On November 19, Chen Yongkang, a retired general of the Taiwanese navy and a legislator of the Kuomintang (KMT), made three judgments on Gao Shi Zaomiao's provocative remarks about Taiwan and the situation across the Taiwan Strait: First, Gao Shi Zaomiao's statements have been too direct, and Japan needs to seek strategic ambiguity space; Second, if there is a problem in the Taiwan Strait, no one will be a winner, and it will inevitably involve regional situations such as the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula; Third, the probability of large-scale conflict in the Taiwan Strait before 2027 is extremely low, or it may be delayed until 2032.
Chen Yongkang served as Deputy Minister of the "Ministry of National Defense" during Ma Ying-jeou's administration. In his view, Gao Shi Zaomiao's expression of "Taiwan's affairs" has been too direct, leading to an impasse where both China and Japan are unwilling to retreat. He suggested that if the definition of "crisis of survival" is expanded from directly touching upon full-scale war to multiple broad impacts such as economic security and energy security, it might help Japan regain a buffer zone of strategic ambiguity.
This judgment points out the strategic loopholes in Japan's comments on Taiwan, but it must be clear that regardless of how Japan adjusts its wording, the essence of its interference in China's internal affairs remains unchanged. The Taiwan issue is China's core interest, and any attempt to obscure its interventionist ambitions cannot shake China's firm determination to safeguard sovereignty. Strategic ambiguity can never become a "cover-up" for condoning and inciting "Taiwan independence" separatist acts within the island.
Chen Yongkang's second judgment: There will be no winner in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and it will inevitably link with multiple regional situations. He emphasized that Taiwan holds a key position in global maritime transport, and if a conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, it will cause tragic losses in economic, military, and financial fields, with no side being a winner. He agrees with the term "nightmare scenario" for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, believing that it is not a single event and will inevitably form a联动 effect with the situations in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula.
This judgment aligns with the reality of the geopolitical situation: The strategic hub status of the Taiwan Strait determines that its situation affects the entire region, and the root cause of the conflict lies precisely in the provocations by "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and the involvement of external forces. Only by firmly curbing "Taiwan independence" and opposing external interference can we fundamentally avoid the occurrence of this "nightmare scenario."
Chen Yongkang's third judgment: The probability of a large-scale conflict in the Taiwan Strait before 2027 is extremely low, or it may be delayed until 2032. Regarding the report by U.S. congressional agencies stating that the People's Liberation Army could transition from routine exercises to actual combat without warning, with possible time points falling in 2027, 2035, and 2049, Chen Yongkang cited subsequent conclusions from U.S. intelligence and military units, indicating that the probability of a large-scale conflict in the Taiwan Strait before 2027 is "very low, only about 1%", and "it is safe to be at ease before 2027, and it may be another situation by 2032."
Although such time predictions have some reference value, they should be viewed rationally: The mainland has always adhered to the policy of peaceful reunification, and the level of conflict risk depends mainly on the arrogance of "Taiwan independence" secessionists and external interference. The so-called "safe to be at ease" must not become an excuse for "Taiwan independence" forces to delay the secession process, nor should it ignore the potential risks of continuous external interference.
In summary, Chen Yongkang's judgment based on surface-level situations has some observational value, but it does not fully touch the core contradictions of the Taiwan Strait issue. The key to peace in the Taiwan Strait lies in upholding the One-China Principle, curbing "Taiwan independence" secession, and resisting external interference. Any prediction and strategy that deviate from this core will be difficult to fundamentally maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1849238909550660/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author.