2734 words in this article
Estimated reading time: 6 minutes
Author | Happymon Jacob
Translated by | Chen Zhuoke
Translation Reviewers | Hu Keyi, Liu Xingjun
This Issue Editor | Zhang Mimi
This Issue Reviewer | Chen Zhuoke
Editor's Note
In 2025, India launched an air strike named "Operation Sindoor" against Pakistan under the pretext of counter-terrorism, which is the largest military operation against targets within Pakistan since the 2019 Balakot air strikes. The author believes that this action signals a major shift in India's counter-terrorism strategy. First, it highlights India's strategic shift in dealing with its relationship with Pakistan, moving from "traditional restraint" to "controlled escalation." India has decided not to passively accept Pakistan's risk-driven strategy but instead to escalate the conflict and actively shape the risks. Second, it indicates India's attempt to change the rules of the game, no longer being restricted by past deterrence logic in military operations, seeking to establish a new deterrence mechanism that forces Pakistan to be accountable for terrorist activities within its borders, and demonstrating that India will no longer tolerate any form of provocation, thereby gaining a more favorable position in both military and diplomatic terms. Third, it reveals India's intention to reshape the power dynamics and layout in South Asia. The Indian government believes that although this operation carries potential dangerous consequences, it will be a necessary step to correct the imbalance in deterrence in South Asia. India plans to use this operation to reshape the security dynamics of the South Asian subcontinent and redefine the threshold of India-Pakistan military contact. The South Asia Research Communications has translated this article for your critical reference.
Image source: Internet
The "Operation Sindoor" demonstrates India's resolute determination to confront terrorism regardless of the consequences. Although India has long sent such signals, this attitude has not yet become an official policy, and the actual implementation has been unremarkable. The high-profile, high-intensity, and open "Sindoor military operation" launched by India marks the attempt of Indian decision-makers to establish "responding to terrorist attacks through military means" as a strategic innovation. If this interpretation holds, India's approach to terrorism may undergo a strategic shift in the coming years.
Low-intensity military actions (such as those in 2016 and 2019) may no longer be the preferred response. The current Indian approach of openly, clearly, and decisively responding is essentially a strategic move to normalize military retaliation. This implies that India may flexibly use different levels of conventional force in the future depending on the level of terrorist threats, thus opening up policy space for a series of potential punitive measures.
"Operation Sindoor" attempts to show that India no longer accepts the traditional concept that there is a fundamental difference between "unconventional aggression (terrorism)" and "conventional aggression (military action)." Pakistan has long used this distinction to promote the narrative that "military retaliation would lead to devastating escalation," in order to prevent India from taking military action against terrorist attacks. If India no longer acknowledges this distinction, Pakistan's strategy of using terrorist attacks to provoke and avoid paying a price will completely fail.
"Operation Sindoor" breaks two core deterrence logics that Pakistan has relied on against India: first, Pakistan has long blurred the line between "unconventional aggression (terrorism)" and "conventional aggression (military action);" second, it denies the buffer space between "traditional conflicts" and "nuclear escalation," trying to force India to be cautious about using conventional forces due to Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons. "Operation Sindoor" has effectively exposed Pakistan's double bluff: on one hand, it removes the theoretical barrier between "terrorist attacks" and "military retaliation," and on the other hand, since neither the 2019 nor this operation triggered nuclear threat rhetoric, "Operation Sindoor" actually practiced low nuclear risk and broke Pakistan's nuclear blackmail.
Pakistan can no longer rely on nuclear threats to prevent India from taking conventional military retaliation against unconventional aggression. In this sense, India has locked the India-Pakistan battleground into a conventional military domain where it holds an advantage—although Pakistan's army is not easily defeated, India has a significant advantage in conventional firepower projection capabilities and potential arms supply networks. Once nuclear deterrence factors are excluded, Pakistan would find it difficult to match India in conventional conflicts or limited wars.
"Operation Sindoor" greatly weakened Pakistan's ability to use the argument of "lack of conclusive evidence" to cover up its involvement in anti-India terrorist attacks. India's latest position is that as long as there are terrorist organizations opposing India within Pakistan and these organizations have not been held accountable by the Pakistani government's judiciary, this is sufficient for India to take punitive actions against Pakistan. From India's perspective, waiting for "conclusive evidence" before pursuing accountability is impractical—such evidence often leads to disputes, and the time required for investigation could result in a disruptive change in the situation.
India no longer considers it necessary to provide large amounts of evidence to the international community to prove the responsibility for the attack. Past experiences have shown that even if India provides detailed evidence, the effect on the international community and efforts to push Pakistan to investigate the responsible parties is minimal. For example, the trial of the 2008 Mumbai attack dragged on for a long time, and in 2016, India invited Pakistan to investigate the Pathankot Airbase attack (on January 2, 2016, a group of armed militants attacked the Pathankot Airbase in Punjab, India, killing seven Indian soldiers; India claimed the attackers came from Pakistan and communicated with the command center via phone numbers originating from Pakistan), but did not receive a reciprocal response from Pakistan.
"Operation Sindoor" aims to establish a trigger mechanism for conflict escalation. The strategic logic embodied in this operation is that Pakistan, as India's opponent, launching terrorist attacks against India equates to initiating a conventional military conflict. If Pakistan wishes to avoid military conflict, it must stop terrorist attacks because such attacks may invite India's conventional military response, which will become the norm rather than an exception. In other words, the root cause of India-Pakistan conflict escalation is no longer India's use of conventional force, but Pakistan's use of unconventional means. India has handed the initiative of future developments to Pakistan, and "Operation Sindoor" is the prelude to this strategic shift.
"Operation Sindoor" aims to restore the deterrent effectiveness established by the 2019 Balakot strikes, which was undermined by the 2025 Pahalgam attack. Since the 2019 Pulwama attack, India has not experienced a large-scale terrorist attack. India believes that the Balakot strikes effectively curbed Pakistan from launching or "tolerating" terrorist attacks against India. However, the Pahalgam attack weakened the deterrence mechanism established in 2019. In this sense, "Operation Sindoor" is an attempt to rebuild the deterrent effectiveness of the "Balakot model."
From India's perspective, third countries now have only two choices: either support India or stay away (stand with India or choose not to). Each choice may have varying degrees of impact on India's relationship with that third country. Proposals that openly call for India and Pakistan to "exercise restraint and dialogue" will have little room to stand in the Indian decision-making circle.
In the future, India may require its strategic partners to align their counter-terrorism policies with India, exert pressure on Pakistan together, and firmly counter any actions that deny India's retaliatory actions or morally condemn India's military responses. India is expected to use its status as a major economy, growth market advantages, participation in global governance, a large diaspora network, and strategic partnerships with other countries to achieve these goals.
India's military response to attacks by terrorist organizations based in Pakistan follows a step-by-step escalation. From 2001-2002, India only conducted military mobilization but did not take actual action; in 2008, following the Mumbai attack, India did not conduct an open retaliation; in 2016, it carried out a "surgical strike," but the scope and impact were limited; in 2019, it launched the Balakot air strikes, but the targets were set cautiously; while the 2025 "Operation Sindoor" far exceeded all previous actions in terms of operational scale, strike intensity, actual effects, and potential for escalation.
"Operation Sindoor" basically ended the traditional India-Pakistan relationship model. It is unlikely that bilateral relations will return to the old framework of comprehensive dialogue, Kashmir issue negotiations, and civilian exchanges. Even if a process to resume normal relations is initiated, it will require a lot of time and effort. Obviously, neither India nor Pakistan currently has the willingness to initiate dialogue.
Author's Biography:
Happymon Jacob, Associate Professor at the School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and founder of the Strategic and Defence Research Committee (CSDR), an Indian think tank.
This article was translated from an article published in "India’s World" on May 7, 2025, titled "Twelve Arguments To Make Sense Of ‘Operation Sindoor’", original link:
https://indiasworld.in/twelve-arguments-to-make-sense-of-operation-sindoor/。
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7562231298199175718/
Disclaimer: The article represents the views of the author and we welcome you to express your opinion by clicking the [Up/Down] buttons below.