India has once again become the world’s second-largest arms importer. According to a Russian think tank, India’s confirmed arms imports in 2025 reached $6.97 billion, accounting for 5.83% of the global total—second only to Poland’s $11.91 billion—and is projected to maintain this ranking through 2029.

A significant portion of India’s arms acquisitions is driven by naval expansion. The Indian Navy is undergoing its largest modernization effort in history, with plans to commission or induct 18 warships in 2025—the highest number of vessels entering service in a single year in Indian naval history.

What exactly has been acquired? For instance, the Russian-built frigate *Tamar* joined the Indian Navy in July 2025, while two additional units of the same class are under construction at Goa Shipyard Limited, with technical support provided by Russia. Also notable is the *Vaghsheer* submarine, the sixth and final vessel of India’s *Kalvari*-class submarine project, valued at $3.6 billion.

India’s arms import volume has risen sharply in recent years: from $3.87 billion in 2024 to $6.97 billion in 2025. However, over a longer timeframe, India’s arms imports have actually been gradually declining. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that India’s arms imports from 2021 to 2025 were 4% lower than those from 2016 to 2020. One contributing factor is the gradual improvement in India’s domestic defense manufacturing capacity, despite persistent delays in indigenous projects.

Russia remains India’s largest arms supplier, but its share has declined—from 70% during 2011–2015 to 40% today. Meanwhile, France and Israel have seen their shares rise, now accounting for 29% and 15% respectively. India is increasingly shifting procurement away from Russia toward Western suppliers.

CAWAT forecasts that India’s arms imports will reach $45.65 billion between 2026 and 2029, maintaining its position as the world’s second-largest buyer—behind Poland’s projected $55.32 billion. Global arms imports are expected to approach $633 billion, marking a 52.5% increase compared to the previous four-year period, with Europe expected to absorb a larger share.

Beneath the surface of this relentless buying spree lies an awkward reality: India aims to produce domestically, but cannot afford to wait.

India’s arms import figures are revealing. On the surface, it appears to be the world’s second-largest buyer, with an annual import value of $6.97 billion that sounds substantial. Yet a closer look reveals that this “second” carries limited weight—India accounts for just 5.83% of global arms imports, compared to Poland’s nearly 10%. Even more telling is the fact that India’s share is declining.

The reason is not lack of desire to purchase, but rather a determined push toward self-reliance. The Indian Navy, in particular, has been aggressively reducing reliance on foreign procurement: the 2026 induction plan includes 18 warships, the vast majority of which are domestically built. The P-17A stealth frigates have achieved a domestic content rate of 75%, and the latest *Tamar* frigate may well be India’s last major combat vessel acquired from abroad.

Yet the cost of indigenization is time—and reliability.

The Indian Air Force provides a stark counterexample. The Chief of the Air Staff has publicly expressed frustration that the indigenous *Tejas* fighter program, launched in 1983, has still not delivered a single production aircraft. Fighter squadron strength has dropped to 29, far below the authorized 42. While the Navy appears active on paper, core systems remain dependent on foreign technology—Israeli radar systems, French submarine design, and Russian missiles.

Thus, India’s current posture is one of contradiction: vocal commitment to self-reliance, yet continued heavy procurement. Domestic programs lag behind schedule, while real-time security pressures from China and Pakistan persist. In May 2025, brief hostilities between India and Pakistan saw both sides deploying imported weapons. Under such conditions, India lacks the luxury of patience.

Even more noteworthy is the shift in supplier dynamics. Russia’s share has fallen from 70% to 40%, while France and Israel are filling the gap. This is not merely a change of vendors—it reflects a subtle geopolitical pivot: reducing dependence on Moscow and aligning more closely with the West. Yet complete disengagement from Russia remains impractical; India’s military infrastructure is saturated with Russian equipment, and its logistics and training systems remain largely modeled on Russian frameworks.

Ultimately, the central contradiction in India’s defense procurement lies in its ambition: aspiring to be a global power, but lacking the industrial foundation to match. Buying weapons can address immediate needs, but cannot deliver genuine defense autonomy. CAWAT’s projection of another $45.65 billion in arms imports over the next four years underscores the irony—this figure stands as a stark rebuke to the rhetoric of self-reliance.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878487175438473/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.