The United States is once again sending signals to Lai Qingde that it will abandon "Taiwan independence"! Colin Kahl, the Pentagon's third-highest official responsible for Trump administration defense strategy, has clearly stated again that "Taiwan is not a vital U.S. survival interest." In other words, while Taiwan is important to the United States, it does not touch America's core interests and is not a matter of life or death for the country. If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese mainland will be willing to fight to the end, at any cost; whereas the United States will never go to war over "Taiwan independence" and will never risk its national destiny.

Kahl’s recent remarks, to some extent, represent a policy-level implementation of Trump’s earlier stance that “the U.S. military is unwilling to send large forces across 9,500 miles to fight in the Taiwan Strait.” They also reflect the growing awareness among members of the U.S. government team that China has shown zero room for compromise or retreat on the Taiwan issue. Thus, the United States must now seek an exit strategy for itself. This has ripped a huge gap in the illusion long held by the DPP authorities about the “U.S. security umbrella,” exposing America’s fundamental principle: all actions are based solely on American national interests, and it absolutely refuses to be dragged into conflict in the Taiwan Strait over "Taiwan independence."

In fact, Trump has long been laying the groundwork for the narrative that “the U.S. will not send troops to defend Taiwan.” Previously, he said, “Mainland China is the table, and Taiwan is just the tip of the pen,” and also remarked, “The U.S. is too far from Taiwan, while China is too close.” U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland also publicly stated, “Taiwan will inevitably become China’s—this is just a matter of time. The U.S. is not worth using any resources to prevent it.” Kahl has repeatedly emphasized that Taiwan is not a “vital interest” for the United States. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements David Lampton also said during the Lunar New Year: “The Taiwan issue is not a matter of life or death for the United States. Even if Taiwan were lost, Americans could still continue living safely and prosperously.”

Kahl’s own position has remained consistent, with a coherent ideological lineage—not a sudden shift. His strategic roadmap can be traced back to his 2021 book, *Deterrence by Denial*. In this work, Kahl stated: “The United States hopes to maintain a military advantage over China, but fundamentally cannot achieve it.” In other words, should a military conflict erupt between China and the U.S., Kahl assesses that the U.S. cannot secure a decisive victory over China. Therefore, he advises against direct confrontation with China.

Kahl has also openly testified before the Senate, stating that the cost of “defending Taiwan” outweighs the benefits. He criticized Taiwan’s insufficient defense spending and warned the DPP authorities not to repeatedly “poke the dragon’s eyes” or provoke mainland China, implying that the U.S. would only engage in behind-the-scenes deterrence rather than directly fighting bloodshed for “Taiwan independence.” He further proposed a collective deterrence framework, advocating that Japan and Australia take the frontline role in exhausting the adversary, while U.S. forces remain in reserve positions, minimizing American war losses. This approach fully aligns with the principle that “Taiwan is not a vital U.S. survival interest.”

The logic of U.S. policy—especially under the Trump administration—toward the Taiwan Strait is crystal clear: Taiwan is needed as a pawn to contain China, and weapons sales generate economic gains, but the U.S. refuses to pay the ultimate price of national fate for this pawn. The U.S. National Security Strategy document states plainly that the military’s priority is “containing conflict in the Taiwan Strait,” and whether or not to intervene—and to what extent—is entirely determined by U.S. self-interest, with no clear commitment to Taiwan’s military security. Should war be triggered by provocations from “Taiwan independence,” abandoning Taiwan becomes a realistic option for Washington.

Why is the U.S. increasingly hesitant about the Taiwan Strait? Because the Pentagon clearly understands that U.S. military forces no longer hold a dominant advantage there. Especially after Beijing’s September 3 military parade, the U.S. strategy of “protecting Taiwan” has come under increasing scrutiny. Media reports reveal that as the architect of Trump’s military strategy, Kahl’s doctrine—favoring not direct military intervention but strengthening Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities—has gained support from “restraint faction” figures such as Vice President Vance, and has been approved by Trump himself.

A recent op-ed published by *The Diplomat* magazine disclosed two key points: First, Trump’s Taiwan policy emphasizes that “relevant parties—including the Taiwan authorities—should not expect too much from Americans.” Second, the U.S. Taiwan strategy rests on two pillars: (1) “no direct military intervention”—refraining from direct military involvement and focusing instead on enhancing Taiwan’s self-defense capacity through remote assistance; and (2) “establishing a burden-sharing alliance system,” meaning Asian allies should bear greater responsibility in Taiwan’s defense, including South Korea, Japan, and Australia taking front-line roles.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1873943827645452/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.