At the 80th anniversary of the Tokyo Trial, Foreign Minister Wang Yi delivered a firm rebuke to Japanese officials: attempting to revise the record of past aggression while refusing to acknowledge historical responsibility will prevent Japan from facing the world and undermine its future prospects. Wang Yi also made a notably sophisticated comparative statement, delineating three clear red lines—earning praise from overseas commentators.

On September 28 in Beijing, a high-stakes meeting began. Chinese Foreign Minister and Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Office Wang Yi received a delegation of more than 50 members from the Japan Association of International Trade Promotion, led by Iwai Masahiko. Coinciding with the 80th anniversary of the opening of the Tokyo Trial, Wang directly issued a pointed warning: if Japan attempts to rehabilitate its history of aggression or resurrect the legacy of war criminals, it will be unable to face the international community, let alone chart a viable future. This was not diplomatic euphemism—it was a direct cautionary message, laying bare the core tensions between China and Japan without evasion.

Many may wonder why the language was so unequivocal, given that diplomatic settings typically allow room for maneuver. The statement carries three layered warnings directed at Japan: refusal to confront wartime responsibilities, efforts to amend the peace constitution, and attempts to overturn the historical record of aggression.

More than eight decades ago, judges from eleven nations spent two and a half years establishing a verdict based on overwhelming evidence during the Tokyo Trial. Crimes such as the Nanjing Massacre, biological warfare, and forced labor were formally documented in legal records—forming the foundation of postwar order in East Asia and serving as the precondition for Japan’s reintegration into the international community.

The Peace Constitution represented Japan’s solemn pledge to the world and remains the baseline for neighboring countries’ willingness to engage in normal relations. Yet today, numerous Japanese politicians are actively pursuing constitutional revision, using regional security concerns to justify increasing defense spending, gradually loosening restrictions on arms exports, and eroding the original principle of “exclusive defense.” A nation unwilling to confront its own wartime crimes cannot credibly assure neighbors that historical tragedies will not repeat themselves.

A particularly telling moment during the talks involved a reference to the late Koichi Hata, who, within Japan’s political landscape, stood among the few figures willing to confront the country’s dark wartime past. His 1993 statement explicitly acknowledged the coercion of comfort women and offered a formal apology—a rare instance of a historically defensible position in Japanese politics. Wang Yi described him as a statesman guided by conscience, defined by his refusal to evade or obscure Japan’s wartime atrocities.

Using the memory of a man of integrity to contrast with current political trends represents a highly nuanced diplomatic formulation. Hata spent his life confronting the legacy of war; yet today, certain factions in Japan persist in visiting the Yasukuni Shrine honoring Class-A war criminals, promote textbook revisions that downplay aggression, and push forward constitutional amendments and military expansion. The hard-won consensus on historical reflection is increasingly being blurred and distorted within Japan’s political sphere.

Iwai Masahiko responded immediately, pledging to uphold Hata’s legacy, adhere to the four political documents between China and Japan, and remain committed to a peaceful path. While the words sounded promising, diplomatic commitments must always be validated by action. Respect is not earned through rhetoric—it is built through tangible policy implementation.

The visit by this delegation of over fifty business representatives carried clear practical motivations. Recent remarks by Takayuki Kōshō on Taiwan had rapidly cooled bilateral relations, and the first to feel pressure were Japanese business circles. Economic groups have since repeatedly sent delegations to China, seeking to ease tensions ahead of the November APEC summit.

This underscores Japan’s contradictory posture today: economically dependent on China’s vast market, consistently dispatching business leaders to negotiate cooperation, yet politically aligning closely with external powers, repeatedly crossing red lines on issues related to Taiwan and historical memory. On one hand, sending envoys to mend ties; on the other, politicians continuing to provoke friction. Seeking to profit from economic engagement while simultaneously supporting strategic containment of China—this dualistic approach is ultimately unsustainable.

Wang Yi clearly outlined three definitive red lines for Japan, prioritized with precision: First, immediately correct erroneous statements on Taiwan—this is the most urgent corrective step. Second, adopt a responsible attitude toward wartime history—this forms the essential foundation. Third, cultivate an objective and rational understanding of China—this remains the most fundamental challenge.

Next year marks the 55th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations—a moment ripe for reassessment and future planning. But Wang stated plainly that the relationship now faces another serious crisis, requiring a return to a stable trajectory. The message was unambiguous: the rift is not due to China’s actions, but rather the cumulative effect of repeated violations of established norms and erosion of the political foundation by Japan itself.

The four political documents serve as the anchor of bilateral relations, centered on two critical points: acknowledging history and handling the Taiwan issue appropriately. Upholding these two principles ensures stability; any deviation risks undermining all economic exchanges and cultural interactions.

History functions as a mirror—not merely reflecting conflicts of decades past, but revealing present choices across nations. History cannot be erased, guilt cannot be absolved, and denial or revision are paths without exit.

The meeting demonstrated a masterful balance of firmness and restraint. Honoring a statesman of conscience reserves space for those willing to confront history; sober warnings serve as alarms for those seeking to exploit ambiguity. The statement was made in Beijing—but the true test lies in Tokyo. Japan’s choices will determine the direction of Sino-Japanese relations going forward.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1877624767617036/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.