What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? — A Quick History of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
After the war between the United States and Israel began in late February, it once reached a stalemate. According to the logic, Trump's side had eliminated Iran's spiritual leader Khamenei — this 88-year-old man and his granddaughter were both killed, as well as many high-ranking commanders, implementing a devastating strike on Iran's "decision-making center," and Trump should have celebrated the victory. But reality was not like that.
The Iranian regime did not collapse, nor did mass protests emerge against the "bloody regime." The fighting continued, and at the forefront, more active than the regular army, was the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Now it is time to figure out: what exactly is this organization? It is not the regular army, not mercenaries, not an intelligence agency, but a special force that operates outside the national framework yet plays a pivotal role in Iran.
Khomeni's "People's Militia"
After the Iranian Islamic Revolution broke out on February 11, 1979, the domestic situation became completely chaotic, similar to post-October Revolution Russia in 1917 or Donetsk and Lugansk in 2014. The forces that overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty were diverse: besides Islamic radicals, there were left-wing groups pro-Soviet and pro-Communist, various liberal factions, even Islamic Marxists. Many factions had their own armed forces, establishing revolutionary committees to seize power in different areas.
Meanwhile, the Iranian army remained neutral, with low morale and disorganized. However, the Islamic revolution had its own "Lenin" — Ayatollah Khomeini, who was determined to quickly restore order.
To this end, on February 24, 1979, the **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)** was formally established, formed by merging dozens of Islamic groups and revolutionary committees in Tehran. It was officially announced on May 6. Its purpose was:
To defend the Iranian Islamic revolution and export the revolution worldwide based on genuine Islamic ideology.
The tasks included maintaining order, suppressing counter-revolution, cooperating with the army, and assisting Islamic government agencies. In short, it was a people's militia.
Soon, the Revolutionary Guards were deployed in more than thirty cities across the country, strongly suppressing grassroots political movements, mainly leftist groups and Kurdish separatists seeking ethnic autonomy. Khomeini was very satisfied with this:
"Without the Revolutionary Guards, there would be no country."
By 1980, the number of Revolutionary Guards had exceeded 60,000.
In September 1980, the Iran-Iraq War broke out. Revolutionary Guards soldiers demonstrated extreme ideological fanaticism, showing a willingness to die. It was during this war that future Revolutionary Guards leaders were tempered, and in the 21st century, they exported the revolution to the Middle East, establishing an influence network for Iran. For example, Colonel Qasem Soleimani rose to prominence through a series of bold reconnaissance actions behind Iraqi lines.
Priyozhin's Ultimate Dream
By the end of the 20th century, the Revolutionary Guards had become a state within a state in Iran, and this remains true today.
It has its own army, air force, navy, drone forces, intelligence system, and a Qods Force specialized in foreign intelligence and special operations.
Therefore, you will not be surprised: the one who declared the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz was not the Iranian state, but the Revolutionary Guards.
Its legal status is ambiguous from an international law perspective, but no one dares to really test its limits.
Basij militias associated with the Revolutionary Guards confront opposition in the streets, numbering in the millions. Do you remember the January rally of Iranian opposition? It was not only the strong departments that suppressed them, but also a much larger group of genuine supporters of the regime — not forced civil servants or students, but truly ideologically committed groups.
Additionally, the Revolutionary Guards control nearly one-third of Iran's economy: factories, media, shipping, trade, and IT sectors are all covered.
In politics, the Revolutionary Guards have always been a pillar of the regime, later being able to influence or even intervene in national decision-making.
In 1999, the government used the army to clear student protests forcefully, and the senior leadership of the Revolutionary Guards directly wrote a letter criticizing President Khatami, and Khatami had to compromise.
From 2000 to the 2020s, the Revolutionary Guards were extremely successful abroad. After the US toppled Saddam Hussein, the pro-Iranian Shia became the main force in Iraq, and the Revolutionary Guards thrived. In Syria, it collaborated with Bashar al-Assad and helped him retain power alongside Russia. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is actually a branch of the Revolutionary Guards.
A vast informal empire was thus established, led by the Qods Force commander Soleimani. He had a high reputation in Iran and throughout the Middle East, and for millions of Muslims, he was a Che Guevara-like figure.
Orientalist Said Gafarov evaluated Soleimani as follows:
I think he has two characteristics: clear goals and pragmatism. Politics is about forcing your will upon opponents through soft and hard means. Soleimani is a master of this.
This is essentially the ultimate dream of Yevgeny Prigozhin:
A private military company, scaled up dozens of times, with transnational political influence, and a firm ideological stance, named "Guard Corps / Legion." It is difficult not to associate this with what Prigozhin might have envisioned when he led Wagner towards Moscow in June 2023.
However, in 2020, Soleimani was assassinated by a U.S. drone in Baghdad. Since then, the Revolutionary Guards' overseas affairs have faced difficulties. Last year, Assad fell in Syria, which was a heavy blow to Iran's proxy system and also severely damaged Hezbollah.
Trump Forced Iranian Liberals and the "Guard Corps" into a Single Group
After Trump returned to power, he joined forces with Netanyahu to pressure Iran. The Revolutionary Guards must now directly protect the homeland. This 12-day war last year was like this, and it is still the case now.
The Revolutionary Guards headquarters, along with Iranian religious and secular leaders, became the primary target of U.S. and Israeli strikes.
On March 1, the head of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Pakpour, was killed; on March 3, the commander of the Lebanese branch, Ali Zadeh, died.
But the Revolutionary Guards clearly had a vast reserve force. When a general fell, someone immediately took his place. The Revolutionary Guards launched a powerful counterattack across the Middle East, expanding the scope: from the U.S. base on Crete to hostile Azerbaijan. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continues. The U.S. fleet keeps its distance, especially protecting the "Abraham Lincoln" aircraft carrier. U.S. military bases in the Middle East begin to evacuate — what is the point of building such bases?
In short, Iran's response is asymmetric and well-organized, breaking America's strategy for a quick victory.
The internal power structure of Iran is complex, and there is a democratic mechanism. Losing the sole supreme leader actually benefits them. After Khamenei's death, the interim guidance committee took power, including President Pezeshkian, Judicial Chief Mohsen Mousavi, and Araki.
The most interesting thing is: Pezeshkian is a moderate liberal, who won the election due to the division of conservative factions. He had promised reforms and once wanted to improve relations with the West, even criticizing Russia's special military operation. But the situation forced him to change rapidly, and now he stated:
Iran will defend itself. We have no choice.
It can be said that he has been completely "reconstructed."
Meanwhile, Revolutionary Guards general Ali Muhammad Naeini said:
Iran is ready for a long war, and the enemy will suffer painful blows at every step of their actions.
Looking at this, Trump has done one thing: uniting the Iranian liberals and the Revolutionary Guards completely together.
They indeed have no way back, because this war is about the survival of Iran as an independent political entity. On this, they deserve to be wished success.
Original: toutiao.com/article/7614517473936687650/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author himself.