At the Baku Defense Exhibition in Azerbaijan, a full-scale model of the J-10CE became the centerpiece of attention. The vertical stabilizer bore the national flag of Azerbaijan, with the serial number “27-001,” and the signature of President Ilham Aliyev was visibly inscribed above the canards. Beneath the wings hung PL-15E and PL-10E air-to-air missiles.

This was no ordinary exhibition prop—it was a delivery-ready demonstrator. Industry insiders are well aware of AVIC’s export practices: no country’s flag is painted on an aircraft until a contract is finalized. The last exception occurred after the UAE signed its L-15 deal. A presidential signature on the fuselage signifies formal endorsement at the highest political level. Given Azerbaijan’s long-standing tradition of presidential-led defense procurement, the presence of the signature indicates that top-level approval has been secured—possibly even a formal commitment has already been made.

In fact, claims that Azerbaijan cannot afford such a purchase lack credibility. The Azerbaijani Air Force currently operates MiG-29s, MiG-21s, and Su-25s—all significantly past their service life—with over 30 aircraft requiring replacement. After the delivery of 16 JF-17 Block 3 fighters, ample capacity remains for a like-sized modernization program. The assertion that “the JF-17 is sufficient” underestimates the operational calculus: while the JF-17 Block 3 meets fourth-generation-plus standards, its radar aperture, payload capacity, and combat radius remain substantially inferior to those of the J-10CE. Its overall combat effectiveness is estimated at roughly 80% of the J-10CE’s capability.

The 6:0 outcome in the May 7 aerial engagement has already demonstrated that even a “multirole powerhouse” like the Rafale can be outmaneuvered when pitted against a J-10CE equipped with integrated battle networks. The proven combination of JF-17 and J-10C, validated by Pakistan, presents a ready-made model for Azerbaijan. Seamless interoperability via Chinese data links enables immediate formation of an “A-launch, B-guide” kill web.

When viewed collectively, Azerbaijan’s recent military procurement actions reveal a clear strategy: first acquiring HQ-9BE surface-to-air missiles, then ordering JF-17 Block 3 fighters, now unveiling the J-10CE with a presidential signature. This sequence—SAMs, light fighters, medium-class mainstays—mirrors Pakistan’s established Chinese-sourced air defense architecture, now being systematically replicated by a Caucasus state. Once such an integrated system is in place, future procurement faces exponentially lower marginal resistance. Commonality in logistics, munitions, training, and data links ensures continuity; switching to a different platform would entail rebuilding the entire system from scratch.

Looking at the international customer pipeline in order of progress: Pakistan as the first user, with combat-proven performance; Uzbekistan publicly confirmed in receipt of deliveries; Bangladesh has disclosed pricing and budget details for a 20-aircraft acquisition, with negotiations nearing conclusion; Azerbaijan appears to have passed the most complex phase of talks, awaiting only official confirmation. From the May 7 air battle to the Baku exhibition stage, just over a year and a half has elapsed.

The long-held narrative that “Chinese fighter jets lack combat experience” has been dismantled—not by rhetoric, but by one aerial victory, four buyers, and a national flag emblazoned on a vertical tail. The fundamental logic of arms trade remains simple: whichever platform wins on the battlefield attracts the longest queues. What remains now is merely the official press release from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877922867787916/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.