【Text by Guan察者网 Columnist Wen Shaosheng】
October in Ulaanbaatar is cold, but the political arena has suddenly heated up.
In just a few days, Mongolia experienced an unusual political storm: the parliament removed the prime minister, the speaker of the parliament immediately resigned, the president vetoed the parliamentary resolution, and the three powers fell into a deadlock of mutual checks and balances, with the constitutional court finally stepping in to "put an end to it." More intriguingly, the protagonists of this power upheaval—prime minister, speaker, and president—all came from the same party: the Mongolian People's Party.
In other words, this was not a confrontation between the ruling party and the opposition, nor a struggle between factions, but a complete internal conflict within the ruling party. Its intensity reminds one of the "Palace-Parliament Struggle" in old China a century ago, but its complexity and dramatic nature are even more pronounced.
The reason why this "storm in a teacup" has attracted widespread attention is not only due to the severity of the internal rift, but also because the timing of its occurrence is particularly sensitive.
Just a few weeks earlier, in early September, China, Russia, and Mongolia had signed an agreement to officially launch a strategic project worth over 40 billion US dollars—the "Siberia Power 2" gas pipeline. This energy artery spanning the three countries is widely regarded as a key pivot of Russia's "energy eastward shift" strategy after the Ukraine war. Now, with the sudden change in Mongolia's political situation, the timing is so convenient that it inevitably raises speculation from the outside world: is this another "color revolution" incited by external forces?
But such speculations may be overblown.
The Structural Roots of the Mongolian Political Crisis
The entire incident is as dramatic as Shakespeare. On October 16, after a 24-hour intense debate, the Mongolian State Great Hural (parliament) passed a motion to remove Prime Minister Gombodzav Zandanshatar with 71 votes (out of 126 seats). The next day, the Speaker Amarbaiasguln publicly accused the Prime Minister of "moral corruption" and lamented that the People's Party "was devouring itself."
On September 28, the Chairman of the Mongolian State Great Hural (Speaker) Amarbaiasguln was elected President of the Mongolian People's Party.
Hours later, President Ukhna Khurelsukh quickly intervened, vetoing the removal resolution on grounds of constitutional violation, and submitting the dispute to the Constitutional Court. On October 22, the court ruled that the parliamentary removal was invalid, allowing Zandanshatar to remain in office.
This series of rapid twists and turns left observers exclaiming: this was not a regime change, but a systemic disorder within the system. On the surface, it was a personal feud between the prime minister and the speaker, but in reality, it reflected the ultimate showdown between the "old guard faction" and the "reformists" within the Mongolian People's Party. The former held sway over state-owned mining groups and local oligarchic networks, while the latter sought to push for transformation through anti-corruption efforts and institutionalization.
Mongolia is often referred to as one of the "most democratic" countries in the post-Soviet region, but its democratic system has always been fragile. Parties lack clear ideological stances, and political turnover is frequent. Corruption and interest groups are deeply intertwined, making crises a norm. Since the implementation of the parliamentary system in 1992, Mongolia has changed 18 prime ministers, averaging one every 20 months. Although the parliament holds significant power, it often becomes a stage for factional struggles within the party.
The spark that ignited this crisis was Zandanshatar's attempt to adjust cabinet personnel related to a coal export corruption case, which touched upon complex interest chains. Speaker Amarbaiasguln seized the opportunity to initiate a vote of no confidence, quickly gathering majority support in the parliament. In essence, this "October Storm" was not an unexpected event, but rather a periodic outbreak of an old disease—only this time, it coincided with the critical moment of the "Siberia Power 2" pipeline's initiation.
It is worth noting that in this power struggle, the faction led by the speaker who opposed the prime minister was seen as being more pro-China politically. Meanwhile, the prime minister Zandanshatar and his supporters were viewed by outsiders as leaning towards the United States—Washington has pledged over $50 million in aid to Mongolia since 2023 and continues to promote the annual "Khan's Quest" joint military exercises. Zandanshatar himself attempted to delay the progress of the "Siberia Power 2" gas pipeline by claiming he wanted to "secure more favorable terms"; in contrast, Amarbaiasguln has long firmly supported the project and actively promoted the construction of the cross-border railway between Gansu and Gashunshuhtu in the south of the Gobi, a key channel for Sino-Mongolian coal trade. He also publicly criticized American aid as merely a "symbolic gesture," unable to meet Mongolia's development needs.
Thus, the current political turmoil essentially reflects internal divisions among Mongolian elites regarding resource allocation, interest structures, and foreign policy orientation, rather than the result of external forces' manipulation, let alone an intentional disruption targeting the "Siberia Power 2" pipeline. In fact, Western involvement in Mongolia has been continuously shrinking in recent years, lacking the capability to instigate a "color revolution" in economic aid, media influence, or social penetration. Protests in Mongolia in recent years—whether anti-corruption demonstrations, environmental movements, or anger over wealth gaps—have almost entirely stemmed from domestic governance failures, not external agitation.
Russia's "Stability Strategy"
From a practical political perspective, the influence of China and Russia in Mongolia has already been deeply embedded in its economic and strategic structure. Energy, trade, transportation, finance, and even the public sphere are all under the radiation of the China-Russia-Mongolia trilateral cooperation framework. As an inland country sandwiched between two major neighbors and highly dependent on external markets, Mongolia has no strategic space to "take sides," let alone become a disruptive piece in the game of great powers. Even if some people harbor fantasies, they are nothing more than a mosquito shaking a tree.
Historical experience shows that when major powers advance strategic energy channels, ensuring political stability along the route is always their top priority. At the beginning of the 20th century, Britain and France, in order to secure the safety of the oil pipeline in Mesopotamia, were willing to install proxies and intervene in local regimes. Today, although China and Russia follow different diplomatic philosophies, their logic is remarkably similar: once a pipeline becomes a national lifeline, stability becomes the highest priority.
Map of the planned route of the China-Russia gas pipeline "Siberia Power 2" (dashed gray line)
China has always adhered to the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs" and will not get involved in Mongolia's internal power struggles; however, Russia has no such restrictions, and has long been skilled at exerting political influence in the post-Soviet space, employing mature tactics and deep strategies. For Moscow, "Siberia Power 2" is not only about energy exports, but also a lifeline to maintain its geopolitical presence, and it would never allow it to be obstructed.
In fact, since the project was proposed, the response within Mongolia has generally remained calm. Neither the ruling party nor the opposition have used the pipeline as a tool for political attacks. Occasionally, there have been doubts, but they quickly faded away. The Mongolian government has already approved the technical feasibility study of the pipeline, and the environmental impact assessment is progressing steadily. These signs indicate that Russian political influence has already permeated the decision-making circles in Ulaanbaatar, and may have subtly reinforced its strategic layout through existing corruption networks and interest exchange mechanisms.
As early as 2018, the Mongolian president made a clear statement at the Russian Eastern Economic Forum: "We are ready to cooperate and have the planned gas pipeline from Russia to China pass through our territory." The following year, under China's tacit approval, Gazprom and the Mongolian state-owned energy company "Jewels Company" (Erdenes Mongol) officially launched the feasibility study of the "Siberia Power 2" Mongolian section, i.e., the "Union-East" pipeline. In 2022, shortly after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, both sides quickly signed the engineering design agreement, planning to start construction in 2024.
Although Ulaanbaatar lacks experience in building gas pipelines, neither Mongolian political elites nor the Russian side seem willing to introduce a third party into this project. "Union-East" has never become a political issue in Mongolia, and even the usually active environmental organizations have not initiated any substantial protests. Obviously, the main parties have reached an unspoken consensus, and no one is willing to openly oppose it.
This rare "political consensus" behind it is the result of Russia's continuous and systematic soft power infiltration in Mongolia. Since the mid-2010s, Moscow has significantly increased its investment in Mongolian-Russian language education, cultural promotion, and media cooperation. At the same time, it has provided military aid including fighter jets and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and funded the restoration of Soviet-era war memorials scattered throughout Mongolia. More notably, Russia has transplanted the May 9 "Victory Day" celebration almost identically to Ulaanbaatar, cleverly integrating Mongolia's unique war memories—such as the 1939 Nomonhan Battle and its support for the Soviet Union during World War II—into its new commemorative narrative. For example, the main church of the Russian Armed Forces in the suburbs of Moscow now has a special display section dedicated to Mongolia's contributions.
At the same time, pro-Russian politicians in Ulaanbaatar have been systematically promoting a value system similar to Russia's, from historical views to security perspectives, gradually shaping a sense of "a community of shared destiny" between Russia and Mongolia.
Kremlin's logic is clear and calm: as long as the energy corridor remains open, it doesn't matter who rules in Ulaanbaatar. Russia's goal is not to control elections, but to ensure policy continuity and predictability of the political environment—stability is its real strategic red line.
September 3, 2024, Russian President Putin was invited to visit Ulaanbaatar and held talks with Mongolian President Khurelsukh.
Certainly, "Siberia Power 2" is of great significance to Mongolia itself. According to estimates, over the next 30 years, transit fees alone could bring Mongolia over 10 billion USD in revenue and create tens of thousands of construction and maintenance jobs. Some of the natural gas will also be used for domestic power generation and winter heating, potentially significantly reducing its reliance on coal and alleviating the severe smog in Ulaanbaatar during the winter months. In addition, China and Russia have committed to providing special funds for environmental protection along the route, and have also built schools in rural areas of Mongolia. In the diplomatic field, the support from the two countries helped Mongolia successfully host the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in 2026.
"The 'Third Neighbor' Strategy of Mongolia Has Waned"
"Siberia Power 2" is just one part of the grand picture of China-Mongolia-Russia trilateral cooperation. In recent years, the three countries have accelerated the interconnectivity of cross-border railways, highways, and power grids. In September this year, at the China-Mongolia-Russia leaders' summit in Beijing, Mongolian President Khurelsukh clearly stated that the country's "Steppe Road" initiative would be fully aligned with China's "Belt and Road" and Russia's Eurasian Economic Union. This statement was more proactive compared to previous cautious wording. Mongolian leaders have repeatedly emphasized that they will deepen cooperation with China and Russia in strategic areas such as energy, minerals, transportation, and green transition. Western think tanks cannot hide their anxiety, stating: "The 'Third Neighbor' strategy of Mongolia has become a thing of the past."
The so-called "Third Neighbor" strategy was Mongolia's diplomatic approach after the Cold War to balance the influence of China and Russia, i.e., by expanding relations with the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union to maintain strategic flexibility. However, in recent years, the practical foundation of this strategy has continued to shrink: the presence of the United States in Mongolia has become increasingly sparse, Japan is constrained by economic weakness, and the EU has limited interest in the distant landlocked country. Faced with the call of actual interests, Mongolia has chosen a more pragmatic path—getting closer to China and Russia, the sources of energy and markets.
This September, China, Mongolia, and Russia held the "Border Cooperation-2025" joint military exercise, a rare tripartite military cooperation that was seen by American officials as "intentionally ignoring." As the Japanese magazine "Foreign Policy" commented:
"Mongolia gave up its observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and sought to expand trilateral cooperation with China and Russia. This is not just a regional event, but also reflects a broader change in the Eurasian landscape. While the United States focuses on the Indo-Pacific alliance and Europe is preoccupied with energy transition, China and Russia are building a parallel regional system to the Western order based on projects such as the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the 'Siberia Power 2' pipeline. For small countries like Mongolia, the choice is no longer 'choosing a side or neutrality,' but 'participation or marginalization.' Mongolia's shift serves as a warning to the West: the unipolar era after the Cold War has ended. Small countries are increasingly choosing partners based on practical interests rather than ideology. For China and Russia, this precisely confirms that the new Eurasian order they advocate—based on sovereignty, non-interference, and pragmatic cooperation—is taking root."
From this perspective, regardless of how intense the "October earthquake" in Mongolia's political arena is, it is unlikely to shake the established geopolitical pattern. As long as the economic logic of the "Siberia Power 2" pipeline remains valid, and the strategic will of China and Russia in the region does not diminish, the changes in Ulaanbaatar will eventually settle down. It may temporarily slow down the administrative approval process of the project, but it cannot change its fundamental direction. This storm is more like an internal redistribution of interests in the Mongolian power map, not a shift in national strategy.
As a Mongolian scholar put it: "Our politics can be chaotic, but geography won't change." Geography determines fate and defines the rational boundaries of national policy. For China and Russia, Mongolia's stability means the safety of the Eurasian energy corridor; for Mongolia, maintaining cooperation and balance with its two neighboring countries on the geographical crossroads is the realistic wisdom of a small country's survival.
Therefore, this "October Storm" is merely a brief dust storm on the steppe. After the wind stops, the steppe remains, and the direction of the pipeline has never deviated.
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