[Source/Author: Guancha Net Columnist Party Haonan]
After Trump's re-election as President of the United States, he adopted unprecedentedly severe measures to pressure Western allies including Ukraine, urging them to immediately negotiate a ceasefire with Russia. At the same time, he sent positive signals to Russia and instructed the State Department to negotiate the normalization of relations with Russia.
Following this, the US and Russia held two rounds of talks in Saudi Arabia on the issue of peace in Ukraine in February and March, reaching a series of consensuses; these included: no attacks on each other's energy facilities by Ukraine and Russia, and the possibility of the US suspending some of its sanctions against Russia. Of course, such results are far from completely ending the conflict, but these scenarios were unimaginable during the few months when Biden's administration was in power.
Just a few weeks later, with mutual accusations from both sides about attacks on infrastructure, and Russian missile strikes on Sumy Province and Ukrainian offensives in Belgorod Region, the peace blueprint drawn up by the US and Russia in Saudi Arabia gradually became a mirage. In the eyes of international problem analysts, such an outcome is not surprising. Even if both the US and Russia have the intention to stop the Ukraine conflict, their "bottom lines" for negotiation remain far apart. Although certain consensuses were reached under the strong-willed and hasty efforts of Trump, any agreement deviating too far from the current geopolitical reality is bound to be unimplementable.
However, if we focus our attention on the two rounds of US-Russia normalization negotiations held in Istanbul, we will find that the agreements reached in these negotiations are clearly more "down-to-earth" and easier to implement. Both sides made progress on issues such as restoring normal embassy operations, unfreezing diplomatic assets, and facilitating the arrival of diplomats. Although both sides emphasized that the Istanbul negotiations only involved technical issues to improve bilateral diplomatic relations and would not discuss the Ukraine issue (in other words, they would not link the end of the Russia-Ukraine conflict with the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries), such rare positive interactions, can they be seen as the "stabilization" of the spiraling decline in US-Russia relations after the 2014 Crimea crisis?
On local time April 10th, US and Russian delegations held about six hours of talks in Istanbul, Turkey. Reuters
As two major powers with global influence, the US-Russia bilateral relationship should naturally be multi-layered and three-dimensional. Setting aside the most acute geopolitical conflicts between the two at present, the US and Russia at least need dialogue and coordination on nuclear arms control, responding to non-traditional security threats including terrorism, and the gradually rising risks of artificial intelligence.
Even when returning to the geopolitical issues in US-Russia relations, one will also find that the main impact of the Russia-Ukraine war is still on the European security framework. Although, in the eyes of American institutionalists, the security interests of the transatlantic alliance are inseparable, rationally speaking, even regarding US-Russia relations alone, the Ukraine crisis itself may not pose a greater threat to the US than the complete collapse of the US-Russia nuclear arms control system.
If we look back at US-Russia relations before 2022, it is not difficult to find that on issues such as the Iranian nuclear issue and the North Korean nuclear issue, Russian and American positions not only do not oppose each other, but often coincide more than they differ.
Then, if the contradiction over the Ukraine war or the underlying European security issue leads to the US and Russia engaging in cost-insensitive confrontation on all other issues, does this align with American interests, especially Trump's view of national interests?
In my opinion, Trump's pressure on allies and his friendliness toward rivals in ending the Russia-Ukraine war, and his obsessive drive to improve US-Russia relations, fundamentally stem from his and traditional political elites having different definitions of American interests. Based on this, if the US under Trump chooses to avoid its security responsibilities to NATO allies and reduce its maintenance of the "rules-based international order," then I believe that the limited recovery of the severely deteriorated US-Russia relations during Trump's administration can be separated from the stalled three-year-old Russia-Ukraine conflict resolution.
On April 26th, Trump and Zelensky had a brief meeting in Vatican City. AFP
Why is the "reverse Kissinger triangle" so hard to establish?
In the above analysis, I believe that the improvement of US-Russia relations is entirely possible. Then, in this potential geopolitical change, has China's international environment also undergone some corresponding changes?
When discussing Sino-US-Russia relations, the "classic model" that cannot be skipped is the Sino-US-Russia triangle, also known as the "Kissinger triangle." It is necessary to explain that the interactive and complex evolution factors causing the relationships among the three countries are certainly not all within the "large triangle system" (this article abstracts the international relations among the three countries as system internal, and the influence of other countries and international organizations on them as system external). Here, the large triangle is "isolated" from international relations for analysis to observe the mutual influences among the three countries. At the same time, it should be noted that the relationship within the large triangle varies in strength at different historical times, meaning that sometimes the three countries' relationship clearly presents the characteristic of linkage within the "large triangle," but at other times, this feature is not very obvious. Due to space limitations, the time range discussed in this article is limited to the recent decade or so.
From the end of the Cold War to the 2010s, with the increasing multipolarity of international relations, the "one superpower, many strong powers" pattern gradually emerged. During this historical period, fewer people used the "large triangle model" to analyze Sino-US-Russia relations because, in the tide of capital globalization, the universal enhancement of interconnections among countries of various sizes meant that the international political stage was no longer dominated by major powers. Therefore, this analytical perspective was considered as "Cold War thinking" or "historical analogy."
However, with the slowing down of globalization, "great power competition" has strongly returned to the international political stage, and discussions about the "new great triangle relationship" have gradually increased, becoming a focal point for academia and policy circles. In recent years, well-known international problem think tanks such as the Atlantic Council and the Wilson Center have organized seminars on this issue.
The "new great triangle relationship" in the current international political environment often specifically refers to the "reverse Nixon strategy" or called the "reverse Kissinger triangle." Its core idea is that Russia's comprehensive national strength has fallen far behind that of China and the US, and China is defined by the US as the "only competitor with both the intention and capability to reshape the international order." Therefore, it is proposed to improve relations with Russia, ideally to estrange China and Russia, and then concentrate on containing China. The core idea remains to focus on the main contradictions and set aside secondary ones, but the approach is opposite to that of the 1970s, which involves allying with Russia to counter China or drawing Russia to contain China. For the sake of simplicity in writing, it will be referred to as the "reverse triangle" strategy hereafter.
Here, I first give my conclusion: the "reverse triangle" strategy is no longer feasible.
First, looking at history, the successful implementation of the great triangle strategy depended on the complete rift between China and the Soviet Union and the significant reduction of geopolitical contradictions between the US and China. In other words, the difficulty for Nixon and Kissinger to promote this strategy at that time lay only in overcoming domestic political forces' ideological biases against China. Subsequently, Kissinger adopted pragmatism as his guideline, bypassing Congress using secret diplomacy to directly engage in high-level dialogue without formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Without a doubt, this bold strategy's successful implementation brought significant geopolitical benefits to both China and the US during the Cold War. However, what Kissinger essentially did was to play political courage and use unconventional means to open the doors to early warming of Sino-US relations based on already formed geopolitical realities.
On February 21st, 1972, U.S. President Nixon arrived in Beijing by special plane, and Premier Zhou Enlai greeted him at the airport.
Returning to the present day, in recent years, the Sino-Russian relationship has been described in numerous joint declarations and political documents issued by the two countries' top leaders as being "at its best in history." I really cannot think of any "leverage" the US could still use to estrange China and Russia. Then, under the maturity and stability of bilateral relations between China and Russia, can the US make moves outside the "system" of Sino-Russian relations, enticing Russia to distance itself from China?
Trump's "America First" placed national interest above ideology, which has some similarity with Kissinger's emphasis on realism and his advocacy of formulating foreign policies according to national interests. However, regardless of how high Trump's expectations are for improving US-Russia relations, the geopolitical contradictions between the US and Russia today are substantial and real. Perhaps Trump can restore US-Russia relations to some extent through his unique approach, but the sanctions and asset seizures resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war pose challenges in solving them, given domestic politics and pressure from European allies. Trump has little room to compromise with Russia. Even if Trump is willing to embrace Russia at any cost, technically, according to the CAATSA passed in 2017 (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), sanctions on Russia have been legislatively fixed, restricting the president's power to lift or ease these sanctions without congressional approval.
And if Trump grits his teeth but can only offer minor benefits, how can he move the shrewd Russian leadership? Don't forget that before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia's demands to the US included withdrawing troops from the border, which required "guaranteeing that Ukraine will not join NATO" and "withdrawing offensive weapons deployed by NATO in Eastern Europe." Even now, with the war dragging on and Russia facing massive sanctions, it has not budged on these issues. Therefore, inducing Russia to abandon its strategic partnership with China, such an economic security interest, seems unlikely even for the self-proclaimed shrewd dealmaker Trump to "make big deals" with the traditionally "asking for everything" Russians.
There is another frequently misunderstood issue mentioned in the above analysis: "improving relations with Russia, estranging China and Russia, and then concentrating on containing China." Some American politicians believe that the so-called "concentrating on" issue simply does not exist.
America, boasting of being the world's sole superpower, has long implemented a "double containment" strategy towards China and Russia. In practice, it uses its hegemonic position in the current international system and its global network of allies, primarily using NATO as a tool in Europe and utilizing alliances like the US-Japan and US-South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region to strategically encircle and contain China and Russia respectively. This simultaneously exploits existing geopolitical contradictions and historical disputes, alleviating the military weakness America faces when confronting China and Russia.
The Half-hearted "Transactional Diplomacy" of Trump
Since pushing for peace talks in Ukraine is politically and technically extremely complex, why did the eager-for-results but self-proclaimed shrewd Trump choose to tackle this tough nut?
As everyone knows, President Trump is quite enthusiastic about diplomatic affairs, possibly because the image of traveling around the world to reach negotiated deals is more appealing than issuing executive orders in the Oval Office. Trump's personal diplomatic style is indeed unique. Looking back at his previous term, his most grandiose diplomatic activities might include: the Helsinki Summit with Russia, the Abraham Accords, and the two rounds of summits with North Korea.
Although considerable efforts were made diplomatically to achieve the highly anticipated Helsinki meeting, no substantive agreements were reached. The only result might be that Trump realized his dream of meeting Putin face-to-face, but at the same time, Trump's "unorthodox" behavior sparked fierce criticism from Republican senators such as Romney and McCain in Congress. More importantly, after the talks, attempts by the US and Russia to negotiate on issues such as the Syrian civil war ultimately ended inconclusively. This fully illustrates that the structural contradictions in US-Russia relations are far beyond what the personal wishes of the two leaders can resolve.
Compared to the summit meetings between US and Russian leaders, it was even more unexpected that the US-North Korea summit took place.
The enormous power gap between the US and North Korea, decades of mutual hostility, and the high complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue in both political and technical terms determined that it would be difficult for either side to solve problems through such a high-level diplomatic form as a summit meeting. But perhaps the eager-to-achieve and innovative Trump at the time indeed believed that he could swiftly resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through extreme pressure on North Korea beforehand and the unpredictable "art of the deal," thereby gaining the maximum political capital for himself.
Unfortunately, such a dramatic outcome did not occur, and the US-North Korea relationship continued to develop according to the geopolitical reality. To this day, North Korea has written possession of nuclear weapons into its constitution, making its determination to rely on nuclear weapons for security even harder to shake.
On June 30th, 2019, Trump crossed the military demarcation line between North and South Korea, becoming the first sitting U.S. president to step foot in North Korean territory. Wen Hui Bao
As for the "Abraham Accords," which Trump called his greatest diplomatic achievement, it is worth reflecting upon.
On the surface, the accords normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries, but the accords did not address the core issue of the Middle East — the establishment of a Palestinian state. Essentially, this accord was the further loosening of the Arab League under US pressure, abandoning the previous condition that Israel recognize the establishment of a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for recognizing the state of Israel, i.e., the "establish state first, then establish diplomatic relations" plan. This unilateral concession directly led to the loss of话语权 of the moderate faction within Palestine, indirectly leading to armed conflicts between Hamas and Israel and the shocking Gaza tragedy.
Certainly, Trump's style of operation is very unusual, and his remarks distinct from the establishment during his initial term also refreshed people's ears. Perhaps it is precisely because of this that no matter what uncommon statements he makes or what extraordinary actions he takes, there is always someone who believes that Trump is "playing a bigger game."
But after carefully analyzing his so-called "diplomatic achievements," I found that Trump's seemingly bold and forward-moving diplomatic style has brought the world anything but fair and just dispute resolution, dispelling suspicions and building consensus. Instead, due to his arrogance, ignorance, and impatience, his attempt to forcefully resolve international issues formed by complex reasons through flashy personal diplomacy has exacerbated the already turbulent international geopolitical relations.
Based on reviewing the historical Sino-US-Russia trilateral relationship and summarizing Trump's behavioral preferences, we can more definitively conclude that the current Sino-US-Russia trilateral relationship differs from any period in history, leaving no room for the "reverse Nixon" strategy to be implemented.
Even if Trump continues his destructive diplomatic style, US-Russia relations may recover somewhat, but achieving a true ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine concerns the entire European security system, which is extremely complex, and the US cannot fully control it. Given Trump's eagerness for quick results, it is likely that after a few more attempts, he will give up in disappointment due to failing to achieve the expected results. After all, history has proven that the so-called Trump diplomacy leaves behind mostly half-finished, unresolved messes.
This article is an exclusive contribution from Guancha Net, and the content purely reflects the author's personal views, which do not necessarily represent the platform's stance. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited, or legal action will be taken. Follow us on WeChat at guanchacn for daily interesting articles.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7500833841725063692/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and welcome your opinions by clicking the "like/dislike" buttons below.