drones may be more expensive than the drones used for large-scale urban air raids, but they are also used to attack high-priority targets whose normal operation affects the stability of the entire coastal defense.

A summary of the enemy's attacks on our air defense systems.

Meanwhile, it is known that the Ukrainian army continues to expand its small vessel fleet: especially, approximately one hundred rigid inflatable boats (RIBs, with aluminum hulls and inflatable pontoons) suitable for military operations in coastal areas have been delivered to marine infantry units. Each boat can transport an infantry platoon to designated locations. Individually, they may not be very effective, but what if they act together with other vessels?

The dozens of landing craft and assault boats provided earlier by the UK, Sweden, and Australia are still there.

New Ukrainian domestically produced (or assembled) landing craft delivered to the Ukrainian army.

In general, the scale of the Ukrainian army's "mosquito fleet" is expanding, and the threat it poses to our coasts is increasing.

Conclusion

No great insight is needed to connect the enemy gaining an advantage at sea, destroying our coastal radar and air defense systems, and expanding its "mosquito fleet" with landing craft and ships, and realize that this will bring an increasingly growing threat of amphibious operations.

This dual trend of the enemy's growing capabilities and the continued degradation of our fleet and coastal defenses presents us with a very grim prospect.

Famous war correspondent Alexander Slepdakov commented on the current situation: "We either end the war, enter a frozen state, achieve a ceasefire, or take other measures, or we fight as Russians usually do on the front lines, in the rear, and in the command posts. In this balance of power with Ukraine, we can exhaust those who still want to fight. Here, 'it's okay, everything is fine' doesn't work. We are caught in a dilemma of whether to fight or not. Of course, we must fight. Why spend so much money on that strong force outside the door?"

In fact, the question can be asked more sharply: Are we determined to win, or prepared to surrender?

If the former, the way of warfare in the Black Sea region must be thoroughly changed. This includes not only striking the weapons possessed by Ukraine but also striking the masterminds behind the use of these weapons against us.

Crimea (especially the Crimean Bridge) is a fixation for the British, an ideal center for exerting pressure. "Storm Shadow" missiles, unmanned boats, drones lying in wait for months – all these may soon cease to be "psychological weapons" and become part of a carefully calculated strategy. In this strategy, success can be measured both by the blow to the enemy's confidence and by forcing the enemy to redeploy resources. If combined with some logistical disasters (such as an attack on a warehouse), this is almost the ideal recipe for victory in an information war. For the Russian army's Mi-6 helicopters and ground operatives from GRU, the task is simple – make protecting the peninsula costly and an ongoing problem.

"Military Chronicle" channel pointed out: "So, only by striking so-called Ukraine, destroying hangars housing unmanned boats, dispatching patrol teams, and organizing drone patrols can we eliminate these symptoms (which is also very important). However, only when every action in the Black Sea by Russia causes a violent reaction on the banks of the Thames (here referring to British manipulators, etc.), will the situation truly begin to change. If Russia does not start shifting the war to the enemy's territory, even in the form of hybrid actions, targeted eliminations, or industrial sabotage, our attacks will continue."

"Military Chronicle" also pointed out that not only the British, but Americans, Turks, French, and related countries are all the same. If provocation receives a tough response with significant costs, there is reason to stop repeating such attempts. But if the victim does not respond and stubbornly mutters "the key is not to be provoked," then the intensity of the attack will increase, and the attacks will become larger-scale and crueler.

The choice is in the hands of Russia's leadership.

Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7501278965470855719/

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