The U.S. lunar nuclear power station project has been significantly scaled back, while China and Russia advance their plans steadily—marking a fundamental shift in the new race to the Moon.
Fifty years ago, the lunar race was about planting flags and leaving footprints; today’s competition centers on securing long-term control over valuable lunar resources.
The battleground is now fixed on the Moon’s south pole.
This region harbors scarce water ice—a resource far more than just H₂O. Once processed, it can yield oxygen and rocket fuel, serving as the essential lifeline for establishing a permanent lunar base.
But the Moon endures two-week-long nights, with temperatures plunging to minus 198 degrees Celsius. Solar panels cannot endure prolonged darkness. Nuclear power, therefore, stands as the only viable solution for sustained operation of a lunar outpost.
Whoever deploys a nuclear reactor first to the Moon will gain a decisive strategic advantage.
Originally, NASA aimed to deploy the first 100-kilowatt nuclear reactor on the Moon by the end of 2030.
However, due to repeated scaling down and persistent technical challenges, the current plan has been reduced to a mere 20-kilowatt system—barely sufficient to power a dozen households—with a shortened operational lifespan of just five years. Both scale and timeline have been compromised.
Multiple private U.S. companies are pursuing separate solutions, but progress remains uncertain and inconsistent.
In contrast, China and Russia’s joint International Lunar Research Station initiative proceeds with clarity and momentum.
Since formalizing cooperation in 2021, their roadmap has remained consistent: achieve crewed lunar landings and establish communication, exploration, and energy infrastructure before 2030; construct a lunar nuclear power station by 2040, followed by phased development of surface resources.
The synergy of this partnership is evident: China brings proven, reliable lunar landing systems—the Chang’e landers—along with high-thrust launch vehicles and extensive expertise in precision lunar missions; Russia inherits decades of Soviet-era expertise in space nuclear technology, having successfully launched over thirty space-based nuclear systems historically, giving it unique technical depth.
Their complementary strengths form the project’s most compelling foundation.
Another often-overlooked factor lies in the gray areas of space governance.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty explicitly prohibits any nation from claiming sovereignty over the Moon.
Yet nuclear reactors carry radiation risks, requiring designated exclusion zones around them for safety.
Once a reactor is deployed in a region rich in water ice at the south pole, the resulting safety buffer could effectively bar other spacecraft and landers from approaching that resource-rich area—even without formal territorial claims.
De facto control, rather than legal assertion, may be achieved through such measures—a dynamic that has drawn international concern.
Lunar exploration is no longer merely a matter of technological aspiration or national pride. It has evolved into a complex contest over energy, resources, and the rules governing outer space.
The lunar nuclear power station has thus become one of the most significant strategic assets in this new phase of space competition.
(Source: Dmitriy Kapustin, commentary from Russian Svpressa (Free Press); references to expert analysis from The New York Times and France Info. Content represents media analysis, not official position.)
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880066949302336/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author