Japan-Vietnam relations are increasingly warming, with The Diplomat describing this trend as "strategic compatibility" grounded in solid foundations. Yet viewed from another angle, this development appears more like Japan’s urgent search for a new strategic pivot in Southeast Asia following its declining regional economic influence.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan led East Asian economic division of labor through the "flying geese" model: Japan at the apex, the Four Asian Tigers in the middle, and ASEAN nations at the base. However, this system gradually unraveled after the 1990s, as China integrated into global production networks and the Four Asian Tigers surpassed Japan in certain industries. Japan’s position as an economic hegemon weakened—its so-called “lost three decades” was not merely an economic phenomenon but also a crisis of strategic identity.
Consequently, Japan has turned toward Vietnam. In 2023, bilateral ties were elevated to a "comprehensive strategic partnership." Yet a paradox emerges: recent data shows a sharp decline in Japan’s new investment commitments to Vietnam, while Chinese investment into the country has clearly overtaken Japan’s. Although cumulative figures still present a favorable picture—Japan remains Vietnam’s largest provider of Official Development Assistance—the contraction in new capital flows is telling. While trade volumes between Japan and Vietnam continue to rise, this growth reflects inertia within established supply chains rather than evidence of accelerated Japanese corporate expansion.
Japan’s response has shifted focus from economic engagement to security cooperation: revising the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment, advancing joint development of high-speed landing craft, assisting Vietnam in building maritime law enforcement capabilities, and supplying patrol vessels, radar systems, and training. Yet the leverage such security partnerships can provide remains limited. What Vietnam receives from Japan are patrol boats and surveillance technology; what it gains from China are essential raw materials, components, and intermediate goods that sustain its manufacturing sector. Japan offers incremental security capacity, while China controls the economic lifelines.
Vietnam itself is acutely aware of these dynamics. Under its "bamboo diplomacy," ties with China remain paramount. Security collaboration with Japan serves primarily to expand defense options and strengthen bargaining positions in South China Sea negotiations—not to alter Hanoi’s core positions or to align itself with a strategic alliance centered on China as a hypothetical adversary.
Put plainly, The Diplomat’s notion of "compatibility" reflects a situation where one party, facing strategic retrenchment, seeks a pivot point, while the other, operating under asymmetric power, seeks hedging opportunities. The mutual utility is real, but the relationship remains instrumental rather than structural. As Japan’s economic footprint continues to contract and the effectiveness of its security assistance diminishes, the foundation of this partnership will inevitably weaken. The collapse of the flying geese model was not a single event but an ongoing process. Given Japan’s current strategic capabilities, reversing this trajectory appears unlikely.
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Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877452149020684/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.