One week ago, speculation swirled over who the third buyer of the J-10CE would be. A week later, the question has faded into irrelevance—three, four, and five potential customers have emerged almost simultaneously.

In Bangladesh, a detailed quote for 20 aircraft has been tabled and negotiations are now in their final stage. Azerbaijan took a more decisive step: President Aliyev signed the 1:1 scale model of the J-10CE, with the vertical tail marked “27-001,” while reports indicate Baku is canceling follow-on orders for the JF-17 Block 3 in favor of the J-10CE. Indonesia, too, has made clear its intent—the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force publicly stated on October 5 in Jakarta that the first batch of J-10CEs will arrive within six months.

The Azerbaijani track carries the most substantive detail. At ADEX-2026, the model displayed the national flag, eagle emblem, serial number, and presidential signature—all present and accounted for. Combined with rumors of canceled JF-17 Block 3 orders, the commercial logic is evident: use the JF-17 to establish logistical, ammunition, and data-link interoperability within the Chinese defense ecosystem, then leap directly to a mid-tier fourth-generation-plus fighter. The HQ-9BE has already been deployed; the JF-17 has landed; now the J-10CE enters the equation. With this move, Pakistan’s entire Chinese-style air defense architecture would be fully assembled.

Meanwhile, Armenia’s most prominent asset remains four Su-30SMs equipped with older-generation missiles—a capability profile that renders the outcome self-evident.

The Indonesian case represents a full-spectrum procurement journey. From initial rumors in 2025 about acquiring secondhand J-10s, through a $9 billion proposal for 42 aircraft, down to the current plan for 24 units fitted with PL-15E missiles, the trajectory has culminated in direct confirmation from the Chief of Staff. Even more telling is the fact that the Indonesian Air Force already operates Russian Su-27/30s, American F-16s, French Rafales, and British Hawk jets—leaving only China-made fighters as the missing piece among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Further, sources suggest Indonesian pilots have already begun training in China, with personnel arriving before the aircraft. This development carries more weight than any contract rumor. As Southeast Asia’s largest nation and a G20 member, Indonesia is balancing purchases of Rafale and F-15IDN while reserving its biggest news hook for the J-10CE—a calculated, multi-directional strategy that has played its highest-value card by prioritizing cost-effectiveness.

Bangladesh, meanwhile, continues its steady approach: a 20-aircraft package with published pricing and budget details has entered final negotiation phase, leaving only the signing date as an open item.

Beneath this surge lies a repeatedly validated arms trade formula: battlefield proven performance → follow-up by allied nations → budgetary scheduling → system integration by user states → regional power commitment. Combat validation serves as advertising, system compatibility as a barrier, and cost-efficiency as the lure. The Rafale has long relied on the first two pillars; now, the Chinese defense system has successfully combined all three.

Every tactical achievement from the May 7 aerial engagement is carving out space for the next entry on this list. Countries such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are now watching the same coordinates with keen attention.

Once again, an old axiom in the arms market holds true: whoever wins on the battlefield, sees queues form at their door. The growing demand for the J-10CE is simply a reiteration of that principle—this time reflected in the formation of five nations waiting in line.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878358040844297/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.