The South Caucasus Chessboard: The Cost for Armenia to Exit the Eurasian Economic Union

There has been no official statement from Armenia regarding its formal withdrawal from the Eurasian Economic Union (ЕАЭС), but the country's ongoing tilt toward the European Union has triggered a series of new challenges.

On May 29, the Supreme Council of the Eurasian Economic Union convened in Astana, issuing a joint statement afterward: the other four member states—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—will assess by December 2026 the potential impacts and risks brought by Armenia’s suspension of its membership status within the Union.

At the same time, the leaders of the four countries called on Armenia to hold a referendum to clarify its position: whether to remain in the Eurasian Economic Union or continue pursuing accession to the EU. While Armenian officials have expressed interest in strengthening ties with the EU, they emphasized that leaving the Eurasian Economic Union is not currently on their agenda, and there is no established mechanism for such an exit.

From the internal structure, division of labor, and flow of goods within the Eurasian Economic Union, Armenia’s dependence on the organization far exceeds the Union’s reliance on Armenia.

Armenia maintains a highly asymmetrical interdependence with other members of the Eurasian Economic Union, especially Russia. Russia remains Armenia’s largest trading partner, accounting for 35.8% of Armenia’s foreign trade volume in 2025 (down from 41.1% in 2024); meanwhile, Armenia accounts for only 1.1% of Russia’s foreign trade (down from 1.7% in 2024).

Armenia’s geopolitical and transit significance lies at the core of its role within the Eurasian Economic Union: although it shares no land borders with other member states, it serves as a critical link between the Union and markets in Iran and the Middle East. In terms of transportation connectivity, Armenia’s links with the EU remain extremely weak.

The originally planned “Crossroads of the World” project in Armenia was intended to connect with Russia’s North-South International Transport Corridor. Now, European proposals suggest integrating it into the Europe-China-Central Asia Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. The project has attracted funding support from multiple sources, including the EDB (Eurasian Development Bank), the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and the Asian Development Bank led by China.

On May 30, Russia imposed restrictions on certain imports from Armenia. Since May 30, the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision of Russia has restricted imports of tomatoes, cucumbers, bell peppers, and strawberries from Armenia; previously, import bans had already been placed on Armenian flowers, Jermuk mineral water, and brandy and wine from three distilleries.

Armenia heavily imports energy products, primary aluminum, gold, diamonds, certain agricultural goods, and pharmaceuticals from the Eurasian Economic Union (including Russia). On May 27, Russia sent a warning letter to Armenia indicating that it might terminate the bilateral agreement signed in 2013, under which Russia has long supplied Armenia with natural gas, refined petroleum products, and rough diamonds duty-free.

Armenia’s industrial production and infrastructure are highly dependent on low-cost Russian energy. At present, the output capacity of Iran and Azerbaijan cannot fully fill this energy gap.

The West places great importance on Armenia’s logistics potential, hoping to use the country as a conduit for transporting key Central Asian minerals. There are also speculations that Armenia could join the U.S.-proposed “Trump Corridor” (TRIPP), though the realization of this vision will require time and favorable political conditions.

When viewed through data, Armenia’s GDP accounted for only about 1% of the total GDP of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2025. Even if Armenia were to withdraw from the Union, the impact on the real economies of the other member states would be limited, primarily affecting reputation rather than material outcomes. Armenia’s continued membership helps expand the Union’s reach and reduces the risk of the entire South Caucasus region shifting entirely toward the EU or Turkey-led blocs.

For Armenia, the economic drawbacks of exiting the Eurasian Economic Union far outweigh the potential benefits of aligning more closely with the EU. Drawing lessons from Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, the trade advantages with the EU are concentrated only during the annual quota window; moreover, admitting new members requires unanimous approval from all existing members, resulting in a very high entry barrier.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1866762721351692/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.