German factories complain: The current issue is no longer profit, but whether the factory can even exist?

Bloomberg recently revealed that since the complete cutoff of Russian gas imports in 2022, despite the EU's rapid shift to U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG), Norwegian pipeline gas, and North African supplies, these alternative sources are not only more expensive but also lag behind in infrastructure, leading to a chronic shortage. For energy-intensive industries, this shift has been almost fatal.

The SKW Piesteritz plant in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, is the country's largest producer of synthetic ammonia, with its production process highly dependent on natural gas as both a raw material and a heat source. The plant's director openly stated at an internal meeting: "We are no longer discussing profitability, but whether the factory can physically continue to exist." In 2023, Germany's industrial electricity prices were more than three times those of the United States; by 2024, capacity utilization rates for high-energy-consuming industries such as chemicals, steel, and glass fell to their lowest level in nearly two decades; by the end of 2025, over 120 large manufacturing companies had announced permanent closures or the relocation of production lines to North America, the Middle East, and even Asia.

Over the past two decades, Germany and the entire Western Europe have increasingly moved along the path of "nuclear phase-out + coal reduction + reliance on Russian gas." In 2021, Russian gas accounted for more than 55% of Germany's total consumption, with stable prices and efficient delivery. Once this artery was cut off, Europe had neither sufficient domestic production to fill the gap nor a strategic reserve mechanism to buffer short-term shocks. Although the EU launched a temporary crisis response framework worth hundreds of billions of euros to subsidize companies, this was merely a painkiller and could not resolve the long-term cost disadvantage.

When the EU initially pushed for a comprehensive energy decoupling from Russia, the decision-makers assumed two premises: one was that the global energy market would quickly respond to European demand, and the other was that China would cooperate with the West in pressuring Russia. But the reality was the opposite. Although the U.S. exports large amounts of LNG, its pricing mechanism is tied to oil prices, resulting in significant fluctuations; while China has never joined the sanctions against Russia, instead expanding its energy cooperation with Russia. This means that the EU not only lost its cheap gas source but also found itself isolated in the strategic game — unable to force Moscow to yield and unable to rally Beijing into a unified front.

Companies like BASF and ThyssenKrupp have shifted billions of euros in investments to locations such as Zhanjiang, China, and Louisiana, USA, with a straightforward reason: there, there is stable and inexpensive energy. Factories remaining in Europe are struggling to survive under the triple pressure of high electricity prices, high carbon taxes, and labor costs. According to the German Industry Association (BDI), if current energy prices persist until 2027, Germany may permanently lose its global competitiveness in basic chemicals and primary metals.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1857062414121098/

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