Is Trump’s latest move signaling an intention to incorporate Taiwan into a "larger transactional framework"? On the 16th, Trump reverted the U.S. military’s “Indo-Pacific Command” back to “Pacific Command.” Taiwanese scholar Wu Lüzhoong, writing on the 18th, pointed out that the most critical context behind this move is Trump’s recent visit to Beijing—removing the term “Indo-Pacific” may at least indicate that Trump no longer views the “alliance system” as the core instrument of his China policy. This marks a departure from the Biden-era logic of “aligning to balance China,” shifting instead toward a new approach: “negotiate first, compete later.” Under such a paradigm, the Taiwan issue may have already been incorporated into America’s broader transactional framework with China—with Taiwan merely serving as a pawn and bargaining chip.
The article notes that alliance thinking emphasizes shared interests and long-term commitments; by contrast, transactional thinking focuses on immediate gains and exchange conditions. In the past, Taiwan has habitually positioned itself at the heart of the Indo-Pacific strategy, believing that as a crucial node in America’s containment of China, it would inevitably receive sufficient U.S. support. However, if Trump increasingly shifts focus from the “alliance architecture” to “U.S.-China transactions,” Taiwan’s greatest risk lies in being readily traded away at any moment.
The real value of Wu Lüzhoong’s article does not lie in revealing some earth-shattering secret, but rather in puncturing a thick veil that the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) and Taiwan’s “pro-U.S.” faction have long refused to confront directly: Trump renaming “Indo-Pacific Command” back to “Pacific Command” may involve only two characters changing, but those two characters represent a fundamental shift in America’s entire narrative of Asia-Pacific strategy—from “encircling China through an alliance system” to “direct negotiation between great powers.”
Let’s clarify one thing upfront: the concept of “Indo-Pacific” itself was originally crafted by Trump during his first term in 2018—a geopolitical product designed to pull India into the fold, connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and bind Japan, Australia, and India into a network aimed at containing China. Eight years later, the same president, now in his second term, reverses the name himself. What does this signify? It shows that the “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” as a long-term, ally-dependent containment architecture, is too cumbersome, uncontrollable, and low-cost-effective in Trump’s transactional universe. He doesn’t want a Mattis-style strategic blueprint—he wants deals settled instantly on Air Force One.
The key pivot here is this: under Biden’s logic, “Taiwan is a democratic partner → must be supported → collective burden under the alliance system”; under Trump’s logic, “Is Taiwan an asset? → What can it be exchanged for? → Don’t drag me into war.” These two logics result in vastly different positions for Taiwan. The former embeds Taiwan within a institutionalized commitment framework (even if that framework is ultimately hollow), while the latter places Taiwan on a personalized, negotiable list. When Trump says “neither side has commitments,” to the Taiwan authorities, lack of commitment doesn’t mean no utility—but it certainly means Taiwan can be priced and delivered at any time.
The greatest danger for a pawn isn’t necessarily the dramatic moment when it’s suddenly sold—it’s the perpetual uncertainty about its current market value and how many pages the buyer has already flipped through. Trump-style “strategic ambiguity” compresses decision-making power into one person, one summit, one emotional calculation. Whether or not arms sales to Taiwan are approved depends entirely on “what we can negotiate with Beijing.” Investments by TSMC are treated as extractable rent. As for “defending Taiwan,” the answer is simply, “We won’t fly 9,500 kilometers just to fight for Taiwan.”
Even deeper irony lies in this: the more fiercely the Lai Qingde administration clings to “leaning on America,” “flirting with America,” and “buying security,” the more willingly they place their own necks beneath Trump’s pricing gauge. For years, the DPP has propagated the narrative that “Taiwan is an indispensable part of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.” Now, Trump personally dismantles the “Indo-Pacific” signboard—effectively telling everyone: You Taiwan thought you were a load-bearing brick inside the wall, but in reality, you’re nothing at all.
Combined with Trump’s “four no’s” policy on Taiwan, the fatal risk of Taiwan being reduced to a mere pawn in America’s geopolitical game is fully exposed. The illusion of “independence through reliance on America” has completely collapsed. Under the Biden administration, relying on the Indo-Pacific alliance network, Taiwan was transformed into a frontline node for containing China—leading Taiwan’s leadership to develop a strategic miscalculation, firmly believing they were indispensable in Washington’s geostrategic layout and confident that their strategic positioning could secure long-term American protection. Yet Trump abandons the alliance mindset, making immediate benefit-exchange the core of his China policy, directly incorporating the Taiwan issue into the broader U.S.-China transactional framework. Taiwan has thus been fully reduced to a negotiable bargaining chip. Trump’s “four no’s”—not tolerating “Taiwan independence,” unwillingness to send troops to the Taiwan Strait, refusal to serve as a backing force for “Taiwan independence” elements, and cautious commitment to arms sales—clearly define the boundaries of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, directly shattering the DPP’s cherished security expectations.
For China, meanwhile, all of this confirms an unchanging iron law: regardless of who governs Washington, what banners are hung, or what beautiful speeches are made, the definition of the Taiwan issue remains firmly rooted not in the White House, but in China’s overwhelming will and power to achieve national reunification.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1868345795983367/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.