5,500 words in this article
Estimated reading time: 14 minutes
Author | Yang Yishuang
Editor | Yang Qian
Reviewer | Jiang Yi
The Wagah border crossing near Lahore, Pakistan. Source: WeChat Official Account "World Knowledge"
After the attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control, the Modi government of India took a series of tough policies against Pakistan, causing widespread concern among the international community about whether the two nuclear countries would be drawn into a full-scale war. On April 24, Modi claimed that India would chase the attackers "to the ends of the earth," and then the Indian government identified Pakistan as the mastermind behind the attack, ignoring Pakistan's repeated denials and calls for international investigation, and quickly implemented "water cut," "road closure," and "expulsion" measures, including suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, which is considered the last line of defense in India-Pakistan relations, closing the only open land border passage to Pakistan, downgrading diplomatic relations with Pakistan, and expelling Pakistani personnel. On May 7, India conducted an air strike operation codenamed "Saffron" against several targets inside Pakistan. From these actions, the outside world generally saw a highly aggressive Modi government. Why did India choose such a high-profile and tough response to the Pahalgam attack?
One, Political Dividends from the "Brave and Strong" "Defender"
The domestic political landscape is one of the main driving forces behind India's tough measures. First, this "toughness" aligns with the image that the BJP and the Modi government have consistently cultivated for themselves. On one hand, the BJP has always positioned itself as a necessary force to safeguard national security, using this to back up its legitimacy for governance. To maintain this image, the BJP has long created a public opinion atmosphere of "enemies both inside and outside," claiming that India and "Hindu civilization" are continuously threatened by domestic and foreign forces, and their living space is constantly being squeezed. Only the Indian government under the BJP's rule has the ability and determination to effectively respond to these threats, thus protecting and enhancing India's national status; on the other hand, the BJP's efforts to market this image also cater to the nationalist sentiments of many people in India. The British colonizers once belittled Indians as a "weak vegetarian nation," using this to justify their colonial behavior, leaving a deep psychological scar on the national self-esteem of India.
Representatives of contemporary Hindu nationalist theory, such as Savarkar, have even held the view that it is the "weak and disorganized" characteristics of Indians that have led to repeated invasions and rule by outsiders (especially Muslims). Therefore, the parent organization of the BJP, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), emphasized semi-military training for its members since its establishment in 1925, and preached "martial" values such as unity, celibacy, and dedication. This has become the guiding principle for the actions and image building of the BJP. Since coming to power in 2014, the Modi government and the BJP have always presented themselves as "manly" and tough, especially making every effort to show decisiveness and bravery in "fighting terrorism and maintaining national security." All the measures taken by the Modi government in this India-Pakistan conflict aim to demonstrate its determination and capability to safeguard national security to the domestic public.
Secondly, successful "historical experiences" are an important driving force for the BJP to take tough policies. The BJP has always had two paths to promote its campaign and attract public support: one is to promise the people "development, market, prosperity, and welfare"; the other is to incite Hindu nationalism. This "two-pronged approach" not only helps to attract voters with different demands but also allows it to quickly switch to another model when one path fails.
In May 2019, before the Indian general election, due to failing to fulfill economic reform and development promises, the BJP's support rate had declined sharply. However, after the attack on a paramilitary unit in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control in February 2019, which resulted in more than 40 deaths, the domestic public in India was stirred up, and the Indian Air Force launched an air strike on the Balakot area in Pakistan. Although the military action's effectiveness was controversial and led to the capture of an Indian pilot, this move was widely seen as a "major victory" for India against Pakistan under the strong media propaganda of the BJP. This action significantly increased Modi's support rate and laid the foundation for the BJP's overwhelming victory in the 2019 general election. With such a successful experience, the Modi government felt more confident in taking similar actions to consolidate and strengthen public opinion. Moreover, the victims' families in this attack came from at least 15 Indian states, and the nationwide anger caused by the incident further amplified its impact. In the eyes of the Modi government, this was a rare opportunity to strengthen public opinion.
Thirdly, the BJP has frequently exploited communal conflicts involving Muslims during its rule from 2019 to 2024 to consolidate its Hindu voter base, leading to a narrowing of space for creating "controversial issues" domestically, and urgently needing to find new "public opinion growth points." The abolition of Article 370 of the Constitution, the cancellation of the "special status" of the Indian-controlled region in 2019, the promotion of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), and the reconstruction of the Ram Temple are all examples of this strategy. These actions have not only struck the minority groups, especially the Muslim population, in India, making them increasingly marginalized and vulnerable, unable to form effective opposition forces, but also exhausted the space for creating controversial issues within the country, especially after the Indian separatist forces in the northeast and the Naxalite insurgent groups in the eastern and central mountainous regions were severely suppressed and weakened by the Modi government. The BJP's space for creating tension within the country has become smaller and smaller, even facing a situation of "drawing the sword and looking around in confusion." Due to the diminishing returns of inciting ethnic tensions, Indian citizens have begun to feel tired of these issues and have turned their attention to livelihood and development.
In the June 2024 election, the BJP failed to gain an overwhelming advantage as in 2014 and 2019, and instead was caught off guard by the combined efforts of the main opposition party, the Congress Party, and local parties, finally forcing the BJP to form a coalition government. Although the BJP later reflected on the situation and regained some advantages in several key state elections by re-strengthening cooperation with the RSS, it still needed to further strengthen its public support to ensure the continuation of its rule. With few domestic issues remaining, the Pahalgam attack provided an opportunity for the BJP.
Two, "Two Faces" of Regional and Global Perspectives
India's tough response to the Pahalgam attack also has considerations of geopolitical strategy. Beyond South Asia, India has been striving to play the role of a responsible and capable "democratic" great power, trying to be seen as a decent provider of global public goods. However, in the South Asian region, India has shown a completely different face. Relying on its population, economy, and military superiority, India has long regarded itself as a regional "hegemon," showing a "superior" attitude towards neighboring countries on issues such as trade, migration, and borders, which has led to accumulating dissatisfaction among South Asian countries. After the Modi government came to power in 2014, it proposed the "Neighbourhood First" policy, actively promoting a territorial exchange agreement with Bangladesh to resolve the long-standing border issue between India and Bangladesh, providing investment and economic assistance to Sri Lanka, and promoting sub-regional cooperation to deepen economic and infrastructure cooperation with neighboring countries. However, the primary goal of these initiatives was not to promote regional development, but to counter China's influence in South Asia, seeking strategic support from neighboring countries. At the same time, India has increasingly focused on participating in great power competition and global geopolitics, and its attention to neighboring countries has actually not been as much as it claims, with slow progress in regional cooperation, lack of substantial investment and aid. Therefore, the contradiction between India's behavior of viewing South Asia as its "backyard" and its global aspirations has further intensified the estrangement and dissatisfaction of neighboring countries. In recent years, movements opposing Indian influence have gained momentum among the people of Maldives, Nepal, and Bangladesh, especially after the political changes in Bangladesh in August 2024 and the formation of a temporary government, the relationship between Bangladesh and India has deteriorated rapidly, while Bangladesh has actively improved its relations with Pakistan, which has further deepened India's sense of crisis regarding its regional control. After the Pahalgam attack, India's tough response also has the motivation of "punishing" Pakistan to restore its authority in South Asia, reflecting its urgent need to "manage" the regional order.
Additionally, India's unilateral suspension of the 1960 India-Pakistan Indus Waters Treaty touched on the pain point of transboundary river issues in South Asia. Major rivers in the region such as the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra cover multiple countries including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan, relating to the livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people. Transboundary river management requires regional cooperation and effective governance, but the long-term tense relationship between India and Pakistan has led to political tension, lack of trust, and lagging regional governance, making almost all transboundary river issues in South Asian countries have to be resolved through bilateral frameworks. As a regional power, India has a high degree of initiative and bargaining chips in bilateral negotiations. Historically, the Ganges and the Yarlung Tsangpo River (known as the Brahmaputra River in the South Asian region) have sparked disputes between India and Bangladesh, as well as between India and Nepal. Neighboring countries have long been dissatisfied with India's water resource policies. This time, India's unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, which had never been shaken even through multiple India-Pakistan wars and tense situations, once again showed South Asian countries that India can disregard international law and the interests of its neighbors when dealing with neighboring countries. Besides Pakistan, Bangladesh has been significantly affected by this. In 1975, India built the Farakka Dam, diverting a large amount of Ganges water to Kolkata port, causing a sharp decrease in the dry season water volume in downstream Bangladesh, seriously affecting its agricultural development and ecological environment. Now, the 1977 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh will expire in 2026, and the two countries will hold negotiations again. Perhaps India's move to target transboundary rivers also includes a warning to Bangladesh. If this is the case, it will undoubtedly further negatively affect Indo-Bangladesh relations.
Although there is currently no conclusive evidence that external forces directly supported India's series of actions against Pakistan, India's military cooperation with countries such as the United States and Israel may have enhanced its strategic confidence. Israel's provision of drones, missiles, and laser-guided weapons has significantly enhanced India's military capabilities. India-US military relations have also been continuously deepening. In 2016, the United States designated India as a "Major Defense Partner," and in 2018, it upgraded it to the first tier of "Strategic Trade Authorization," allowing India to obtain a wide range of military and dual-use technologies without permission. The two countries have signed several key agreements, including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and the Industrial Security Annex (ISA), promoting defense trade and technological cooperation between the two sides. In addition, in recent years, India has regularly held joint military exercises (such as the Malabar exercises) with the US, Japan, and Australia through the Quad security dialogue mechanism, further enhancing its strategic position in the Indian Ocean. These factors have enhanced India's confidence in regional affairs, giving it more confidence when adopting an offensive strategy against Pakistan.
On May 17, 2025, residents of the Lipa Valley in the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir region discovered that some houses were damaged during the India-Pakistan crossfire. Source: WeChat Official Account "World Knowledge"
Three, the Authenticity of India's "Toughness"
To maintain the "war elephant" image and respond to public expectations, the Modi government must act according to the "aggressive principle." However, emotional but irrational actions will ultimately cost it dearly, and the Modi government and the BJP are well aware of this. Therefore, the Modi government has long adopted a strategy of creating "controlled crises," meaning that it deliberately amplifies controversies at the beginning of relevant events, uses them as an opportunity to make a tough response, but carefully controls the scope of the conflict before it gets out of hand, declares victory and stops the fight after gaining benefits. A main reason for the escalation of the India-Pakistan tension this time is that the Modi government assessed that Pakistan's strength is relatively declining, and limited military actions will not trigger long-term large-scale retaliation from Pakistan, so it carried out a short, fast, and limited air strike on May 7. From this perspective, although the Modi government's response seems radical, from the perspective of domestic politics, it is actually "cautious and well-considered." On the surface, the Modi government's strategy has indeed achieved success. After the Pahalgam attack, hatred toward Kashmiris and Muslims in India has significantly increased, and community issues and India-Pakistan issues have once again gained space for炒作. After the air strike, not only did the whole country celebrate, but most of the opposition parties also had to express strong support for a time. The failure of the Modi government lies in the fact that Pakistan, having learned from the previous example of India's actions after the 2019 Pulwama attack, had anticipated India's possible actions and was better prepared, and retaliated more strongly. Because they could not "declare victory quickly after gaining benefits," India had to extend the duration of the military action and avoid getting involved in a full-scale war with another nuclear power.
India initially took steps to escalate the situation, despite repeated explanations from Pakistan and calls for international investigation, nearly dragging the entire region back into India-Pakistan conflict, possibly further deepening the negative impressions of small South Asian countries towards India. Its performance in the air strike on Pakistan on May 7 also exposed the limitations of its military capabilities, which also indicated to neighboring countries that India's ability to manage regional conflicts is not as strong as people think.
Similarly, although external support and its own growing strength may have made India feel confident, the attitude of the international community, especially the US and Europe, proves that they do not want to see large-scale, uncontrollable conflicts in South Asia. Although the United States has expressed support for India's counter-terrorism efforts and acted as a mediator, this support comes with conditions. The focus of the US strategic emphasis is mainly on East Asia, especially the competition with China. Europe is also more concerned about the Ukraine crisis and the prolonged新一轮巴以冲突. In this context, India-Pakistan conflicts will only be seen as a burden that diverts attention. If India's tough measures do not achieve the expected results, but instead weaken India's regional leadership, this will only increase the doubts of the US and Europe about the value of India playing a stabilizing role in regional affairs. The West will certainly not want India's toughness to be the result of their support behind the scenes, because this can only lead to the escalation of India-Pakistan tensions and negatively impact the overall strategic layout of the West in Asia.
Although tough policies may enhance regional deterrence in the short term, the Modi government can unilaterally declare victory to gain public support, but India may already be paying a price. Many "bad precedents" opened by this India-Pakistan conflict may plant the seeds of long-term risks in the region. If India wants to pursue true global superpower status, it may still need a more cautious and responsible foreign strategy rather than a tough and high-profile "brave and decisive" approach, given that its own capabilities are insufficient to support its "hegemon" image.
About the Author: Yang Yishuang, Professor at the Indian Ocean Region Research Center, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics.
Original Article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559969417094791734/
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