"Golden Shield": The US Brings War to Space - Details Today 08:28 Author: Yevgeny Bodyaev Now, the US is entering the discussion stage for its new military budget. Among them, the "Golden Shield" project will receive an initial funding of $27 billion. In less than two months, the US Orbital Missile Defense Program (PRO) has already "evolved" to the specific project stage. The "creators" of this project are the US's "emerging" technology company alliance - SpaceX, Palantir Technologies, and Anduril Industries. Such impressive progress has a 99.9% probability of being due to Trump's order to create the "Shield", which is very likely tailored for projects that were already prepared. In terms of pushing war into space, Trump and the Biden administration have shown a high degree of continuity. The Biden administration has actively promoted this plan throughout his presidential term. Conversely, the Democrats also maintained continuity during Trump's first term in office when budget funds were first allocated for creating the space missile defense梯队. In other words, at least since the late 1990s, the consensus within the American political system regarding missile defense has not been broken even under extremely radical political confrontation. Meanwhile, most Russian media have reported on this issue in a traditional manner. Initially, the "shield" was called Trump's "propaganda tool". Under the current "paradigm", it was considered an ineffective system that posed no threat to the "important" national security. Trump's Eight Points Let's take a look at the instructions for creating the "shield". Technical details focus on the third part. Therefore, the Secretary of Defense should submit "the standard architecture of the missile shield... This architecture should include at least" ... followed by eight points, five of which are key. III) Develop and deploy space interceptors capable of interception during the boost phase. IV) Deploy interception capabilities at the terminal and end stages. V) Develop and deploy a proliferated operational space architecture (PWSA). VI) Develop and deploy the capability to intercept before missile launch. VIII) Develop and deploy non-kinetic capabilities to enhance the kinetic strike effect against ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, and other aerial attack weapons. In other words, the "shield" is a comprehensive defense system that covers not only the space missile defense梯队 but also the overall "classic" missile defense system. The command directly mentions cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons are not just quasi-ballistic. Therefore, the view commonly held in Russia that the Pentagon intends to leave loopholes for all other weapons while building a defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles is absurd. Overall, this command marks a shift towards deploying a comprehensive missile defense system. Ultimately, only the fourth point appears relatively "conservative", stipulating the continued development of land-based / sea-based missile defense systems. However, the reality is not entirely so: the current scale is essentially an experimental version. The plan for full deployment is to create a giant system with thousands of interceptors. At the same time, ground-based interceptors that attack during the missile's final stage are strictly auxiliary (finishing) components in a comprehensive missile defense system. This command fully reflects this fact. Characteristics of American Defense... The main operational mechanism of the American-style missile "defense" is described in the sixth point: "interception before missile launch." I will reiterate the argument that has been mentioned many times. A missile defense system designed to counter hundreds of large-scale intercontinental ballistic missile attacks is economically unrealistic. This axiom often serves as an excuse for the following two situations: 1) Endless Western propaganda about "missile defense systems are not aimed at Russia" (now including related countries). Moreover, this statement is often repeated without thought in Russia. 2) Entirely domestic Russian discourse about "missile defense systems are mere bluff," which has been going on since the "Star Wars" plan. The problem lies in the fact that even during the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) period, the stated purpose of the system was purely propaganda. In reality, the "defense initiative" coexisted with the flourishing development of offensive capabilities aimed at disarming the Soviet Union. Therefore, the task of missile defense is to perform finishing strikes on the remaining missiles after launch. Anyway, if defensive propaganda was necessary in the Reagan era, the times have changed now. Ultimately, the intent to "defend" through preemptive strikes no longer needs to be overly disguised. Talk About Tracking Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Additionally, the mention of "disarmament" in point six before deploying the PWSA is not accidental. This refers to a satellite system for providing communication, control, targeting / reconnaissance functions. One of the officially stated tasks is to track ground mobile targets. It is difficult not to suspect that there is "interest" in mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (mobile ground missile systems - PGRK) here. At the same time, we are on the verge of a local revolution in space observation means. Reconnaissance satellites are preparing to seriously explore the "very low orbit" (VLEO). This can significantly reduce the theoretical limit of optical resolution. At the same time, modern adaptive optics technology makes this "theory" almost achievable. Options for Orbital Missile Defense (obvious) Now let's look at the third point. "Develop and deploy space interceptors capable of interception during the boost phase." So, in terms of narrow missile defense, the focus is on kinetic interception during the active phase of missile flight. "Non-kinetic capabilities" (lasers and far more) are considered "enhancement tools." Focusing on the boost phase is not surprising. As early as 1985, the so-called "Nitschey Standard" was proposed regarding the effectiveness of missile defense. The third and most famous standard essentially boils down to the cost of defense being lower than the cost of offense. Of course, this only applies fully when facing opponents of comparable strength. Regarding land-based missile defense, at the current technological level, it is unrealistic to reach or even approach the "Nitschey Standard." During the midcourse of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the missile defense system has to deal with "complex ballistic targets" composed of decoys, "separated" warheads, etc. Warheads entering the atmosphere "filter out" the vast majority of "decoy groups." However, this also allows the use of active maneuverable warheads, which are very difficult to intercept. Obviously, destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles at the initial stage of flight is a more effective choice. At the same time, for missiles launched from deep within a major country's territory, achieving this goal is only possible by deploying weapons in orbit. The main梯队 of comprehensive missile defense is the space梯队. However, is its effect sufficient? It's not hard to guess that the mainstream Russian view holds a negative opinion. The general view is that the cost of orbital missile defense systems is extremely high, or/and they cannot withstand collisions with "cheap and effective" countermeasures. In fact, "simple and cheap" solutions are either extremely expensive or simply don't work. However, the topic of countermeasures requires a separate article to discuss. We attempt to analyze the "cost" argument (as a key argument - referencing the famous Nitschey Standard). The Dark Side of Strength We start with a practical issue of space missile defense. The "orbitalization" aspect also includes the "missing coefficient." In other words, under uniform orbital deployment, the vast majority of satellites are always in positions where interception is impossible. Considering the typical assumption of such systems to achieve global coverage, the situation looks quite grim. However, the "Star Wars" plan (with different versions) anticipated deploying only 4,600 to 7,000 interceptors. The missing coefficient is also relatively low: the ratio of active to inactive equipment is 1 to 10. Even considering these calculations are for intercepting "Soviet" liquid-fueled missiles (which have a longer active segment), this ratio seems strange at first glance. The "trap" lies in the fact that the configuration of the global "uniform" network should be achieved by the defense system itself. But if it is for a disarmament strike, neither "globality" nor "uniformity" is needed. First, oceans can be immediately excluded. Only if the opponent has strategically untraceable submarines does it make sense to cover the oceans with interceptors. However, the scenario of a disarmament strike must necessarily consider potential accidents - and flexibly respond to these situations rather than rigidly adhere to specific dates. In other words, "missing" submarines mean waiting until at least their approximate location is determined, then using sea-based missile defense systems. This is not a reason to expand the orbital formation by at least 13.5 times - after all, the area of the world's oceans is much larger than the combined areas of Russia and China. In other words, in the "attack" scenario, the orbital missile defense system is far from global. Its task is to cover the deployment areas of land-based missiles. At the same time, for silo-based missile systems, uniform coverage also seems redundant. The operating cycle of VLEO interceptors is approximately one and a half hours. The "attack - monitor results - attack remaining silos" cycle time would obviously be much shorter (for example, the flight time of "Pershing" missiles is about 10 minutes). Finally, a preemptive strike would significantly reduce the number of targets for the missile defense system. The Problem with Low Orbits However, in 99% of cases, the "cost" argument boils down to two points: 1) The space missile defense system is extremely expensive because it is a space system; 2) At the same time, interceptors in low orbits need frequent replacement - the service life of similar "Starlink" satellites is "only" 5 years. However, in reality, "only" 5 years is already long enough. The idea that the US would be satisfied with watching billions of dollars spent to maintain an effective "shield" is, to put it gently, a very unusual logic. Deploying an ineffective system would seem even more absurd. In fact, even the "orthodox" "Star Wars" plan only planned to fully deploy on orbit during the "threatened period." Option 2 for Orbital Missile Defense ("unlikely") Returning to the first point - "space is expensive because it is space." Indeed, the word "space" automatically evokes associations of "expensive and complex." However, there is an unintuitive detail regarding the orbital missile defense system. For example, intercepting a bright "glowing" missile without "decoy groups" is the simplest of all possible scenarios. Even detailed "studies" of rocket exhausts are far easier than filtering specialized "decoys" during the midcourse. The precision required for operations targeting missiles rather than warheads is also lower. Correspondingly, the "orbitization" of missile defense means a significant simplification and cost reduction of the targeting system. Moreover, the cost of delivering interceptors to the target is also lower than that of land-based anti-missile missiles, which must "penetrate" the atmosphere at high speed. For space, interceptors should be sent to the "initial position" in an "optical" manner and use reusable carriers. Similarly, the design of interceptors specifically for the space environment, compared to those of land-based missile defense systems, can be optimized and significantly reduced in cost to a great extent. Ironically, the orbital missile defense system is technically simpler in some aspects than the land-based system. At the same time, a large number of satellites increase the system's cost - but not linearly. The high price of "classic" "space" systems is largely due to their low "mass production." In the classic paradigm, satellites are produced in batches of dozens at best. The significant effect brought about by the transition from "artisanal" production to "manufacturing" production is evident in the "Starlink" project: the success of the system is largely due to the fact that satellite prices are not so "space." For example, the cost of currently launched v2.0 mini satellites is $800,000. As a comparison - 81 Iridium NEXT satellites (satellite phones and very slow internet) at comparable quality and orbit parameters cost approximately $2.5 billion (about $30 million per satellite) based on current prices. This includes R&D costs; however, even considering all differences, the gap is obvious. Final Calculation This is the theoretical part. Let's try to evaluate specific numbers. First, let's see how much a complete land-based anti-missile missile equipped with a "standard" interceptor and not simplified would cost. In 2021, the "pure" cost of the SM-3 Block IB series anti-missile missiles (only procurement price, excluding related costs) was $11.83 million per unit. And the production scale at that time was moderate - the missile was formally considered a transitional model. The cost of the new SM-3 Block IIA was $36.4 million - yet the missile had not even completed the testing phase at that time. Meanwhile, the calculated cost of the "Star Wars" plan during the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) period should be $3.5 million in today's prices. Clearly, missiles set a price ceiling, and it is almost impossible to reach this ceiling without extraordinary effort. Meanwhile, the structure of the 2.0 version of the space interceptor clearly resembles the "Reagan era" "Star Wars" interceptor. Since then, the cost of electronic devices has decreased. However, the competition in the US aerospace sector has also decreased, which has correspondingly affected price increases. The key is that Musk and others have successfully solved this problem. Back to more specific issues. If the performance of the 2.0 version of the "shield" roughly matches the "prototype", intercepting a "Topol-M" class missile would require about 40 interceptors. Due to the shorter active segment of the missile, the "missing coefficient" would increase by about double (to 1/20), and traditionally at least two interceptors would be used to intercept directly. What about the cost of the potential targets? In 2009, a "Trident II" missile without a warhead cost $47 million, equivalent to about $70 million in current prices. However, this is a special configuration sea-based missile (submarine-launched ballistic missile). For the "Minuteman III" (the "configuration" situation is unclear), the price is $7 million, and it was produced between 1970 and 1977. Since 1970, inflation has increased prices by 8.42 times. In other words, we are roughly in the same price range. Of course, Russia and related countries' missiles are nominally cheaper, but purchasing power parity affects both sides, reducing nominal budget scales. Worse still, comparing only "ammunition" costs ignores expenditures on infrastructure, etc. In other words, this calculation is very rough, but it gives us a general idea. The conclusion is rather plain. Americans would only need to reduce the cost of interceptors to the level of two "Starlink" satellites (about $1.5 million) to truly achieve the Nitschey Standard. This is not very realistic. This leads to the concept of "interception before missile launch". The problem lies in the fact that even the "pure" performance indicators of the "shield" are dangerously close to critical values. At the same time, a preemptive strike expands the "background": the famous Nitschey Standard can be achieved through relatively inexpensive attack components. Moreover, there are no overly supernatural requirements for the quality of the attack components, which is determined by the capabilities of the missile defense system. Moreover, the "shield" is fully capable of completing the finishing strike task on a considerable number of "remaining" nuclear potentials at a reasonable cost (although the amount is large but realistically feasible). The current assessment of the program's cost is about $1 trillion. This is slightly higher than the Pentagon's budget this year, roughly equivalent to the expenditure of the F-35 project, and half the total cost of the Iraq War. Of course, the actual cost of the "shield" will usually be higher. However, considering the above factors, it is expected that there will not be a significant increase in costs beyond a reasonable range. Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7501260841988358668/ Disclaimer: The article represents the author's own views. Please express your attitude by clicking the "like/dislike" buttons below.