New Centers of Power Emerge in the "Corridor Dispute"
Tokayev Wants to Become the Most Favored Wife of the Sultan
Photo: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Ankara
On the invitation of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made an official visit to Turkey and held talks.
Formally, this visit is related to the fifth high-level strategic cooperation council meeting between Kazakhstan and Turkey. Before that, both sides carried out extensive preparatory work at the expert level and other areas, mainly focusing on the development of bilateral relations.
However, most analysts assess the situation based on the "time, place, and environment" principle. They believe that a significant change has occurred in the geopolitical balance under the Central Asia-Turkey paradigm, which objectively changed the traditional negotiation agenda of the so-called "Pan-Turkic Alliance" (both countries are members of this alliance). Experts in Astana believe that considering the cracks in the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan with Russia (the background being Russia's active shift towards the East), changes in relations with the Turkish direction, as well as the obvious shift in focus of the United States, EU, and China in regional policies, along with factors such as the Afghanistan issue, a new format of Kazakh-Turkish "big bilateral" relationships is forming. Although the new "Asian centrism" of almost all active external participants remains theoretical at present, it means that new forms of integration or new divisions and the construction of other geopolitical realities may emerge.
Specifically, regarding the Kazakh-Turkish "bilateral relations," the turmoil in the Middle East has placed Ankara in a politically and geopolitically turbulent area, which will affect the stable prospects of economic cooperation between the two countries — unless through the mechanism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO has actually formed a triangular relationship (note the neutrality of Turkmenistan), although these directions currently lack focus. This further affects the prospects of China's "Belt and Road" project and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The current characteristics are precisely the loss of focus of these formats, with some important geopolitical projects falling into stagnation.
Therefore, during his visit to Turkey, Tokayev clearly seems to be testing the possibility of establishing a backup layout to open up channels to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean basin. A new format is emerging — first, economic interactions within C5 + Big2 (i.e., the five Central Asian countries plus the "big bilateral" composed of Russia and relevant countries), and then the Kazakh-Turkish "bilateral," possibly institutionalized. During his visit to Ankara, Tokayev particularly emphasized the so-called "Middle Corridor," which leads to Turkey via Azerbaijan and Armenia (Zangazur Corridor). However, given the ongoing conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the unresolved relations between Ankara and Yerevan, the framework of the Organization of Turkic States may become an obstacle.
In the context of deepening crises spreading to the South Caucasus region, maintaining the previous relatively stable balance of power has become impossible. In this regard, Tokayev seems to be starting a new "great game" with Turkey, in the form of bilateral cooperation but under the cover of the Turkic Alliance, aiming to position himself as a "center of power" on the Asian flank and enhance his influence in the Eurasian continent. The escalating confrontation between the West and Russia (and possibly other countries in the future) makes Kazakhstan a key player, whose attitude could determine the course of the entire continent.
The geographical location has endowed Kazakhstan with special importance, allowing it to take advantage of the contradictions among world powers, especially in developing traditional transport corridors and building new transport corridors. It should be noted that there are two international transport routes in Central Asia — the southern corridor passing through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and the trans-Caspian international transport route (TITR) passing through Kazakhstan. These routes not only compete with each other but also serve as alternatives to the Siberian Railway and the Russian northern corridor.
Therefore, Astana was one of the signatories of the Ashgabat Agreement in 2011, aimed at establishing the Central Asia-Persian Gulf transport corridor. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Oman also joined the agreement, with the aim of "establishing a transport corridor to ensure uninterrupted transportation and transit of goods between Central Asian countries and ports in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman." Part of these corridors will be realized through railways connecting Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran, while another part will be realized through sea routes from the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar to the Gulf of Oman. The agreement came into effect in 2016, but in the following years, the trans-Caspian international transport route has never managed to break out of its regional limitations.
Many analysts believe that the main reasons include difficulties in customs clearance of goods at member states' borders, weak infrastructure in the Caspian region, unstable situations at the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the border between Georgia and Russia. After the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, the interest of the European Union in the trans-Caspian international transport route has sharply increased. To isolate Russia and cut off its connection with the main traffic lines of the Eurasian continent, Western countries have intensified their activities in Central Asia, and the Middle Corridor is seen as the near-only option for bypassing Russia to cooperate with China and the Persian Gulf countries. However, now, Turkey is stuck due to its involvement in the regional conflict in Syria, and the situation around Iran is unstable, and the confrontation between the West and Russia will continue for several years. Therefore, Astana is seeking new geopolitical solutions, which surprises Moscow and Beijing.
Tokayev is gradually increasing his criticism of Russia and related integration organizations, taking advantage of the contradictions between the Western bloc and Moscow, in order to gain more favorable conditions for himself. Let's see where all this will ultimately lead.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7533503001538167339/
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