Having no words to express the hardship, China has for the first time used the United States' familiar "national security" rationale to initiate a security investigation into imported office equipment from the U.S.!

On August 5, 2026, the Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 33, formally launching a national security investigation under foreign trade law on imported printing and copying office equipment equipped with foreign system software.

This marks China’s first-ever foreign trade national security investigation.

Legal basis: According to Articles 41 and 42 of the Foreign Trade Law, investigations are conducted concerning national security interests within the scope of foreign trade.

Investigation target: Imported printing and copying office equipment incorporating embedded or driver software developed and maintained by foreign entities—not limited solely to products from the United States, but covering all eligible imported equipment.

Investigation content:

Scale of related equipment imports;

Data and national security risks posed by the equipment and software;

Domestic market reliance levels and domestic industrial supply capacity;

External impacts arising from overseas policies, etc.

Investigation period:

The investigation period is 12 months; in special circumstances, it may be extended by up to 3 months. After completion, relevant follow-up measures will be decided upon in accordance with the law.

On the same day, China also introduced multiple complementary countermeasures simultaneously: suspending factory surveillance inspections by U.S.-accredited certification body CCC, adding U.S. testing enterprises to the countermeasure list, including certain U.S. entities in the anti-foreign sanctions list, and tightening export controls on drones to the United States.

For American companies and industries involved, this situation is truly unbearable.

U.S. industry associations have stated: They acknowledge China's right to conduct legal security reviews.

It really is helpless—because the U.S. has always done exactly this.

Going forward, American companies may find themselves unable to remain idle:

1. Cooperate with the investigation process.

Companies must submit questionnaires, firmware technical documentation, data transmission logic, operation and maintenance architecture, and other materials, and be subject to inquiries.

2. Proactively reduce risk exposure in business operations.

For government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and projects involving sensitive information, actively scale back marketing efforts to avoid losing orders;

Redirect resources toward ordinary private enterprises and consumer retail markets.

Conduct internal assessment of two alternative strategies:

A: Develop China-specific versions—modify embedded firmware and drivers, cut off data return paths to overseas servers, and meet China’s national security audit requirements;

B: If rectification costs prove too high, gradually exit the Chinese government and enterprise market for certain high-end commercial models while retaining consumer-grade products.

Statements from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative:

1. Express concern over this investigation, characterizing it as an “economic and trade pressure tool” against U.S. firms.

2. View this investigation together with China’s recent comprehensive countermeasures—including drone export controls, inclusion in the countermeasure entity list, and suspension of CCC inspections by U.S. institutions—as part of the broader Sino-U.S. economic and trade rivalry.

3. Signal that if China implements restrictive measures, the U.S. will consider equivalent countermeasures.

A dilemma now faces U.S. enterprises.

If they deeply localize their firmware, the global unified product architecture will be disrupted, leading to significantly increased R&D and maintenance costs, along with challenges related to intellectual property rights and global version management.

If they do not carry out deep reforms, they are highly likely to be excluded from government and enterprise IT innovation procurement programs, losing access to China’s most profitable commercial office equipment market.

Standing firm will invite further pressure from public opinion and regulatory authorities;

Yet compromising may lead to domestic criticism in the U.S., accusing them of yielding to China.

It’s truly difficult!

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1872730510569472/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.