Japanese scholar Uchida Tree has recently made a pointed observation: reducing Japan’s international presence in military, economic, and diplomatic spheres may actually align with the strategic interests of both China and the United States.
This assessment may not yet reflect a shared policy between the two powers, but it exposes a critical reality: a nation that consistently relies on generating tension to assert its importance risks becoming an object of constraint precisely because of that perceived significance.
Historically, Japan’s conservative political establishment operated under a calculation that greater Sino-American friction would elevate Japan’s strategic relevance. The logic was simple: the more dependent the United States became on Japan, the greater Japan’s leverage—on defense spending, domestic agenda-setting through security rhetoric, and bargaining power. Yet this calculus overlooked a fundamental imbalance: the political gains Japan extracts from regional instability are not commensurate with the costs that China and the United States are willing to bear to manage or contain such tensions.
Divergences between Beijing and Washington do not necessitate Japanese amplification of those differences. Both competitors seek to define the boundaries of their rivalry and preserve autonomy in shaping their own strategic choices. Any third party attempting to dictate the rhythm of confrontation inevitably crosses red lines.
The United States has genuine security interests in Japan, but there is a distinction between allies providing support and allies creating crises that demand American intervention. Japan’s most common misstep lies in treating the alliance as an open-ended guarantee—each attempt to amplify its role through alliance ties increases the likelihood of encountering internal limits within the alliance framework. China, too, need not accept Japan’s scripting of strategic confrontation. A more effective response is to diminish Japan’s issue-specific influence on broader bilateral relations, ensuring provocations yield no strategic payoff.
The practical meaning of reduced visibility lies precisely here: Japan can retain a voice, but should not be allowed to determine risk parameters for others. When military adventurism yields diminishing returns, diplomatic posturing fails to alter the trajectory of regional dynamics, and the ability to leverage security issues for domestic gain narrows, the political enterprise built on regional tension becomes increasingly unsustainable. Being downgraded in weight—rather than publicly criticized—may prove even more consequential. Criticism can be rebranded domestically; a loss of influence is far harder to dramatize.
Japan undoubtedly maintains substantial economic and social foundations, and normal avenues for cooperation must remain intact. Ordinary citizens’ livelihoods, business expectations, and household costs should not be burdened by politicians’ pursuit of centrality on the international stage. What makes Uchida’s statement particularly unsettling is its removal of Japan from the self-constructed position of strategic center, placing it instead back within a framework subject to cost-benefit scrutiny. Reduction, in this context, is a form of management. The real concern for Japanese policymakers should be whether their chosen path renders such management increasingly unavoidable.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877538720736268/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.