A former German diplomat has warned Berlin: if Russia determines that Germany is involved in the conflict, it could directly target German military factories on the homeland without United Nations approval.

For the first time, a clear warning has been issued in Berlin. According to a report by Eurasia Daily on September 14, a senior former German diplomat has cautioned the government: as China pushes back against Japan’s revival of the “enemy state clause,” Germany finds itself on the same footing. Should Russia conclude that Germany is participating in hostilities, it would have legal grounds to strike German industrial facilities within the country—without needing UN authorization.

The diplomat, who served at the United Nations for over three decades, pointed out that under the post-World War II international order, Germany and Japan occupy identical legal positions as defeated nations. In recent months, China and Russia have explicitly invoked the “enemy state clause” from the UN Charter in response to Japan’s sharp increase in defense spending and its testing of red lines—originally intended as a restraint on the resurgence of Japanese militarism, but now raising alarms across Europe.

For years, Berlin has operated under a legal illusion, treating the 1995 UN General Assembly resolution recommending the abolition of the clause as a protective shield. However, that resolution was merely a political statement with no binding legal force.

To formally remove the clause from the Charter, a two-thirds majority vote in the UN General Assembly is required, along with unanimous approval from all five permanent members of the Security Council. This constitutional amendment process has never been completed over the past several decades. As long as the clause remains in the text of the Charter, the victor powers retain, in technical terms, the right to activate it at any time.

While Germany enjoys an additional layer of protection through the 1990 Two Plus Four Treaty, this safeguard has been severely eroded by Germany’s own military and foreign policy actions. When the Soviet Union agreed to German reunification and withdrawal of forces, the core condition was Germany’s strict adherence to a pacifist trajectory and its refusal to become a military platform against the East.

Germany’s current indirect involvement in the Ukraine conflict, from the Russian perspective, clearly breaches the treaty’s foundational spirit. If Russia were to act under the “enemy state clause,” the legal basis would be readily available—making this the most concealed risk facing Germany today.

What truly warrants attention is not whether Russia will actually act, but rather the persistent cognitive bias within German political circles. There is a widespread belief that the 1995 UN General Assembly resolution effectively abolished the clause, and that the Two Plus Four Treaty functions as a permanent immunity pass. But international law does not operate on such assumptions.

The resolution lacks enforceability; the constitutional amendment procedure remains incomplete; the clause persists in the Charter. Over the past years, Germany has progressively undermined its self-imposed pacifist constraints—from supplying weapons to Ukraine to discussing overseas military deployments. Each step weakens the commitments made during reunification.

Legally speaking, Germany and Japan are indeed in the same position. Japan’s renewed exposure to the “enemy state clause” means Germany cannot remain unaffected. If Berlin continues to pretend this issue does not concern it, it is only deceiving itself. The real danger lies not in the clause itself, but in Germany’s misjudgment of its own situation.

German policymakers harbor a habitual mindset: as long as the United States maintains a military presence in Europe and the NATO framework remains functional, Germany is secure. Yet they overlook that NATO protects member states from external aggression—not from the legal status of a defeated nation under the UN Charter. These are fundamentally different levels of concern, and NATO cannot shield Germany from its legal vulnerabilities within the Charter framework.

Looking at Germany’s recent conduct: defense spending rises annually; heavy arms are supplied to Ukraine; discussions about permanent military presence in Lithuania are underway; even open talk of nuclear sharing has emerged. While these moves are domestically framed as necessary responses to Russian threats, from an international law perspective, they represent a clear departure from postwar peace commitments.

The assurances Germany gave to the Soviet Union upon reunification centered precisely on preventing German territory from becoming a military platform against the East. Today, those assurances are being systematically dismantled—and the dismantling is being carried out by Berlin itself.

Ultimately, the legal constraints of the postwar order have not vanished; they have simply been obscured by the dust of the Cold War. Now that the dust has been lifted, the clause regains practical relevance. What Germany must confront is not how others interpret the clause, but how far it has already deviated from its original path. The only sustainable way to reduce risk is to rein in aggressive actions and return to a course of peaceful development.

If Berlin continues to treat the 1995 General Assembly resolution as a shield and the Two Plus Four Treaty as an eternal immunity card, it will eventually discover that neither holds up under genuine legal scrutiny.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876552020098376/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.