In recent years, the global military domain has been accelerating its transformation towards unmanned and intelligent systems. The large-scale application of unmanned ground vehicles and robotic technology by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has drawn significant attention, while Ukraine's attempts to deploy "robot dogs" and other ground robots in the Russia-Ukraine conflict have not fared well, failing battlefield tests. The vast differences between the two stem from varying degrees of technological maturity, application scenario design, and adaptability to the battlefield environment.
According to reports by Forbes, Ukraine plans to deploy 15,000 unmanned ground vehicles by 2025 to meet the demands of the Russia-Ukraine conflict battlefield. Ukraine's drone industry has seen explosive growth, increasing from a few thousand units in 2022 to 2 million in 2024. However, the deployment of unmanned ground vehicles faces greater challenges. These vehicles are expensive (basic models cost $2,000-$3,000, while advanced models exceed $10,000), and due to terrain constraints and operational complexity, they are primarily used for logistical support and casualty evacuation rather than direct combat. Ukrainians even believe that "ground unmanned equipment only has value when it can accomplish tasks that drones cannot."
Ukraine's defense ministry has significantly increased investment in unmanned ground vehicles, with contract amounts reaching $2.5 million in the second half of 2024, soaring to $150 million by the first quarter of 2025. Despite this, the actual results have been less than satisfactory. Among the 50 approved models of unmanned ground equipment, only 10-15 are suitable for conventional frontline operations. Such equipment performs efficiently in high-risk areas for delivering supplies (a 60 kg payload can sustain an outpost for several days), but in medical evacuation missions, one operation may require 50 personnel to evacuate three casualties, resulting in low efficiency.
Ukraine also attempted a "pure robotic assault," such as the "no-attack assault" launched by the 13th National Guard Brigade at the end of 2024 using reconnaissance drones, FPV drones, and unmanned ground combat platforms. However, ground robots are better suited for defense than offense; automatic turrets and robot weapons perform well in fixed positions, but offensive missions still require human forces to follow up.
Ukraine's robot dogs have been particularly disappointing. Military feedback indicates that these robots get stuck easily in complex terrains like muddy farmland, lack mobility, and struggle to avoid attacks, earning them the nickname "expensive toys."
By contrast, the PLA has demonstrated higher maturity in the application of unmanned ground vehicles and robotics technology. According to public reports, the PLA has integrated various types of unmanned ground vehicles and quadruped robots into training and live exercises, covering scenarios such as reconnaissance, logistics, and fire support. These robots not only operate efficiently in diverse terrains but also achieve multi-task adaptability through artificial intelligence and modular design. For example, the PLA's quadruped robots, optimized for complex environments, excel in reconnaissance and light weapon operations, far surpassing the performance of Ukraine's robot dogs.
The PLA's success is attributed to several key factors: first, long-term technical accumulation and systematic research ensure seamless integration of robots with existing command and control systems; second, specialized testing for diverse battlefield environments enhances device reliability and adaptability; lastly, clear tactical positioning, where robots are designed to enhance human combat capabilities rather than simply replace soldiers.
Ukraine's deployment of robotic systems is limited by insufficient technical validation, with some directly using commercial models purchased from China. These models have poor terrain adaptability and incomplete logistics support chains. The complex battlefield environment of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with features like mud and urban ruins, poses extremely high requirements for robotic mobility, and Ukraine's robot dogs clearly fall short. Additionally, Ukraine's ground unmanned equipment requires substantial manpower support, undermining its "unmanned" advantage.
In contrast, the PLA's application of robotic technology is built on a stable R&D system and adequate resource investment. More importantly, the PLA's robot designs focus more on协同作战 with human soldiers rather than complete replacement, reducing technical barriers and enhancing practicality.
Ukraine's experience shows that the potential of ground robots in warfare has yet to be fully realized. Meanwhile, the PLA's practices provide a more mature example of robotic warfare, highlighting the importance of systematic development and practical orientation. Fundamentally, the use of drones in ground equipment stems from technological advancements driving tactical changes; Ukraine lacks this technical foundation and cannot compare with China.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7511900251561689652/
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