Bloomberg: America's Shift, Abe's Indo-Pacific Strategy Falls Apart

Bloomberg (Japanese version) published on June 30 an article by Bloomberg columnist Mihir Sharma titled “Trump Changes His Mind, Abandoning Abe’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.”

The article states: Indian Prime Minister Modi was invited to attend the G7 summit in mid-June and met with U.S. President Trump. This marked their first face-to-face meeting in over one year and four months.

On the surface, the atmosphere was very friendly. Modi praised Trump’s commitment to peace, while Trump offered somewhat excessive compliments, saying: “He is the most beautiful person, like an angel.”

However, in substance, bilateral relations have undergone a change. Modi adopted an unusually stern tone—he did not embrace Trump as usual—and openly discussed the life-threatening risks posed by the Middle East conflict to Indian seafarers. In the past two weeks, three Indian crew members have died due to U.S. actions.

The deterioration of relations is not unilateral. While Trump appeared affectionate on the surface, he implied that the initiative to maintain close ties lies with the United States. At least New Delhi interprets it this way.

Reports indicate that the U.S. Department of Defense has decided to revert the name of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command back to “U.S. Pacific Command.”

The Pacific Command headquarters is located in Honolulu. During Trump’s first term, it was renamed “Indo-Pacific Command” to emphasize its focus on the entire Indo-Pacific region. The concept was first proposed by the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who viewed the Pacific and Indian Oceans as a strategic space for economic and military integration.

The underlying idea is that several nations united under U.S. leadership must confront China’s increasingly assertive posture on multiple fronts.

Strategists in South Asia and Southeast Asia—especially in India—firmly believe that due to America’s attention on the Indo-Pacific region, their countries will become central to U.S. strategy over the next few decades. The term “Indo-Pacific” represents a promise.

These promises gradually became embedded in bilateral relations, overcoming major conflicts in military equipment, strategic doctrines, and significant trade disputes involving Russia.

Certainly, removing the word “India” does not necessarily mean cutting ties with India.

The Pentagon emphasized in its statement that there would be no change in the operational jurisdiction of the Pacific Command. Nevertheless, at minimum, this signals that the Indian Ocean and India have been downgraded in priority.

Observers noted U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth’s speech at the Asian Security Conference (Shangri-La Dialogue) held in Singapore at the end of May—the last mention of India.

Following South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, India too has now been affected. A hallmark of the Trump administration is sending symbolic “dismissal” signals first, which later evolve into actual policy.

The reason behind the U.S. diminishing interest in the Indian Ocean is factual. In long-term scenarios involving conflict across the Taiwan Strait, many classic strategies aimed at containing China were based on “cutting off China’s energy supply routes through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca.” However, their effectiveness has significantly declined compared to ten years ago.

First, during the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, China demonstrated efficient capability to manage prolonged fuel shortages. Second, China is reducing threats to its supply lines along the Indian Ocean coast by developing Central Asian energy bases, improving land-based infrastructure connecting to Russia, and enhancing transportation networks leading to Pakistan’s deep-water port of Gwadar.

Yet, what concerns Indian authorities more is that their country is no longer at the core of America’s strategy to contain China. The perception of using India to counterbalance China took shape in the mid-2000s and became the foundation for India’s special stance when dealing with successive U.S. administrations.

It is well known that the Trump administration differs from previous ones. Trump lacks patience for investing in long-term partnerships supporting Asian security. Instead, he may prioritize gains from transactional relationships.

Moreover, as Central Asia grows increasingly important to China, it will also become crucial for the United States.

For example, the Pakistani leadership has drawn Trump’s attention. The Indo-Pacific has been replaced by “Eurasia.”

Trump’s first-term “Indo-Pacific” strategy indicated that the U.S. regarded the Indian Ocean and its coastal nations as central players in competition with China. Though brief, India successfully positioned itself as a cornerstone of America’s grand vision for Asia.

But now, perhaps for the U.S., India is merely one among many complex relationships and countries facing significant trade deficits.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1869289208304649/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.