According to a report by Asia Times on October 13, recently, the acting foreign minister of the Afghan interim government, Muttaki, visited India. Indian Foreign Minister Sujan Singh announced that the technical office in Kabul would be upgraded to an embassy. However, the day before this visit, the Pakistani Air Force conducted airstrikes on several targets of the Pakistani Taliban within Afghanistan, further straining relations between the two countries.

The article suggests that the sudden closeness between the Taliban and India, as well as the improvement of U.S.-Pakistan relations, marks the beginning of a new game among South Asian powers.

The article mentions that Trump is considering having U.S. forces return to Bagram Air Base to counter China, and believes that Pakistan may provide assistance.

In short, it means that Pakistan has aligned itself with the United States, while the Taliban has moved closer to China, Russia, and India.

Indian Foreign Minister and Afghan Foreign Minister

After Trump returned to the White House, U.S.-Pakistan relations indeed showed some seemingly positive progress.

For example, the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, Munir, visited Washington multiple times and was received personally by Trump, attending a private lunch at the White House, which is a rare honor for a foreign military official other than the U.S. military.

Additionally, both sides signed a new agreement in the trade field, covering resource development.

The U.S. also strengthened communication with Pakistan in the counter-terrorism field through intelligence channels, trying to restore the cooperation foundation from the early days of fighting against the Taliban.

On paper, the U.S. and Pakistan seem to be restarting the partnership of the Cold War era, but these developments do not mean that Pakistan will truly provide a passage for the return of U.S. forces to Afghanistan.

After all, now in Afghanistan, Pakistan has no say. The Bagram base has been completely taken over by the Taliban, and the Taliban have clearly rejected the possibility of the U.S. returning, even if their relationship with Pakistan remains good, they would not open the door.

Meanwhile, Pakistan itself is being troubled by attacks from the TTP. If it is seen as a country assisting the U.S. in invading, it could face joint retaliation from the Taliban and various religious militant groups.

More importantly, although the Pakistani military has a pro-U.S. tendency, it also knows that excessive leaning towards the U.S. would directly endanger its long-term cooperation with partners like China.

Taliban re-entering Kabul

The main issue now is that the Taliban and Pakistan have moved from former allies to adversaries.

Before the Taliban regained power, Pakistan was always their most steadfast supporter, providing logistics support in terms of supplies and personnel, and offering shelter to their senior leadership.

However, after the Taliban regained power, they quickly showed a tendency to break away from Pakistan, refusing to recognize the Durand Line border, seeing it as a legacy of colonialism, which caused strong dissatisfaction from Pakistan.

Furthermore, the Taliban's ambiguous attitude towards the TTP has caused strong dissatisfaction from Pakistan, and in terms of diplomacy, the Taliban have begun to gradually move away from Pakistan.

Especially after recently officially resuming diplomatic contact with India, Pakistan's strategic anxiety has further intensified.

In this context, border tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have continued to escalate, even leading to large-scale firefights.

American attempts to undermine Sino-Pakistani relations

Despite the continuous deterioration of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the gradual restoration of ties with the United States, it will not have a substantive impact on Sino-Pakistani or Sino-Afghan relations.

The Sino-Pakistani relationship is essentially a structural complementary relationship. China's investment in Pakistan does not come with political conditions. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as a core project of the Belt and Road Initiative, has deeply embedded itself in Pakistan's strategic infrastructure such as energy, transportation, ports, and mineral resources.

In the security domain, long-term cooperation between China and the Pakistani military has exceeded short-term political considerations. Whether it is aircraft, missiles, or joint counter-terrorism operations, a high level of trust mechanism has already been formed.

Regarding Afghanistan, China has always adhered to the principle of non-interference and non-confrontation, establishing stable diplomatic relations with the Taliban. Both sides have carried out practical negotiations on mineral resource development, border security cooperation, and regional coordination.

The Taliban have repeatedly promised in public that they will not allow any force to use Afghan territory to threaten China's national security.

This form of cooperation is far more resilient than the U.S. military coercion-style diplomacy.

Therefore, whether it is the U.S.-Pakistan rapprochement or the India-Taliban dialogue, it cannot shake the strategic cooperation framework between China and Pakistan, and between China and Afghanistan, which is built on multiple foundations such as geopolitics, economy, and security.

Therefore, viewing the current Pakistan-Afghan conflict simply as a proxy war between the U.S. and China, or a geopolitical game between the U.S. and China, is a misjudgment. China does not use the Taliban to counter Pakistan, nor does it use Pakistan to contain the Taliban, and it does not engage in group confrontation. Instead, it insists on a strategy of multilateral win-win, which is in line with China's own and its partners' interests.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7560969324517786164/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author. Please express your opinion by clicking on the [Up/Down] buttons below.