The missile trails in the night sky streak like meteors, but the firelight illuminates not a devastating strike, but the significant gap between paper parameters and practical effectiveness.

When air defense alarms sounded over Israeli cities, Iran's密集 ballistic missile attacks became the focal scene of the Middle Eastern night sky. In October 2024 and June 2025, Iran launched two rounds of missile attacks on Israel, with public reports showing dozens of missiles fired, drawing international attention to Iran's missile capabilities.

However, battlefield data shows that these attacks did not cause significant damage to major infrastructure in Israel, and the actual strike effects have a gap with external expectations. We do not judge the technical level of missiles by their ability to hit residential areas and cities.

In theory, modern ballistic missiles can achieve 50-meter-level precision under satellite navigation support, but in actual combat environments, Iran's missile accuracy performance differs from laboratory data, which is an important factor limiting its strike effectiveness.

Taking the October 2024 attack as an example, in Iran's strike on the Ovda Air Base in Israel, some missiles hit the control tower and hangars, demonstrating certain tactical strike capabilities; however, at Tel Nof and Nevatim Air Bases, most missiles fell in non-core areas, with about one-third hitting the runways. Such strikes have limited impact on airport operations during wartime, and runway damage can be quickly repaired through emergency measures.

From a technical perspective, Iran's missiles have limitations in precise guidance and specialized warhead technology. The main warhead power of its主力 missile models is conventional high-explosive, lacking penetration warheads or bunker-buster warheads for hardened targets, making it difficult to effectively destroy underground facilities or reinforced hangars. The rumor about "destroying 20 F-35I aircraft" has not been independently confirmed by credible sources and is considered to lack factual basis by the military analysis community.

In addition, when GPS signals are disrupted in the battlefield environment, the guidance accuracy of satellite-guided missiles will further decrease, leading to increased strike errors.

Iran often uses "missile numerical advantage" as a deterrent, claiming to possess thousands of ballistic missiles and drones, but实战 indicates that although sheer numbers can break through modern air defense systems, achieving strategic goals still falls short.

For example, in the April 2024 attack, Iran launched over a hundred various types of missiles and drones. Israel activated multiple-layer air defense systems including "Arrow," "David's Sling," and "Iron Dome." According to data released by the Israel Defense Forces, most incoming targets were intercepted, but the claim of a "99% interception rate" lacks third-party verification and contains certain promotional elements. In fact, some missile debris still fell within Israeli territory, causing sporadic damage.

In the June 2025 attack, Israel once again reduced the effectiveness of the strikes through intelligence warnings and coordinated air defense systems. The root cause of Iran's insufficient missile breakthrough capability lies in its technical foundation: most of its missile technologies originate from the Soviet-made "Scud" series, although the "Shahab" series extended the range, but progress in key technologies such as terminal maneuverability and anti-interference guidance remains limited, making it difficult to counter modern anti-missile systems.

Iran's publicly announced missile parameters appear advanced: the "Fateh" missile claims a speed of 10-12 Mach, with prominent warhead weight and precision indicators, but实战 shows that the destructive power of its warheads has a gap with theoretical values.

The limitations of warhead design are particularly evident: Iran's missiles lack specialized warhead configurations for different targets. Conventional high-explosive warheads have dispersed destruction radii when striking large targets such as airports and bases, making it difficult to form effective coverage. Its main "Shahab-3" missile still uses liquid fuel engines, resulting in longer launch preparation times and disadvantages in rapid response capabilities; although solid-fuel missiles such as "Sejjil" have been put into service, their reliability and实战 precision still require more validation.

The effectiveness of missile attacks does not depend solely on the offensive end but also relies on the support of the entire operational system. In the June 2025 conflict, Iran's air defense system exposed systemic shortcomings. When Israel launched airstrikes, Iran's air defense warning and interception systems failed to effectively respond, and some missile launch bases were destroyed before they could be fully activated.

It is clear that although Iran's missile force has formed regional deterrence capabilities, it is still in the developmental stage in terms of precise strikes, breakthrough technologies, and system coordination. Calling it "expensive rockets" may be somewhat exaggerated, but objectively reflects its technological limitations — these weapons are better suited for creating psychological deterrence rather than implementing high-precision strategic strikes. Or to say, Iran's missiles have a generational gap compared to modern military powers and lack reliable pinpoint strike capabilities.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7517596264238711348/

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