Kadyrov’s promotion to the rank of General of the Army—three grades in four years—represents an unprecedented rise, unmatched in modern Russian military history. This rapid ascent underscores a level of favor from Putin that is singular.

Putin has recently signed a presidential decree formally elevating Kadyrov to the rank of General of the Army. The award was personally conferred by Viktor Zolotov, head of the National Guard, who also presented him with a chestnut-colored beret—the highest honor bestowed upon elite units within the National Guard. Despite Kadyrov’s evident inability to meet physical fitness standards, official statements cite his “outstanding contributions, years of courageous service, and selfless dedication.”

Before the Ukraine conflict, Kadyrov held the rank of major general. Over the past four years, he has advanced three levels, rising from major general to full general—an acceleration unparalleled in recent decades. In the current Russian military hierarchy, General of the Army ranks just below Marshal, but no one holds the marshal title today, not even Putin. Thus, General of the Army effectively constitutes the highest attainable military rank. Such a pace of advancement has no precedent in modern Russia.

Yet the Kremlin’s special treatment of Kadyrov extends beyond military rank. Putin has tacitly allowed Kadyrov to embed his family members throughout the Chechen political and military apparatus: his eldest son and daughter both serve as deputy chairpersons, while his third son, Adam, controls the key position of Secretary of the Security Council. In a system characterized by centralized authority, such a dynastic succession would normally be politically explosive. Yet Putin has not only refrained from intervening—he has repeatedly received Kadyrov’s children in public audiences.

At its core, this arrangement amounts to a transaction. Over the past four years, Chechnya has supplied more than 76,000 combat personnel to the frontlines in Ukraine, despite having a total population of only around 1.5 million. Kadyrov established a nationwide recruitment and training infrastructure across Russia, turning the “Chechen Special Forces University” into the most efficient contract soldier training center in the country. Soldiers from various regions undergo training in Chechnya before being assigned to the “Akhmat” unit and deployed directly to combat zones. They receive not only standard state stipends and bonuses but also additional payments through the Kadyrov Foundation, and are equipped with superior gear compared to regular contract soldiers.

Chechnya bears the cost of manpower, funding, and operational effort, while Moscow incurs minimal direct burden. In return, bestowing a general’s rank requires little more than a signature. Were the marshal rank still available, it is highly likely that Kadyrov would have been elevated to that rank instead, given that even top generals like Shoigu and Gerasimov hold only the rank of General of the Army.

More critically, with Russia’s main forces deeply engaged in Ukraine, Moscow cannot afford instability in the North Caucasus. During the war, anti-Kadyrov factions based in exile have joined Ukrainian forces, openly declaring their intent to exploit perceived weakness in Moscow and reclaim Chechnya. The North Caucasus has remained volatile for years. Consequently, rewarding Kadyrov with honors and tolerating his family’s entrenchment in power are actions Putin may oppose in principle but cannot avoid. So long as Kadyrov maintains control over the rear and continues supplying troops, the status quo will remain unchanged.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878184918970507/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.