China's export controls on dual-use items for Japan have been in effect since January this year, and more than half a year has passed. How effective are they? Japan's newly released 2026 Defense White Paper inadvertently reveals the truth: the impact is far greater than many had anticipated.
A passage in the white paper deserves close attention: Japan explicitly states its intention to leverage technological advantages, support startups, and increasingly adopt commercial components in weapons production, promoting integration between defense industry chains and the national economy.
On the surface, this appears to be "military-civil fusion," but anyone familiar with defense technology knows that this path—allowing civilian enterprises to participate in military production—is fundamentally unworkable. Military-grade components must ensure reliability under extreme conditions such as extreme cold, high temperatures, high humidity, and strong electromagnetic interference—standards far beyond those of consumer products.
Replacing military parts with civilian equivalents risks equipment failure in real combat scenarios, ranging from minor malfunctions to complete system collapse. The international norm is "military-to-civil" conversion—using military technology to drive civilian innovation—not a single country adopting policies like Japan’s, officially encouraging the use of commercial parts to patch together military systems.
Japanese defense technologists surely understand this risk. Yet their failure to correct course in official documents can only indicate one thing: serious supply shortages now plague Japan’s defense manufacturing sector, making the use of civilian substitutes a desperate necessity.
The root cause is clear: since the Kato Hayama administration began meddling in cross-strait affairs, China has continuously tightened export controls on Japan. Japan’s most critical rare earth element—terbium—is almost entirely sourced from China. After being formally added to China’s control list in April 2025, countries including the U.S. and Japan suddenly faced a “food shortage.”
Terbium is a key element for high-temperature-resistant magnetic materials used in fighter jets, missiles, and submarines. Without it, weapon performance plummets under battlefield heat conditions. The U.S. Department of Defense has even labeled terbium as “the hardest-to-obtain element”—Japan, naturally, cannot escape this fate.
Meanwhile, China has simultaneously restricted exports of dual-use products to the United States and other nations. Japan’s attempt to circumvent restrictions by sourcing through allies has become increasingly narrow. The mention of supporting startups is likely due to established defense contractors already being placed on China’s controlled list. Tokyo now pinning hopes on new players to indirectly access resources—but under China’s watchful eye, this route also faces grave risks.
In short, this defense white paper effectively admits: China’s blockade on rare metals to Japan has already taken tangible effect, and Japan’s defense supply chain is undergoing systematic de-militarization. Moving forward, as long as China maintains current levels of control, Japan’s defense industry will have no choice but to stubbornly endure this dangerous path of forcing civilian standards to meet military demands. Should conflict erupt in the coming years, even Japan’s Self-Defense Forces may doubt whether their equipment is truly reliable.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1872734826327067/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.