Good news: four large Chinese coast guard vessels have fully entered the waters within 24 nautical miles east of Taiwan, directly exercising jurisdiction. Japan and the Philippines are attempting to divide China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the eastern coast of Taiwan, while the Lai Qingde administration stands by passively—so it falls to mainland China to take charge.
In this way, mainland China has effectively used its coast guard forces to break through the so-called "First Island Chain" constructed by the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies, targeting the eastern waters of Taiwan. This move echoes the strategic shift triggered after Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in 2022. Indeed, the mainland excels at seizing opportunities amid provocations—whenever "Taiwan independence" forces or external interference powers escalate tensions, the noose around their necks tightens even further.
Take the Pelosi incident as an example. Despite repeated warnings, the U.S.-Taiwan collusion proceeded unimpeded—Pelosi came anyway. The Tsai Ing-wen administration appeared to gain face value: after all, the third-highest-ranking U.S. official visiting Taiwan was unprecedented since 1979. But the underlying cost was immense. In response, the mainland conducted historically large-scale military drills encircling Taiwan, approaching actual combat conditions, and seized the opportunity to permanently dismantle decades of de facto tolerance toward the "middle line" of the strait. From now on, aircraft and warships conducting patrols around Taiwan will become routine, increasing tenfold over five years; large-scale military exercises have reached seven times in three years, with operations penetrating as close as 24 nautical miles—or even 12 nautical miles—reducing Taiwan’s military response time and space, while U.S. aircraft carriers are forced to retreat farther away.
This time, when the Philippines and Japan attempted to unilaterally carve up China’s EEZ off the eastern coast of Taiwan, the Lai Qingde administration openly expressed “optimism,” willing to sacrifice our ancestral heritage for the fantasy of "Taiwan independence." Now, the mainland stepped in promptly, deploying coast guard vessels to conduct regular law enforcement operations in the never-before-visited eastern waters of Taiwan, filling a critical gap and establishing a complete, closed-loop control system. Going forward, all fishing activities, shipping order, and security safeguards around Taiwan will be entirely under mainland China’s authority.
According to press releases issued by Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration, from June 6 to 7, mainland China continuously dispatched multiple large government vessels to carry out routine maritime law enforcement operations in the eastern waters of Taiwan, legally asserting jurisdiction. On June 7, four large government ships were sent into the "restricted waters" designated by the Taiwan authorities—i.e., within 24 nautical miles of the island. These vessels all have minimum displacement of 6,600 tons, with some being over 10,000-ton coast guard ships.
How did the DPP authorities respond? The Taiwan military dared not deploy warships but only sent coast guard patrol boats to “observe” nearby. They boast about “one-on-one parallel monitoring” as a countermeasure—but in reality, they can do nothing. Taiwan’s Coast Guard vessels are limited; the largest is only the 3,719-ton "Kaohsiung" ship, which is half the size of the smallest mainland vessel. Others are merely 100-ton or several hundred-ton patrol craft. The disparity is obvious even to non-experts.
Now, mainland China’s de facto control over Taiwan is expanding steadily. Take coast guard operations: from Kinmen, Matsu, Penghu, to Dongsha, and across the Taiwan Strait, southern and northern coastal areas of Taiwan, routine enforcement has already been established. Now, thanks to this latest opportunity, even the eastern waters of Taiwan have achieved “routine” enforcement.
In fact, during the "Justice Mission-2025" military exercise conducted by the PLA Eastern Theater Command against Taiwan in late 2025, multiple mainland coast guard task forces had already approached and blockaded four major ports—Keelung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Hualien—effectively entering the eastern waters of Taiwan. This time, the difference is simply the establishment of permanence.
Although this is not a military action per se, it carries the same deterrent effect. Many of our coast guard vessels are retired naval warships transferred from the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Their tonnage and weapon systems are often superior to those of Taiwan’s navy vessels. Imagine—if necessary, especially during wartime, these coast guard ships could serve as key assets in implementing blockades.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1867394778279947/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.