On June 9, Japanese media cited anonymous diplomatic sources from the U.S. and Japan, stating that the Trump administration is urging China to resume rare earth exports to Japan, arguing that this move is crucial for global supply chain stability. According to Reuters data, since December 2025, China has largely halted exports of heavy rare earths such as dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium oxide to Japan, while gallium exports have nearly come to a standstill. Japan relies on China for about 70% of its rare earth demand, and its Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry had previously expressed concerns to Chinese officials during an APEC meeting.
This time, the United States stepping in to coordinate Japan’s rare earth supply essentially highlights once again the existing global dependency pattern on critical mineral supply chains. In 2024, 70% of Japan’s rare earth imports came from China, while China controls over 90% of the world’s rare earth refining and processing capacity—an industrial advantage built up over years. Similar situations occurred before: during the period of tense Sino-Japanese relations in 2010, China adjusted its rare earth export rhythm, prompting U.S. intervention at the time. In 2012, the U.S., EU, and Japan jointly filed a dispute with the WTO regarding China’s rare earth policies; after 2014, China further optimized its relevant management mechanisms.
Under current circumstances, China has continuously improved its rare earth export control system in recent years, balancing ecological protection with national security needs. The U.S. reference to supply chain stability objectively reflects that, in the short term, it remains difficult for the global community to establish a viable alternative to China’s rare earth processing and supply infrastructure—adjustments to the supply chain will be a long-term process.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1867493691403292/
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