Kazakhstan did not intentionally join the Middle East alliance, but rather wished to show its autonomy to Russia.

At last week's U.S.-China Central Asia Summit, Kazakhstan announced that it would become the first Central Asian country to join the Abraham Accords. The agreement, brokered by the United States, is a normalization of relations between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries, launched during Trump's first term.

This decision was an achievement of Trump's second term foreign policy. It also confirmed a prediction made by this publication in August last year: Kazakhstan, as the most likely Central Asian country to join the agreement, might join for diplomatic benefits from Washington.

Some Western analysts have seized on this view. As Joseph Epstein, director of the Turan Research Center at Yorktown Institute, stated in an interview with RFE/RL, Kazakhstan's move may seem symbolic. However, in the long run, it could have diplomatic significance: "Astana's decision to join the Abraham Accords marks the beginning of a new phase, transforming these agreements from a Middle East peace initiative into a pro-American alliance of moderate Muslim countries committed to the ideals of tolerance and prosperity."

However, if one views this move solely through the lens of Middle Eastern politics or a newly emerging "pro-American alliance," one overlooks its full strategic purpose. The Abraham Accords are merely a tool meticulously planned by Astana to free itself from geopolitical dependence on Moscow and to consolidate its strategic relationship with the United States. Viewing it as the beginning of a new, ideologically clear alliance is a misreading of the fundamental pragmatism and self-interest underlying Kazakhstan's considerations.

The insignificant stage of Kazakhstan

Supporters of expanding the agreement may see it as part of a broader strategy to build a new geopolitical alliance to counter Iran. But this argument falls apart upon a more in-depth examination of Central Asian realities.

Iran has no substantial influence in Kazakhstan. The two countries do not share a common border (except for the Caspian Sea shared with Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan), and their trade is very limited.

The Islamic extremism threat perceived by Astana's security agencies mainly stems from Salafi extremism and the Taliban's influence, both of which are Sunni phenomena rooted in the Gulf region and Afghanistan, not Shia Iran.

Israel's considerations may also be to lure Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries to distance themselves from Turkey (another competitor, not just Iran). However, this strategy is questionable in the long run, as Ankara is strengthening its relations with Turkic Sunni Central Asian countries through institutions such as the Organization of Turkic States. Portraying Kazakhstan's joining as the cornerstone of a new anti-Iranian or anti-Turkish alliance is imposing the framework of the Middle East onto the reality of Central Asia, fundamentally misunderstanding the situation.

The facts are more direct and brutal: Kazakhstan lacks the networks, expertise, credibility, and strength—both soft and hard power—required to play a significant role in the Middle East diplomatic stage. It does not have the historical influence of Turkey or Iran, nor the religious authority of Saudi Arabia, nor the economic power of the UAE and Qatar. For a country that has consistently been cautious about getting involved in foreign conflicts, the idea that it is trying to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is implausible. President Tokayev himself acknowledged this, telling Ishan Tarull of The Washington Post that he did not expect these agreements to bring any "practical results." He described the move as a "modest contribution," a diplomatic phrase that also acknowledges this reality.

Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's joining can still be seen as a relative success for Israel. Although this is mainly a gesture of goodwill toward Washington, it also demonstrates Israel's diplomatic resilience. Despite the initial agreements being frozen and the biggest goal—reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia—still distant due to the Gaza war, no country has exited the "Abraham framework." The addition of new members indicates that despite increasing criticism of Israel's actions in the Middle East and elsewhere, these countries still see tangible benefits in maintaining relations with Israel.

The real audience: Washington and Moscow

The real reason behind Kazakhstan's move lies in a subtle shift in great power diplomacy. For years, engagement with Central Asia has been framed by the cliché of the "Great Game"—a zero-sum game between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.

At the summit with Central Asian leaders, Washington's approach was notably different. Unlike previous practices, this summit did not focus on lecturing Central Asian leaders on values, democracy, or human rights. This was a shrewd diplomatic move. Historically, such discussions on values often remained superficial, lacking substantive follow-up actions or commitments, and thus yielded little in terms of either values or interests.

More importantly, American officials did not pressure Central Asian countries to take sides.

This deliberate restraint provided political space for leaders with "unbreakable economic and infrastructure ties" (as described by senior regional observer Peter Leonard) to Moscow and China, allowing them to engage with the United States without openly challenging Moscow or Beijing.

Experienced diplomat Tokayev seized this opportunity, showcasing pragmatic political skills.

Joining the Abraham Accords is a low-cost, high-reward signal. Kazakhstan established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. The agreement does not require Kazakhstan to make any new security commitments, as Tokayev clearly stated, the decision to join the agreement is "absolutely firm and irreversible." When asked whether the decision could change even if the West Bank were annexed or Gazans were expelled, he unambiguously replied, "Nothing serious or terrible will happen; let us change our decision." The value of this commitment is completely unrelated to the Middle East situation, as its true target lies elsewhere.

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders have accelerated their traditional "multi-vector" foreign policy into a pressing "diversification" strategy. By joining the Abraham Accords, Kazakhstan hopes to win Washington's favor, position itself as a potential investment and strategic dialogue partner, and demonstrate its independence from Moscow—without openly confronting the powerful northern neighbor.

This move has nothing to do with Israel, Iran, Turkey, or Middle East peace. It is one of Astana's most important foreign policy strategic moves: ensuring its sovereignty and freedom of action to deal with an increasingly fragmented world order among major powers.

Although Central Asian leaders' praise for President Trump may discomfort Moscow, calm Russian analysts like Sergei Markedonov are facing the reality of diversification and advocate that Russia should seek mutually beneficial cooperation within this framework rather than opposing it impractically. For the United States, the lesson here is that sometimes the most effective diplomatic means is to build a framework that encourages other countries to align with Washington, rather than rigidly demanding they choose sides or lecturing them on democratic ideals.

Sources: The National Interest

Author: Eldar Mamedov

Date: November 14

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7573110291962036782/

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