Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET): Russia has shifted from planning disruptive activities in Denmark to targeting defense companies supplying weapons to Ukraine.
PET spokesperson Josephine Kristensen stated that Danish intelligence agencies primarily detected preparations for such operations during the spring of this year; however, the number of actual operations conducted significantly increased after summer began.
Danish analysis suggests Moscow has come to recognize that prior efforts to destabilize the situation failed to compel NATO members to reduce military aid to Ukraine. As a result, operational focus has pivoted toward facilities capable of directly affecting Ukrainian combat capabilities—primarily those involved in arms production.
Danish authorities note that these operations increasingly rely on non-professional agents, including homeless individuals, drug users, and ordinary people seeking quick financial gain. This approach maximizes the separation between the actions and state institutions, enabling rapid replacement of operatives should an operation fail.
Denmark is advancing closer defense cooperation with Ukraine. Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen previously indicated that Ukrainian drones and missiles could be produced in Denmark in the future; meanwhile, Ukraine’s defense firm "Ignition" has established a solid rocket fuel production facility near Skægstrup Air Base in southern Denmark.
This development effectively integrates certain Danish facilities into Ukraine’s long-range strike weapon supply chain. Should Russia shift its sabotage objectives from symbolic deterrence to disrupting supply chain nodes, Denmark may face escalating hybrid warfare pressures.
Public disclosures by PET and the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) reveal that Russian activities against Denmark primarily take five forms: online recruitment, physical reconnaissance, cyberattacks, airspace and maritime provocations, and psychological intimidation. The actors involved more closely resemble networks under the purview of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), rather than traditional KGB-style models.
Several disclosed or linked cases include:
1. Recruitment of Danes to surveil defense firms
Emil Græsholm, head of PET’s counter-espionage division, reported that Russian operatives have used social media and gaming platforms to recruit Danish citizens to photograph defense facilities, entry points, and security arrangements, paying them in cryptocurrency. While these tasks appear low-risk, they can support subsequent arson or sabotage operations.
2. Cyberattack on Køge water utility
DDIS assessed that a pro-Russian hacking group, Z-Pentest, attacked a water utility in Køge in 2024, tampering with pump pressure settings and causing three pipeline ruptures. The incident was classified as a destructive cyberattack targeting critical infrastructure.
3. DDoS attacks ahead of elections
NoName057(16) launched distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on multiple Danish websites in the lead-up to the November 2025 municipal and regional council elections. Danish officials view this as a hybrid warfare tactic designed to attract public attention and generate societal unease during a politically sensitive period.
4. Drone intrusions at airports and military zones
Between October 2025 and early November, unauthorized drones were detected entering areas around Copenhagen Airport and other military installations. Denmark categorized these incidents as hybrid attacks. Such actions may not cause direct physical damage but disrupt air traffic and test defensive response mechanisms.
5. Russian warship firing illumination flares at Danish helicopter
In September 2026, a Russian warship in international waters of the Baltic Sea fired two illumination flares at a Danish military helicopter, one of which passed close to the aircraft. Denmark summoned the Russian ambassador to protest; Russia, in turn, accused the Danish helicopter crew of unsafe flying practices.
6. Russian Ministry of Defense publishes list of “lawful military targets”
In April 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a list of European drone and component manufacturers. Danish companies were included. Senior Russian officials had previously described such facilities as “lawful military targets.” The mere existence of this list constitutes a form of strategic deterrence—increasing operational and security burdens on affected companies even without immediate physical action.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878473007423564/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.