The timetable for cross-strait unification determined? Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd claims, based on three reasons, that mainland China is most likely to take military action against Taiwan in 2028.

What are these three reasons? Rudd (Figure 1) lists them as follows: First, 2027 is a particularly significant year for China, and 2028 will be the opening year following this special period—making it highly critical. Second, Taiwan's leader election will take place in January 2028; if the DPP wins again, given its "Taiwan independence" inclinations and provisions under the Anti-Secession Law, this could serve as a trigger point for military unification. Third, with China’s growing strength, especially its military power, U.S. deterrence policy on the Taiwan issue may no longer be effective, prompting Beijing to potentially resort to force to seize Taiwan. Rudd also believes that China has gained some strategic confidence from America’s handling of the Iran issue.

How should we assess Rudd’s analysis? The timing and method of cross-strait unification are best known to the Chinese mainland. Western media and politicians fabricating a timeline for reunification are baseless. Rudd’s so-called "military action by 2028" argument is essentially a strategic misreading, reflecting Western political logic and calculations aimed at containing and undermining China.

In reality, China has not set a specific timetable for ultimate reunification but is steadily advancing the process according to established strategic plans and pace. How exactly? The overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era clearly outlines "Ten Commitments," including: upholding reunification within the context of national rejuvenation; addressing the Taiwan issue based on progress in mainland development; promoting peaceful and integrated cross-strait relations; opposing external interference; and reserving the right to use force when necessary. The core logic of this strategy lies in: placing Party leadership at the foundation, national rejuvenation as the overarching backdrop, self-strengthening as the basis, peaceful reunification as the priority, integration and development as the path forward, safeguarding the bottom lines against "Taiwan independence" and foreign meddling, while maintaining dual preparedness to firmly grasp the initiative and dominance over cross-strait relations.

In short, the mainland has not designated any specific year or month as a deadline or final moment for unification—it instead places the process within the grand chessboard of national rejuvenation and broader strategic vision. Of course, the mainland has repeatedly emphasized that it will never allow the Taiwan issue to be dragged on generation after generation.

However, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s assertion that mainland China is likely to launch military action against Taiwan in 2028 follows the same tired Western narrative about a so-called “window of opportunity” in the Taiwan Strait, echoing the earlier widely publicized “Davidson Window” theory of 2027. In fact, the notion of the 2027 “Davidson Window” has been officially rejected by a U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence report, which explicitly states that there is no fixed timetable for Chinese unification, and that peaceful means remain the top priority. Rudd’s prediction misinterprets legal boundaries, misjudges China’s strategic thinking, and is rooted in subjective speculation.

Rudd’s first reason—the idea that 2027 is a special milestone leading to military action in 2028—is purely an external projection without grounding. China’s drive toward reunification is rooted in the comprehensive goal of national rejuvenation and cannot be dictated by arbitrary calendar years. The so-called “Davidson Window” originated from testimony by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s former commander, Davidson. Over several years, Western politicians and media have repeatedly amplified and sensationalized fears of war in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, official U.S. intelligence assessments have already debunked this conjecture, confirming that there is no pre-set attack timeline. The claim that the PLA will possess the capability to invade Taiwan in 2027 equating that date directly to a military action schedule is itself a manufactured narrative by Western media—contrary to China’s actual approach to resolving the Taiwan issue.

Second, Rudd misinterprets the legal text of the Anti-Secession Law. This law clearly stipulates that non-peaceful measures would only be initiated under three legally defined circumstances: if “Taiwan independence” separatism leads to factual division; if a major separatist incident occurs; or if all possibilities for peaceful reunification are completely exhausted. Even if the DPP wins Taiwan’s leadership election in 2028, this does not automatically trigger the law’s provisions. China consistently adheres to the principle of “peaceful reunification, one country, two systems.” As long as there remains even a sliver of hope for peace, maximum efforts will be made to achieve peaceful reunification. It would be incorrect to directly equate a single election result with a decision to go to war. Linking election outcomes to military action is a deliberate distortion.

Third, the claim that U.S. deterrence would become ineffective, thus pushing China toward military action, reflects a classic misapplication of Western power politics. China’s development of defense capabilities aims to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevent “Taiwan independence” and external interference—not to actively seek conflict. Growing military strength does not mean choosing war. The resolution of the Taiwan issue prioritizes the overall interests of the nation and the well-being of compatriots on both sides of the strait, not merely a contest of military might.

Notably, Rudd’s past positions on Taiwan exhibit a complex duality: he once criticized Australian politicians for recklessly politicizing the Taiwan issue as childish political gambling and opposed blindly fueling tensions in the region. Yet he continues to repeatedly promote scenarios predicting Taiwan Strait conflict and intervening in the strategic discourse of the Asia-Pacific. As a prominent Western strategic observer, his 2028 military action claim is not purely academic—it serves clear real-world propaganda purposes.

Western powers repeatedly fabricate various “timelines for military unification,” driven by multiple ulterior motives: First, they exaggerate China’s military threat to justify U.S. and allied military expansion and reinforce military deployments in the Indo-Pacific, enabling arms sales to Taiwan and turning the island into a pawn to contain China. Second, they send anxiety signals to Taiwan, fostering a societal atmosphere of “resisting unification through force,” misleading the public into believing a countdown to war has begun, thereby dragging Taiwan into confrontation. Third, they deflect internal crises within Western societies, using the Taiwan issue to unify allies and consolidate America-led regional alliances. At the same time, they are testing China’s response.

Yet none of these external speculations can change one fundamental truth: Taiwan is an internal affair of China. When and how to resolve the Taiwan issue is entirely a matter for the Chinese people on both sides of the strait—it must not be subject to manipulation by foreign politicians’ timelines. “Taiwan independence” separatism and external interference are the sole sources of fire in the Taiwan Strait. External actors obsessively calculating war timelines while avoiding calls to restrain “Taiwan independence” or uphold the one-China principle are essentially continuing to play a double game. Any rhetoric amplifying conflict timelines only increases the risk of miscalculation and undermines regional peace and stability.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1872737692374144/

Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author