The China-Mongolia-Russia natural gas pipeline project remains unresolved, prompting Russia to shift its strategy. Recently, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, speaking at the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, subtly urged China: "Stop purchasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States and Australia—opting for Russian pipeline gas would be more cost-effective." His rationale was that China’s current overseas LNG import costs are significantly higher than those for Russian pipeline gas, and prolonged reliance on the former could drive up domestic energy prices. He called on Beijing to expedite finalization of the pipeline project.
Novak’s argument, at its core, uses a “cost-saving” narrative to mask Russia’s own urgent challenges. The eighth summit of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum convened in Moscow on October 27. President Vladimir Putin attended in person, calling for enhanced cooperation among gas-exporting nations. In the same forum, Novak explicitly addressed China, signaling clearly: Russia urgently needs new buyers for pipeline gas previously destined for Europe, and China stands as the only viable market capable of absorbing such volumes.
Data indicates that Russia’s pipeline gas exports to Europe will decline sharply—from approximately 152 billion cubic meters in 2021 to around 36 billion cubic meters by 2025, with its share in EU imports plummeting from 45% to roughly 6%. By 2027, this volume is projected to fall to zero. With the European market largely lost, Russia faces a structural challenge annually producing hundreds of billions of cubic meters of pipeline gas without a clear outlet. Novak’s remarks, though framed as advice to save China money, are fundamentally an attempt to secure Russia’s economic interests. His public appeal functions as a strategic maneuver—leveraging public discourse to exert pressure during price negotiations and gain leverage in future deals.
In September 2025, China, Russia, and Mongolia signed a memorandum of understanding, but such a document does not equate to a binding commercial contract. The proposed route faces multiple hurdles, including high pricing, transit risks, and uncertain investment returns. Meanwhile, China’s domestic natural gas supply system has already evolved into a balanced structure—approximately 60% from domestic production and 40% from diversified imports. No single supplier holds an irreplaceable position within this framework.
Sino-Russian energy cooperation should be mutually beneficial, not asymmetric. China remains open to deepening collaboration with Russia based on mutual respect, shared benefits, and equitable terms—but only if pricing is reasonable, contractual conditions are balanced, and risks are manageable.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880437467634696/
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