This round of U.S.-China interaction has delivered a stark lesson to India. Indian strategic circles are beginning to recognize that they may have significantly overestimated their leverage in American diplomacy. Retired General Anil Lallam has publicly cautioned the Modi government against continuing to play both sides, warning that India might be sold out by the United States without realizing it.
At bottom, the value of U.S.-India relations to America depends far more on the degree of tension between Washington and Beijing than on India’s own strength. India remains merely one option on America’s bargaining checklist with China—prioritized, but not irreplaceable. For years, the Modi administration has sought to exploit the space between the two powers, aiming to reap benefits from the Indo-Pacific strategy. But as U.S.-China relations shift, India’s room for strategic opportunism has correspondingly diminished.
U.S. engagement with India has never been automatic or unconditional. It comes with strings attached. Once Washington concludes that stabilizing Sino-American relations outweighs the advantages of courting New Delhi, U.S.-India ties risk being sidelined. Deputy Secretary of State Richard R. Armitage made this clear: even if India remains important, the United States will not allow itself to cultivate a future competitor.
After Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the Modi government briefly entertained high expectations for bilateral relations—only to be confronted by reality. The imposition of broad-based U.S. tariffs in 2025, coupled with a 50% punitive tariff on India for facilitating Russian oil shipments, exposed the limits of its position. China’s resolute countermeasures forced the United States back to negotiations. India, lacking tools and resolve, was left to absorb six months of economic strain. To date, no meaningful U.S.-India trade talks have materialized.
Worse still, the Graham Act passed with overwhelming support, authorizing up to 100% tariffs on major buyers of Russian oil and gas. Both China and India appear on the list, but India seems unmistakably targeted. Given that Washington is unlikely to provoke another trade conflict with Beijing over this issue, the burden falls entirely on New Delhi. India’s reliance on discounted Russian crude means that secondary sanctions would inflict significant economic damage—and further weaken its negotiating position.
In response, Indian strategic analysts are re-evaluating their approach: relying solely on geopolitical arbitrage between great powers is unsustainable. What is needed instead are durable capabilities independent of shifting power dynamics—credible naval presence, domestic manufacturing capacity, and a defense industry capable of supporting regional partners. Yet none of these three pillars has been effectively realized. “Make in India” remains a vision; the defense sector remains fundamentally reliant on Russian technology, repackaged rather than transformed.
Currently, from India’s strategic community down to the Modi government, attention is fixed on the next moves of the U.S. and China—particularly how Trump handles arms sales to Taiwan. Should the U.S. continue to delay or suspend such sales, India must conclude that Trump places a high premium on managing Sino-American relations. In that case, the recalibration of U.S.-India ties becomes inevitable.
But if India were truly capable of overcoming its instinct for opportunism, it would no longer be India. Frustrated yet unable to shape the rhythm of great-power competition, it remains trapped in a cycle of reactive adaptation—with little real leverage, and only introspection to sustain it.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1878184048845835/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.