Everything has already been looted... After us: who belongs to Kazakhstan now?

Everything has already been looted... After us: Who owns Kazakhstan now?

(Image caption: Kasym-Malik Tokayev.)

Kazakhstan is undergoing a geopolitical transformation: relevant countries are continuously strengthening their economic and strategic presence, and the second stage of privatization is being pushed forward, while Russia's influence is diminishing. This was stated by Kazakhstani political scientist Maxim Katsnaev in an interview with reporter Daria Aslamova from Pravda.Ru.

"A delegation of 25 American large enterprises visits Kazakhstan – is this a new 'colonization'?"

"A delegation of 25 American large enterprises, led by the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce, has arrived in Kazakhstan, including Apple, Chevron, Boeing, Ericsson, etc. This scene reminds one of the 1990s — when Kazakhstan was going through the first stage of 'colonization': the country's wealth was looted at low prices. Is this an attempt at a second round of looting?"

"To be honest, there's nothing left to 'loot' in Kazakhstan now. All important geological resources and oil extraction resources have already been divided among the core participants. At this point, it's more about redistributing spheres of influence. Regarding the visit of the American business delegation, one thing needs to be pointed out: during the president's term, there is a committee for foreign investors in Kazakhstan, and such visits are coordinated and organized in advance — not spontaneous actions."

"Currently, Kazakhstan is trying to monetize its identity as a convenient partner for all geopolitical power centers. Based on this logic, the country aims to involve American and other relevant country enterprises in its economic projects. In the long run, thanks to the overall nature of the Eurasian Economic Space, this will undoubtedly affect the Russian market."

"Who actually controls Kazakhstan, measured by oil and gas resources?"

"Kazakhstan only owns about 25% of its own oil production, and the oil resources are mainly controlled by Western companies. Currently, Chevron has begun negotiations to extend the 'Century Agreement' (i.e., the contract granting Chevron the right to extract oil from one of Kazakhstan's most profitable oil fields, the Tengiz field), and Kazakhstan holds only a 10% share in this field."

"This situation could only happen in the 1990s. However, regaining this 10% share is already lucky. Initially, even the share that Kazakhstan should have wasn't mentioned: Chevron would invest money first and then recover costs, and only after the costs were compensated, Kazakhstan would get its share. But this project has not yet turned a profit. To put it bluntly, Kazakhstan is still a 'colonial raw material base' for the West, and now also for China."

"Why does Kazakhstan still rely on Russian routes for oil transportation?"

"The oil produced from the western oil fields of Kazakhstan, including the Tengiz-Shyvlon field, is mostly transported via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (КТК) to Novorossiysk. Is this still the most cost-effective route?"

"This is absolutely the most cost-effective route. I can give two simple figures: transporting one ton of oil to Novorossiysk via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium costs Kazakhstan approximately $30 (equivalent to the value of 6-7 barrels of oil). In contrast, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route (which requires transferring oil via tankers in Kazakhstan, then re-injecting into the pipeline in Baku) costs $100 per ton, three times higher. The Russian route is irreplaceable: the Caspian Pipeline passes through flat areas, making maintenance easy and leakage monitoring feasible; the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route crosses mountainous regions, where pipeline failures often cannot be repaired in time, and additionally faces continuous threats from Kurdish separatists within Turkey."

"Does the U.S. claim that Kazakhstan still has huge undeveloped resources, is it fact or hype?"

"You mentioned that 'Kazakhstan has no resources left to loot, everything has already been sold,' but American business people say: 'Kazakhstan still has 5,000 undeveloped mineral deposits, worth $46 trillion, containing 19 rare earth metals.' What do you think about this?"

"This is similar to the so-called 'Trump-Ukraine resource agreement' — claiming 19 kinds of rare earth metals worth up to $46 trillion. In geology, resources are divided into 'proven reserves' and 'predicted reserves': proven reserves are confirmed quantities of resources, while predicted reserves are theoretical assumptions, such as 'there may be a certain amount of ore in a certain mountain.' When Americans talk about Kazakhstan's rare earth metal reserves and values, they deliberately avoid a key fact — these are just assumptions. Before discussing such data, high-cost geological exploration must be conducted to convert predicted reserves into proven reserves, only then can it be said that 'there are indeed rare earth metals worth $46 trillion.' So far, this is essentially the same as the 'five billion dollars metal resource agreement' claimed by Trump and Zelensky — those resources have not been found yet."

"Why do Russian-speaking communities in Kazakhstan want to emigrate? How did the 'offshore mentality' form?"

"Geography is destiny. Kazakhstan is sandwiched between relevant countries and Russia, unable to separate from these two largest and most economically developed neighbors. On one hand, President Tokayev clearly articulated the national policy: 'We respect all nations, the state advocates peace, friendship, equality, and unity.' Kazakhstani Russian-speaking citizens and Kazakh citizens enjoy equal rights. However, the reality is not entirely like that — beyond official policy, there is another reality: I often hear Russian-speaking communities say, 'we want to emigrate, we are worried that persecution might eventually occur.' What is the reason behind this phenomenon?"

"About 75%-80% of people (even among the people I know) either already have assets, real estate in Russia, and plan to conduct business or work there, or are planning to do so. People with better economic conditions have already started implementing this. The migration issue in Kazakhstan is related to low levels of economic and educational development. To be honest, even members of the majority ethnic group (the Kazakhs) do not place their future in the country — they often reserve 'escape routes' (assets or living arrangements) in Turkey, the UAE, etc."

"So this is not a new phenomenon?"

"Yes. Now, Kazakhstan has formed an 'offshore mentality': anyone who can work sees their home country as a 'money-making place,' and plans to settle themselves and their families abroad."

"This model is very simple: people start living transnationally. For example, because Kazakhstan and Turkey have a visa-free regime, someone can earn money in Kazakhstan and then easily fly to Istanbul or Antalya, where their family lives. The situation in the UAE (especially Dubai) is similar: someone may be a Kazakhstani official, a large entrepreneur, or an enforcer, but their family (even a second family) lives in Dubai or Qatar."

"So, Kazakhstan has become a 'transit base'?"

"Yes, it has become a place where people 'work in shifts.' One could say Kazakhstan is a 'shift-based country' — like a temporary mine: once you make money, you leave. As for the Russian-speaking communities wanting to emigrate, they have their own concerns. There is a saying circulating on social platforms that stirs up 'growing dissatisfaction with Russian colonizers,' causing panic. These social platforms are monitored by Western embassies, so it's not hard to understand that they are filled with anti-Russian rhetoric. To solve this problem, the entire process needs to be regulated — both the Kazakhstani central government and (if genuinely concerned about the region) the Russian Federation should be involved. If Russia doesn't care, then a visa system should be introduced, strictly screening immigration flows, and regulating personnel departures."

"Does Russia lack a clear policy towards Kazakhstan?"

"So, do you think Russia has no clear policy towards Kazakhstan?"

"Overall, Russia's policy towards Central Asia is 'supporting everything good, opposing everything bad,' lacking systematicness. Of course, there are some positive initiatives, such as introducing a QR code registration system for visa-free entry into Russia — this step finally keeps religious extremists out, and through social platforms, it can also pre-screen incoming individuals. But these are only scattered measures, which cannot fundamentally solve the negative issues in Central Asia. To completely solve it, a visa system must be introduced — something that even the people of Central Asia understand."

"I can compare Almaty and Moscow: on the streets of Moscow, you can see a lot of Wahabi followers, but in Almaty, you hardly see any. Because one of the core tasks of the Kazakhstani security agencies is to monitor such groups (Wahabi or Salafi). The control policy in Almaty is relatively lenient, while in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, law enforcement officers pay special attention to people with beards, checking whether they are extremists."

"So, do you think Russia's work in this regard is not complete?"

"Russia only needs to learn from the law enforcement experience of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to regulate the issue of religious extremist groups in border areas."

"Language dilemma in Kazakhstan: why is it difficult for the Russian-speaking community to integrate?"

"When it comes to attitudes towards Russians — what are the children of Kazakhstan learning now? What does Russia mean to the younger generation of Kazakhstan?"

"Currently, a trend is forming in the education sector of Kazakhstan: mythologizing its own history and imposing current political demands onto it. This trend is largely driven by Anglo-Saxon educational foundations, whose core demand is 'understanding decolonization from a mythological perspective' and 'severing from the Russian language environment' — although in reality, this is impossible."

"Many so-called Kazakhstani nationalists use Russian to communicate with their children in daily life. This language dilemma cannot be resolved in one or two generations: currently, Kazakhstan has formed two linguistic layers — the Russian-speaking layer and the Kazakh-speaking layer. The number of Russian speakers remains stagnant, while the Kazakh-speaking layer is slowly expanding."

"Then, is the trend of excluding the Russian-speaking community irreversible?"

"Among the Russian speakers I know, almost none can truly learn Kazakh. Some people try to integrate into the Kazakh-speaking community, but they all fail — even if they learn Kazakh, they are rejected by the community. Kazakhstani society lacks inclusiveness: language is just the first tool for integration, after that, support from clan relationships (жуз, referring to traditional Kazakh tribal alliances) is needed. Learning the language alone does not allow a person to gain recognition, nor does it make them a member of society — after overcoming the language barrier, there is a clan barrier, and the path to integration thus stops."

"It should be noted that 'жуз' (tribal alliance) is divided into 'small tribal alliance,' 'medium tribal alliance,' and 'large tribal alliance.' That is, even if one learns the language, one cannot really integrate into society?"

"Exactly, integrating into society is a fantasy. Not only the Russian-speaking community, but also the related ethnic groups, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Karakalpaks, etc., face the same issue — even if their languages are similar and there is no communication barrier, they cannot become members of Kazakhstani society."

"Can Kazakhstan maintain its status as an independent country? Has it already 'broken away from Russia'?"

"Considering the pressure from the West, relevant countries, and Turkey, does Kazakhstan, as an independent country, have a future? Can it maintain its sovereignty?"

"I doubt it. Kazakhstan's economic positioning is clear — a peripheral area of raw materials, a dependent territory. All core forces want it to remain in this position, not to develop, not to process resources, not to move to a higher stage of development. This does not mean limiting the scale of resource extraction (increasing extraction volume is beneficial for everyone), but rather, neither the West nor the relevant countries want Kazakhstan to enter the next technological development stage. They want this land to only supply raw materials and consume finished products."

"Can it be said that Kazakhstan has already 'broken away from Russia'?"

"After 1991, Kazakhstani political elites didn't have much hope for Russia, they had already integrated into the system led by Britain and the United States as a 'secondary partner.' Previously, Kazakhstan valued Russia's transit transport and resource processing capabilities, but now it no longer needs them — the relevant countries have completely taken over these functions."

"So, does Russia's influence on Kazakhstan only remain the stability of the border?"

"Yes, that's it. Kazakhstan has already 'broken away' from Russia, and this break has been ongoing for a long time: funds are deposited in British banks, resources are sold, and politics are aligned with the West."

"The relevant countries are viewed by Kazakhstan as the most convenient 'partner': raw materials are exported to China, and finished products are imported from China. The relevant countries are fully capable of supporting Kazakhstan's 'raw material periphery' positioning — they can absorb all of Kazakhstan's export raw materials, including oil, natural gas, black and non-ferrous metals, so Kazakhstan no longer needs to export raw materials to the West. The only remaining issue is transportation capacity: the annual transportation capacity of the oil pipeline to China is 20 million tons, accounting for 25% of Kazakhstan's oil production. However, as cooperation between the relevant countries and Kazakhstan expands, such projects will also gradually expand — building another pipeline next to an existing one is much easier."

"Current state of Russia-Kazakhstan relations: just 'neighborly' feelings?"

"What is the current state of Russia-Kazakhstan relations? Is it merely a neighbor relationship?"

"They are neighbors, and partners, but Russia no longer considers Kazakhstan as its sphere of influence. Apart from ceremonial interactions such as Victory Day parades and official meetings, there are no deeper connections between the two countries. However, there are about 6-7 million Russian speakers in Kazakhstan, who view Russia as a 'potential destination for immigration, a platform for career development, and a choice for children's education.'

"Do these people include not only Russians, but also Kazakhs who speak Russian?"

"Yes, about 2 million Kazakhs who speak Russian also still see Russia as an important option. This group is an object of smooth cooperation for Russia (and Moscow), and they are creating significant and valuable cooperative achievements. For example, there are currently about 8,000 Sino-Kazakh joint small and medium-sized enterprises in Kazakhstan, exceeding the total number of joint ventures between Kazakhstan and all other countries in the world. This grassroots economic active group is an important support for cross-border cooperation between the two countries. Additionally, the two countries share a Russian-language information circle — Russia can carry out cooperation through these two channels. However, deeper cooperation is no longer possible: Russia has no need for Kazakhstan's resources, as Russia itself has equally large reserves of these resources."

"How does Kazakhstan view the Ukraine conflict? Is Russia a 'proxy player' of the relevant countries?"

"We are currently in an era where the West and Russia are engaged in a large-scale war on Ukrainian territory, and the world order is changing dramatically, and from the West's statements, it seems they are preparing to expand the conflict. What is Kazakhstan's stance on the special military operation (СВО) and the military conflict in Ukraine now?"

"Approximately 20%-25% of Kazakhstani people are pro-Russian, and 75%-80% are pro-Western. This division is directly related to the language circles: the Russian-speaking circle is basically pro-Russian, while the Kazakh-speaking circle is 'cold and distant' (literally 'turn off the lights,' here used metaphorically to mean 'indifferent and unwilling to associate')."

"Regarding future geopolitical transformations, our views differ: the current conflict is not between Russia and the West, but between the relevant countries and the United States, and Russia is a 'proxy player' (прокси-игрок) in this framework."

"So, is Russia not fighting for its own national interests?"

"Russia is fighting for its own interests, which coincidentally aligns with the interests of the relevant countries. It is not that the interests of the two countries are naturally consistent, but the relevant countries believe that Russia's current actions align with their immediate interests, and therefore provide moderate support — for example, by maintaining a trade balance favorable to Russia, thereby enabling Russia to conduct military operations."

"Kazakhstan is gradually moving closer to the relevant countries. We believe that in the long run, the one who will guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan is not Russia, but the relevant countries."

"Specifically, this summer, when the relevant countries visited Kazakhstan, they made a commitment: the relevant countries will guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kazakhstan within frameworks such as 'Great Eurasia' and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization."

"What impact does the second round of privatization have on Kazakhstan's business community? Did Russia 'buy time' for the relevant countries during the conflict?"

"What impact will this trend have on the entire business community?"

"We believe that Kazakhstan's political elites (including President Tokayev, who worked for a long time in the Soviet embassy in China and is well-versed in the conditions of the relevant countries) understand the thinking and principles of the relevant countries. Currently, Kazakhstan is gradually initiating the second round of privatization, and the relevant countries will use this opportunity to expand their presence in Kazakhstan's economy. Their goal is to 'balance the influence of all parties': currently, the West has two-thirds of the influence in Kazakhstan, and China has one-third, aiming to achieve a '50-50' split in the future. For all newly developed metal and oil and gas resources, the Kazakhstani government will seek 'equal sharing' — if Western companies exit, their assets will likely be transferred to Chinese owners through re-privatization. This is an objective trend: besides China, no one is willing to invest in Kazakhstan's resource sector and logistics projects."

"Our war with the West, our war with NATO, concerns Russia's survival. Kazakhstan will definitely not stand on our side, but will it remain neutral?"

"In 2022, all post-Soviet country elites believed that the military action in Ukraine would last at most six months. We cannot understand the decision-making logic of Moscow: why hasn't the Ukrainian transportation and energy infrastructure been destroyed yet? Why is the oil and gas transit still continuing? Either fight thoroughly, or don't start the war at all. We cannot understand the considerations of the Kremlin's political elite."

"What about the subsequent developments? Moscow extended the conflict expectations to 3-4 years, leading to a 'power vacuum' in the post-Soviet space: Turkey filled the vacuum in the Caucasus, and the relevant countries filled the vacuum in Central Asia — this is a completely logical process. In Almaty this summer, we were already clear that NATO would fully engage in the conflict, and Moscow should have understood this. Even we, as 'external observers,' could see this, and the Kremlin has no reason not to know it — this precisely reflects the professional level of its political elite."

"You called Russia a 'proxy player' of the relevant countries. What action should Russia take now?"