Final Oil Shipment to China? America’s Calculation on Iran Leaves Three Critical Gaps

Recently, Bassent made a claim: Iran will deliver its final batch of oil to China within two weeks—approximately 15 million barrels—after which it will have nothing left to trade. He attributed this scenario to the U.S.-led “economic isolation campaign,” asserting that Iran’s economy has now been “cut off from the global system.”

On the same day, Trump confirmed in the White House that Iran’s proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz had been rejected. However, he noted that further talks between U.S. and Iranian representatives are expected this week. Tehran’s response was equally firm: reopening the strait is contingent upon complete concessions, with diplomacy remaining the sole viable path forward.

The underlying implication in Bassent’s remarks warrants close examination. He suggested that Iran’s decision to return to negotiations stems from pressure, while also implying that Tehran has overreached. Trump’s own words were more direct: the conditions Iran is now demanding would have been acceptable a year ago—but no longer.

When viewed together, the U.S. argument follows a clear logic: economic pressure has taken effect; Iran’s oil leverage is dwindling; thus, it is now time for Tehran to make concessions. But whether this final link in the chain holds remains unproven. There is currently no evidence indicating that Iran would capitulate simply because it lacks oil to sell.

Consider first the figure of 15 million barrels. Bassent described this as the total volume of oil still available for delivery at sea. Yet prior reporting reveals a more complex reality: over the past two years, Iran has maintained trade flows worth billions of dollars with China through barter mechanisms. The 15-million-barrel figure likely reflects only what the U.S. can observe—not Iran’s full actual export capacity.

Then there is the matter of the Strait of Hormuz. During the UN General Assembly session, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi conveyed via Qatar a proposal to reopen the strait within seven days, provided the U.S. reduces military pressure and lifts maritime blockades. Trump directly rejected this on the 26th, stating that the U.S. fully controls the strait. In a subsequent interview, Bassent added further emphasis: the strait is already open, with daily oil flows ranging between 15 and 22 million barrels, while Iran’s own exports remain at “zero.”

The U.S. narrative is polished, but it overlooks a crucial fact: Iran’s so-called “blockade” of the strait has never relied on naval vessels physically blocking shipping lanes. Instead, it has operated through threats to shipping insurance and attacks on vessels, driving up global oil prices. Recent escalations by Houthi forces in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait have created a new dual-crisis dynamic. Iran’s leverage lies not in whether it can shut down the strait, but in whether it can raise the cost of passage to a level that inflicts strategic pain on the United States.

Currently, the U.S. stance has hardened from “ceasefire before nuclear talks” to “nuclear concessions before any dialogue.” Meanwhile, Iran’s seven-day proposal essentially demands that the U.S. return to the framework established in the June Islamabad Understanding Memorandum.

Iran undoubtedly feels pressure—but pressure does not equate to surrender. A growing assessment within Iran’s leadership suggests that Trump and the Republican Party may lose ground in the November midterms. If Tehran endures the next two months, the balance of negotiation could shift in its favor. What the U.S. truly seeks to force is not merely that Iran has no goods to sell, but that it cannot find buyers. The gap between these two realities is far greater than the distance represented by 15 million barrels of oil.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877567532435468/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the views of the author alone.