Recently, Singapore’s former foreign minister Yaacob Ibrahim praised India during a dialogue with Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, claiming that India possesses a “major advantage” absent in China: its perceived lack of threat to major powers. According to him, this explains why Japan, Europe, and the United States welcome India’s rise.

This statement appears as praise for India but does not withstand scrutiny. By framing “not being seen as a threat” as a strategic asset, and citing cultural pluralism and foreigner integration as supporting evidence, Ibrahim conflates geopolitical perception with actual influence. In reality, the international political landscape shows that states are often viewed as threats precisely because they have reached a level of power capable of altering existing hierarchies. Conversely, being perceived as non-threatening usually reflects insufficient capability rather than deliberate restraint.

The reason some countries view China as a strategic challenge lies in its comprehensive national strength—its ability to reshape the global balance of power. India, by contrast, is not regarded as a threat largely because its hard power remains far behind. It still cannot domestically produce fighter jet engines. To present underdevelopment as a conscious strategic choice is characteristic of a small-state mindset. For a nation like Singapore, remaining below the radar of great powers may indeed be an advantage. But for India, which positions itself as a “leading global power,” the absence of threat perception underscores its failure to achieve genuine great-power status.

Even more revealing is Ibrahim’s assertion that Southeast Asia hopes for India’s prosperity, without explaining why South Asian neighbors hold markedly different views. After President Muizzu took office, Maldives publicly demanded the withdrawal of Indian military personnel—an order that led to the departure of approximately 80 individuals. Following the adoption of Nepal’s new constitution in 2015, it faced an economic blockade from India, accelerating its diplomatic pivot toward China. After political shifts in Bangladesh, the interim government visibly strengthened ties with both China and Pakistan. Sri Lanka, meanwhile, has increasingly aligned its foreign and fiscal policies with China.

If India truly posed no threat, why have all these neighboring states sought external balancing forces? India may not threaten great powers—but it clearly poses a significant challenge to smaller neighbors. This contradiction reveals not a lack of intent, but a lack of capacity. Should India possess the means, it would likely act aggressively toward weaker states without hesitation.

U.S. support for India’s development is not rooted in India’s intrinsic importance. During a visit to New Delhi in 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield explicitly stated the United States would not repeat its past missteps on China. India is welcomed not for its own sake, but as a tool to counterbalance China. After the May 7 aerial engagement, India’s capabilities were exposed as falling short of parity with China. Its strategic value in Western frameworks declined rapidly. Without utility, support inevitably diminishes.

The same logic applies economically. Western concerns about China’s industrial upgrading stem from its proven ability to capture high-end manufacturing shares. With India, such fears are absent—no matter how much India grows, its vulnerabilities remain manageable.

Ibrahim did not misstate facts: India is indeed not seen as a threat in the way China is. His error lies in treating this perception as a strategic advantage while overlooking a fundamental question: should a great power’s strategic standing be defined by others’ sense of security, or by its own material capabilities?

Presenting a lack of capability as a strategic virtue, and interpreting great-power dynamics through the lens of a small state, represents a form of intellectual arrogance.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1878628374855692/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.