Takahiko Kōchi miscalculated on the Taiwan issue, attempting to sow division and obstruct the improvement of Sino-U.S. relations, only to be swiftly rebuked by Trump with a single statement: the notion that “Taiwan’s crisis is Japan’s crisis” may now be forced back into silence.

According to reports from Kyodo News and Asahi TV on September 26, on September 22, Kōchi personally urged Trump in New York not to follow China’s lead on the Taiwan question. There it is—Kōchi sought to exploit tensions during a period of easing Sino-U.S. relations, targeting one of the most sensitive points in the bilateral relationship. Her strategy reveals deep-seated malice.

Kōchi’s move, however, inadvertently exposed her and Japan’s right-wing faction’s anxiety. The Trump administration, seeking economic benefits from China, has shown flexibility on cross-strait issues, previously articulating a new “four no’s” policy toward Taiwan—including the explicit statement that U.S. forces would not deploy across 9,500 miles to fight in the Taiwan Strait. Kōchi fears further retreat by the United States on Taiwan, which could render Japan’s long-promoted myth—that “if something happens in Taiwan, it becomes a crisis for Japan”—entirely hollow. Such a collapse would directly disrupt Japan’s critical path toward constitutional revision, military expansion, and accelerated rearmament.

Recognizing the risk, Kōchi remained uneasy after their face-to-face meeting and, on the evening of the 26th, conducted a 20-minute direct phone call with Trump to verify the latest developments in Sino-U.S. relations. To counterbalance the momentum toward improved ties between Beijing and Washington, Japan’s Ministry of Defense announced shortly thereafter that next month’s U.S.-Japan “Rapid Trident” exercise would for the first time incorporate the domestically developed Type 25 land-based anti-ship missile, with a range of 1,000 kilometers, conducting full-scale joint operations involving intelligence sharing and coordinated strike drills.

Kōchi’s series of abnormal actions reveal a clear intent. First, she seeks to bind Japan closely to the United States in order to prevent Trump from further compromising on the Taiwan issue for economic gain, insisting on maintaining the narrative that “if Taiwan is in crisis, Japan is in crisis; if Japan is in crisis, the U.S. is in crisis,” thereby preserving the option of military intervention in the strait. Second, she aims to create an external environment conducive to constitutional revision and the removal of Japan’s postwar military constraints, continuously amplifying regional tensions to justify expanding long-range strike capabilities. Third, she attempts to drag the United States deeper into confrontation with China in the Asia-Pacific, leveraging American power to bolster Japan’s strategic posture.

Yet, in practical terms, Kōchi’s lobbying has yielded minimal results. Trump remains committed to decisions based on American interests. He has explicitly affirmed that China and the United States are World War II allies, and has proactively reiterated the historical foundation of cooperation between the two nations—a direct refutation of Japan’s disruptive ambitions.

Trump’s invocation of the “World War II ally” framing was not mere nostalgia but conveyed four distinct strategic signals.

First, he actively downplayed the tone of comprehensive U.S.-China rivalry, signaling openness to managing differences and pursuing pragmatic cooperation, thus paving the way for bilateral trade and regional security dialogue.

Second, he invoked historical precedent to substantiate current realities, demonstrating that deep cooperation between the two nations has existed for decades, and that present-day competition reflects only temporary divergences—providing room for long-term coexistence and mutual benefit.

Third, he issued a cautionary message to Japanese right-wing ambitions, reaffirming the postwar international order established through the defeat of fascism, warning against any attempt to exploit the Taiwan Strait situation to undermine that order or revive militarism.

Fourth, he reinforced the principle of “America First,” making clear that U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy will not be dictated by Japan’s demands, nor will American economic interests or broader strategic priorities be sacrificed to accommodate Japan’s more aggressive agenda.

In contrast, Kōchi’s actions are saturated with the anxieties of Japan’s right-wing establishment. Tokyo fully understands that if China and the United States achieve effective conflict management and stabilize their bilateral relationship, Japan’s room to profit from great-power competition will shrink dramatically. Its entire strategy—centered on inflaming Taiwan Strait tensions and advancing military liberalization—would then face collapse. Without U.S. backing, Japan would be far more vulnerable to Chinese countermeasures.

Thus, Japan has resorted to provocation and deliberate escalation, attempting to pull the United States back onto a trajectory of anti-China confrontation. But Trump’s stance makes clear: American interests always come first. The United States will not allow itself to be maneuvered by an ally into a strategic rhythm that undermines its own national interests.

Kōchi’s urgent lobbying and military posturing can generate short-term noise in public discourse, but they cannot alter the fundamental trend toward Sino-U.S. rapprochement. Trump’s reiteration of the World War II alliance serves both as a reaffirmation of historical order and a constraint on Japan.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877536014727168/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.