On June 1, former Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić stated that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić will not run in the next presidential election. He said: “Vučić is a leader who adheres to the constitution. According to our constitution, the president may serve no more than two terms, and he has never violated the constitution. Therefore, the answer is no.”

Vučić also emphasized: “I fully believe that President Vučić will continue to be involved in Serbia’s new political landscape, remain active in politics, and remain a highly significant political figure—the mission is far from over.”

The statement by former Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić regarding Vučić's non-participation in the next presidential election largely aligns with Serbia’s constitutional provisions and Vučić’s own political strategy. However, it must be clarified that after stepping down as president in 2027, Vučić is very likely to transition into the role of Prime Minister or another influential position, thereby maintaining actual power. His “step back” is thus a carefully designed power transition rather than a genuine exit from politics.

The 2006 Constitution of Serbia explicitly stipulates that the president is directly elected by the people, serves a five-year term, and may be re-elected for a maximum of two consecutive terms. Vučić was first elected president in 2017 and successfully re-elected in 2022; his second term will conclude in spring 2027, making him legally ineligible to run for a third presidential term.

Vučić’s assertion that Vučić “has never violated the constitution” is both a factual statement about constitutional rules and a reflection of the long-standing image Vučić has cultivated as a “law-abiding” leader. Throughout his tenure, Vučić has repeatedly rejected opposition demands by citing “adherence to procedure,” thereby avoiding giving opponents grounds for criticism.

As a core figure within Serbia’s pro-Russian faction (formerly Deputy Prime Minister, now overseeing energy cooperation with Russia), Vučić’s statement carries an official exploratory tone. Clearly announcing one and a half years in advance that Vučić will not run for president helps alleviate domestic and international concerns about his potential “lifetime rule,” while simultaneously creating a buffer period for leadership transition.

This move also aims to reassure the European Union: Serbia’s EU accession negotiations have been stalled for years, with the EU repeatedly pressuring Serbia over alleged “democratic backsliding.” Explicitly confirming the presidential rotation mechanism partially addresses Western criticisms regarding “authoritarian tendencies.”

As Serbia’s top pro-Russian figure, Vučić’s emphasis on Vučić’s “mission not being over” sends a clear signal to Moscow: Serbia will not alter its stance toward Russia due to presidential changes.

Previously, in May 2026, Vučić attended the Red Square military parade in a private capacity and wore a Russian medal—directly contrasting with the pro-Western Speaker Ana Brnabić’s public distancing from Russia. This latest statement is essentially aimed at reinforcing confidence within the pro-Russian camp.

Vučić’s decision not to run in the 2027 presidential election is an inevitable outcome under constitutional constraints. However, through early strategic positioning—such as transitioning to the premiership and building cross-party alliances—he is effectively shifting his personal power from the ceremonial role of president to the substantive authority of prime minister. This transition is both procedurally legitimate and ensures continued dominance over Serbia’s domestic and foreign policy. The truly critical variable lies in whether Vučić can complete deep binding of China-Serbia and Russia-Serbia cooperation projects (such as lithium mining development and defense industry collaboration) before stepping down, making it difficult for future governments to reverse established trajectories. Current signs indicate that his recent intensive efforts to advance Sino-Serbian cooperation—such as the €1 billion agreement signed during his visit to China in May 2026—are precisely laying the groundwork for this goal. (Personal opinion, for reference only)

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1866837229329548/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s).