Reference News Network, January 30 report: The U.S. Foreign Policy website on January 27 published an article titled "After the Davos Forum in 2026: The World Enters an Era of Multipolar Power Struggles," by Jagannath Panda, director of the Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean-Pacific Studies at Stockholm University in Sweden. Excerpts are as follows:

The gathering of political and economic leaders in Davos this year was like an autopsy of the "rules-based international order" after its death. This was a rare moment of collective consensus: people believe that the existing order is not only under pressure but is also being actively redefined.

A central question emerged amid discussions on tariffs, bargaining, and the "rule of the strong": it is not about whether the global order is collapsing, but what kind of order is replacing it, who will shape it, and at what cost. Are we entering a world where bargaining overrides principles? Can sovereignty withstand the influence of transactional geopolitics? Is this moment creating space for deepened Asia-Europe cooperation or accelerating strategic drift?

From Rule-Oriented to Transaction-Oriented

Overall, the speeches at the Davos Forum indicate that the world order is clearly shifting from rule-oriented to transaction-oriented. This does not mean that international law disappears, but rather reflects the general weakening of the binding power of international law. In its place is an order influenced by bargaining: including economic, strategic, technological, and geopolitical leverage.

U.S. President Donald Trump explicitly articulated this shift. His framework of international politics uses tariffs, transactions, and geostrategic considerations as primary tools of statecraft. Interestingly, in this worldview, sovereignty is not absolute, but conditional, acquired and defended through capability. The Greenland incident exemplifies this logic: territorial issues are not absolutely protected by law, but are negotiable strategic assets, with economic pressure being a legitimate tool.

In contrast, leaders such as Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau see this transactional shift as marking the actual end of the rules-based order. According to Trudeau, the danger lies not only in the aggressive behavior of major powers but also in the lack of organized resistance from middle powers. He warns that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be non-negotiable, otherwise international legitimacy would be completely lost.

Between these two extremes, an emerging order is taking shape: neither entirely anarchic nor fully rule-bound, but an order where rules are maintained yet constantly tested by power. It is an order that can selectively be followed, principled on some issues, and bargained on others. This ambiguity precisely reflects the current instability.

Cognition and Strategic Impact on Order Construction

This year's Davos Forum indicated that there will no longer be a single, unified Western position, but rather three distinct visions of order: American, European, and Asian, each shaped by different threat perceptions and strategic priorities.

As Trump articulated, the American vision is starkly pragmatic. Order is no longer a moral framework but a byproduct of successful transactions. Alliances such as NATO are no longer seen as sacred, but more tied to burden sharing, trade balance, and geostrategic considerations, with their stipulations becoming negotiable.

However, Europe's response has become more hardened. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa both insist that sovereignty and borders are fundamental and non-negotiable. Strategic autonomy, once a controversial concept, has been redefined as a necessary condition for survival. Sanctions, defense industrial capabilities, and anti-coercion measures are becoming core pillars of Europe's evolving security principles.

French President Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz further reinforced this view. Macron warned against falling into the trap of the "rule of the strong," while Merz explicitly stated that the return of great-power politics threatens small and medium-sized countries. For Europe, principles without strength are insufficient; this order must now be actively defended by strength.

Meanwhile, the Asian vision does not align completely with Washington or Brussels. China states that it is a defender of globalization and multilateral economic cooperation, opposing unilateralism and zero-sum thinking. Beijing emphasizes respect for sovereignty and non-coercion, but does not endorse Western views on issues such as Ukraine or Arctic disputes. This allows China to position itself as a "stabilizing pole" amid the turbulence in the Atlantic, benefiting from the incoherence of Western positions.

From the perspective of the Global South, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto proposed a completely different set of priorities. For Indonesia, sovereignty is less about border issues than about resilience: it means food, energy, and development security. An order only makes sense when it brings stability and growth. This development-first perspective highlights the growing gap between Europe-Atlantic security discussions and the priorities of the Global South.

Asia-Europe Will Cooperate More

Will this breaking point create opportunities or risks for Asia-Europe cooperation?

In summary, the Davos Forum brought a small but real breakthrough. Europe's push for strategic autonomy does not mean disengagement from Asia; rather, it calls for more cooperation with Asia under the name of diversification.

Cooperation between Europe and India is the least controversial and most promising, based on shared concerns over coercive practices, supply chain resilience, and multipolar stability. India's strategic autonomy better aligns with Europe's need for balance.

Europe's engagement with China remains contradictory. Despite the inevitability of cooperation with China on economic and climate issues, differing views on certain issues (particularly the Ukraine issue) limit deeper strategic trust. In the short term, China may gain tactical benefits from the uncertainty on either side of the Atlantic.

More broadly, European-Asian cooperation can succeed only by building issue-oriented alliances in areas such as technology standards, green transition, infrastructure resilience, and development finance. This approach does not represent a return to universal multilateralism, but rather a pragmatic adaptation to a pluralistic world.

This year's Davos Forum did not paint a new blueprint for the global order, but it clarified the stakes involved. The world is entering a new era where order still exists, but without illusions: there is no universally applicable order, and it will increasingly be shaped by power and principle.

The core issue is not whether the rules-based order can return to its original form (which is impossible), but whether the minimum consensus on sovereignty and restraint can be maintained under the influence of transactional geopolitics. Can Europe transform strategic autonomy into credible strength without abandoning multilateralism? Can Asia balance development priorities with geopolitical realities? Can middle powers organize quickly enough to prevent great-power bargaining from draining international legitimacy?

This Davos Forum showed that these questions remain unresolved. But one thing is clear: the era of comfortable ambiguity has ended. (Translated by Pan Xiaoyan)

Original: toutiao.com/article/7600986746507838006/

Statement: The article represents the views of the author alone.