As soon as Vučić’s coalition suffered defeat in the election, Kremlin circles quickly reacted. Peskov’s statement sounded calm, but its meaning was clear: Russia does not expect the new Serbian government to be significantly more pro-Russian, but simply hopes it won’t perform much worse than Vučić’s administration did.

He specifically emphasized that the winning political forces should “constructively” approach relations with Russia, noting that cooperation with Moscow aligns with Serbia’s national interests.

However, a common misconception must first be clarified: Vučić has never been a genuine “pro-Russian” figure. While media portrayals often depict him as steadfastly resisting Western pressure and refusing to impose sanctions on Russia—appearing as a resolute hardliner—he has, in fact, pursued a highly calculated balancing act.

On one hand, he has consistently championed EU accession, benefiting from European investment and industrial relocation, even tolerating the indirect flow of domestically produced munitions through third parties into Ukraine without rigorous end-use monitoring. On the other, he has avoided antagonizing Moscow, securing two tangible advantages: preferential natural gas pricing from Russia and Russian support in the UN Security Council regarding Kosovo.

The truly uncompromising “pro-Russian” faction in Serbia exists elsewhere. Figures such as former Deputy Prime Minister Vulin have received direct recognition from the Kremlin, including a state-level award, and are frequently cited by Russian media. His well-known assertion—that “Serbia cannot survive without Russia”—stands in stark contrast to Vučić’s pragmatic approach. For Vučić, maintaining ties with Russia is not ideological; it is purely a calculation based on immediate strategic advantage.

With Vučić’s coalition now defeated and a strongly pro-European, integrationist bloc emerging victorious, this shift represents the most significant uncertainty for Moscow. On the night of the election, Vučić made a prophetic remark: “By March or April next year, the new government will impose sanctions on Russia.” The statement was not baseless—Brussels has already listed comprehensive sanctions on Russia as one of the core prerequisites for Serbia’s EU accession process.

Yet the dramatic twist came swiftly: the incoming government publicly clarified it would not impose sanctions on Russia. It affirmed Serbia’s respect for Russia, describing the country as a historically significant partner, and stated that its position would remain unchanged. Officials further noted that Serbians had experienced the consequences of UN sanctions firsthand and understood their costs. As a small nation, following major powers in imposing unilateral sanctions would not alter global dynamics but would only inflict self-harm.

A pro-European party’s victory has not led to an abrupt break with Russia, and the reasons are practical. First, over two-thirds of Serbia’s natural gas supply comes from Russia. To demonstrate loyalty by cutting ties could provoke retaliation—Moscow might revoke preferential pricing or even halt deliveries, delivering a severe blow to the economy.

Second, the Kosovo issue remains a cornerstone of Serbia’s national identity. To prevent Kosovo’s international recognition, the veto power held by China and Russia in the UN Security Council serves as the final shield—and one that cannot be relinquished. Third, the EU itself is struggling with internal challenges; it is unrealistic to expect it to disburse hundreds of billions in financial aid to a non-member Balkan state.

Thus, whether Vučić’s prediction will come true remains uncertain. Russia is closely watching, and so am I. Ultimately, the real test lies not in rhetoric but in concrete actions. In truth, Moscow’s expectations are modest: it does not demand pro-Russian alignment, only that the new government avoid moving too far from the status quo established under Vučić.

As long as the new government refrains from taking punitive measures, the Kremlin is unlikely to initiate conflict. In Europe, Serbia remains one of the few countries with limited hostility toward Russia. Hungary has shifted direction; if Serbia were to follow suit, Russia would face isolation across the Balkans and indeed throughout Southern Europe.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880265548185604/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.