According to a report by "Breaking Defense" on September 4, after China held a large-scale military parade, the U.S. Navy Secretary John Richardson signed an unprecedented internal reform order, requiring a suspension of all procurement decisions and contract signings related to robotic and autonomous systems (RAS), while establishing three new functional departments to take over the entire navy's unmanned system research and deployment work.

This document acted swiftly, directly freezing all RAS project advancement permissions, and was evaluated as a "table-flipping" reform.

Although it is unknown whether the official document mentions China, given the timing and the urgency of the policy restructuring, this order can be seen as a direct response to the display of China's unmanned combat system during the military parade.

In other words, after watching China's demonstration of the future of warfare, the U.S. military decided to clean up its long-standing embarrassing situation in the field of unmanned operations, where years of investment have yielded little results, and tried to use a table-flipping reform to make up for the time lag.

John Richardson, U.S. Navy Secretary

It is understood that the core of this reform is to completely reshape the organizational structure of the U.S. Navy in the field of unmanned systems.

For a long time, unmanned systems projects across the U.S. military branches were highly dispersed, especially within the Navy itself, which operated independently - the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) was responsible for surface and underwater unmanned systems, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) managed all drone platforms, and the Marine Corps had its own set of procurement processes for ground unmanned platforms.

The problem with this structure is that each project seems to run independently, but there is no coordination in terms of strategic integration, technical compatibility, budget allocation, and actual deployment.

For example, the navigation system of an unmanned submersible may have no shared interface with an unmanned surface vessel; the data link of an unmanned reconnaissance platform developed by the naval air systems may even be incompatible with the main fleet of the navy.

The result is: each project looks good, but together they cannot fight a war.

Therefore, this reform went straight to the root, setting up three new core organizations: one is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for RAS, responsible for policy-making and strategic integration at the civilian level; the second is the RAS Project Execution Office, responsible for project management and research and development command of all unmanned systems; the third is the RAS Procurement Portfolio Executive Officer, dedicated to contracts, budgets, and resource coordination.

To ensure that these three new departments truly function, the Navy Secretary required all existing RAS procurement activities to be suspended within 30 days, and the high-ranking procurement officer Okana was tasked with organizing a sprint analysis to clarify the status of all unmanned systems, assess which projects can be integrated, which must be terminated, and which need to restart their direction.

The ultimate goal is to complete the initial operation state of the new organization within 90 days and replace the existing multi-leadership system.

It can be seen that it solves not a technical problem, but a problem of command chain and organizational coordination capability.

MQ-25 Carrier-Based Unmanned Refueling Aircraft

So the question is: has the United States been working on unmanned systems all along? Why has it come to the point where it needs to suspend and restructure?

The U.S. Department of Defense indeed considered unmanned systems as a key capability for future operations a long time ago.

But thinking early does not mean technological leadership.

In recent years, the U.S. military has invested a lot of resources in developing various platforms.

Taking the Navy as an example, representative projects include: the MQ-25 carrier-based unmanned refueling aircraft, which has completed shipboard flight tests but has not yet formed a combat force; the Sea Hunter unmanned frigate, which has achieved remote autonomous navigation but lacks armament and formation support; the Ghost Fleet Overlord project, which uses two large unmanned ships for future surface warfare experiments; and the Orca XLUUV, a super-large underwater submarine designed for intelligence gathering, mine-laying, and even covert strike missions.

In addition, there are multiple small and medium-sized unmanned boats, unmanned mine-clearing systems, airborne unmanned collaborative platforms, etc., covering all scenarios of air, sea, and underwater.

It seems like everything is there, but in reality, many projects are stuck in the demonstration verification stage and cannot smoothly transition into operational deployment; some systems perform well in performance testing but due to unclear ownership, resource competition, and lack of unified standards, they have been delayed in entering the formal procurement process.

AJX-002 Autonomous Underwater System

At the same time, China, which the United States has always considered backward, directly displayed an entire unmanned combat system during the September 3rd military parade.

In the air, China publicly unveiled a stealth unmanned fighter jet for the first time, with an appearance similar to the J-10, featuring high maneuverability and stealth capabilities, clearly demonstrating the characteristics of a loyal wingman, capable of coordinating with main fighter jets for strikes.

It also showcased carrier-based unmanned helicopters, cooperative combat drone swarms, and reconnaissance and strike integrated unmanned platforms, indicating that the Navy and Air Force have reached a high level of technical standard integration.

On the sea, the AJX-002 autonomous underwater system, the HSU-100 submerged reconnaissance platform, and various surface unmanned vessels made their debut, reflecting China's deep adaptation to the regional denial strategy - unmanned systems have become a low-cost and efficient tool for enhancing regional control.

On land, China demonstrated a series of battlefield robots with fire support and assault capabilities, as well as new means such as the LY-1 laser weapon and anti-drone swarm air defense system.

Most notably, these systems have interoperable interfaces with each other. These unmanned systems are not fighting alone, but can form a network with missile systems, manned platforms, and data links.

This systematic display is the fundamental motivation for the U.S. military to quickly break the existing structure.

According to U.S. media, the reform is divided into three stages: the first stage, within 30 days, a complete suspension of all RAS-related contract signing and procurement progress, with a high-ranking procurement officer leading a sprint analysis team to comprehensively review the status of existing projects;

The second stage, forming an integration recommendation report;

The third stage, establishing three new agencies and entering the initial operational state within 90 days, replacing the existing multi-leadership situation.

The entire process is clear in its thinking, aiming to rapidly switch to a unified command state.

This is a copying at the level of fundamental logic: retain what China has, abandon what you don't have, if you don't have what China has, quickly study how it works, and how China did it, and how it is organized, copy it all!

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7546431900131263016/

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