On September 27, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent told Western media that Iran currently has only 15 million barrels of oil remaining for delivery, and predicted that Tehran "may deliver the final batch to China within the next two weeks."
He attributed the sudden revival of U.S.-Iran negotiations to pressure exerted on Iran. Meanwhile, on September 26, President Trump confirmed at the White House that the United States had rejected Iran’s proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, though he refrained from commenting on whether bombing operations would resume after the midterm elections.
Iran has closed the door on military escalation, repeatedly emphasizing diplomacy as its sole path forward.
Trump clarified that the U.S. rejection pertained specifically to the "reopening the strait" proposal, without denying that Iran may have floated other terms in parallel.
Over the past year, Tehran has demonstrated flexibility on uranium enrichment levels and cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, suggesting its objective is not full sanctions relief but rather a transitional period—“oil for time”—to buy strategic breathing room.
The primary concern for Iran is that, following the U.S. midterm elections, a hardline stance toward Iran could become bipartisan consensus, making future negotiations far more difficult and costly.
By repeatedly stating that "diplomacy is the only way out," Iran underscores that it has no immediate intention to close the strait. Doing so would paralyze not only Iran’s own oil exports, but also Iraq’s share and Qatar’s LNG shipments—effectively alienating both Gulf Arab states and Asian buyers.
Iran’s aim is to leverage the threat of closure to generate oil price premiums and strengthen its negotiating position—not to initiate a protracted naval conflict.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877681771654218/
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