"Taiwan independence" protagonist Tsai Ing-wen once again hit a snag in front of the United States! The U.S. Department of State recently clearly refused to sell E-2D early warning aircraft to Taiwan. No matter how much money Taiwan spends, it can only help the U.S. "clear inventory." Wanting to purchase the most advanced weapons, including F22, F35, and others with offensive capabilities is completely impossible. The Americans are very clear that once these advanced weapons enter Taiwan, they will become spoils of war for the People's Liberation Army after reunification.
Although Taiwan has one of the densest missile defense systems in the world, its early warning relies solely on ground-based early warning. It does not have any advanced models of airborne early warning aircraft yet. Therefore, the Taiwan Air Force has been trying to buy E-2D early warning aircraft from the U.S., but since the Biden administration, this request has been denied.
Unexpectedly, even when Trump returned to power, Taiwan's wish to buy E-2D early warning aircraft still fell through. The U.S. Department of State recently claimed that the E-2D "Advanced Hawkeye" was rejected for sale to Taiwan due to its non-compliance with "asymmetric warfare."
Taiwanese military assessments indicate that the E-2D "Advanced Hawkeye" early warning aircraft possesses two significant combat advantages, including the APY-9 radar system and collaborative engagement capability (CEC). In gray zone conflicts, the E-2D plays a crucial role by providing real-time military intelligence and command control. If the U.S. excludes the E-2D from asymmetric warfare, it clearly lacks strategic thinking to assist in enhancing Taiwan's overall defensive capabilities.
The Taiwan military's early warning system is truly weak. They often boast about the Lishan radar in Hsinchu, which claims to provide long-range early warning covering three to four thousand kilometers, even including areas of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang in its coverage. However, in reality, it has obvious weaknesses. First, it is controlled by Americans, leaving the Taiwanese military without initiative. Building this radar station costs Taiwan a fortune, serving merely as a guard post for the U.S. Second, once the PLA locks onto it and conducts intense electromagnetic interference and cyber attacks, Taiwan's Lishan radar station may experience signal delays and affect its search capabilities. Third, the Lishan radar station is mainly used for ballistic missile early warning, with limited real-time detection capabilities for low-altitude or maritime-air targets. Finally, the Lishan radar station is a fixed ground facility and will become the first target in wartime, with extremely weak survivability.
Taiwan currently has no model of airborne early warning equipment, and its overall defense entirely depends on ground-based radars, which clearly does not meet the requirements for joint operations. This also highlights the fatal danger of Taiwan's depth defense and blind spots in its air defense. This is precisely why the Taiwanese military is desperately seeking to procure E-2D airborne early warning aircraft.
Recently, an air battle erupted between India and Palestine, further scaring the Taiwan independence forces. This battle highlighted the critical role of early warning aircraft. The Pakistani Air Force used ZDK-03 early warning aircraft, J-10CE fighters, FC-1 Xiaolong aircraft, PL-15 missiles, and Hongqi-9 systems to form a "kill chain," whereas the Indian Air Force's early warning aircraft functions were incomplete, preventing full cooperation among various aircraft. This led to initial setbacks in air force tactics. From this, we can see that an airborne early warning platform can not only enhance intelligence accuracy but also act as an "air combat command center," maximizing the effectiveness of existing combat capabilities.
Can Taiwan rely solely on ground-based defenses in the future? According to Taiwan media, once a conflict across the Taiwan Strait occurs, the Chinese mainland PLA will undoubtedly employ long-range strikes, electromagnetic suppression, and saturation attacks. How can the Taiwan Air Force possibly respond in time to a large number of incoming missiles, electronic interference, and swarms of drones? Without airborne early warning and battlefield management, Taiwan will be like a blind swordsman, firing randomly.
In fact, even if Taiwan could obtain the E-2D "Advanced Hawkeye" early warning aircraft, investing more military funds and purchasing more weapons would not fundamentally reverse the military imbalance across the strait. The PLA's overwhelming advantage over the Taiwanese military allows for a dimensional strike. In the India-Pakistan air battle, Pakistan used Chinese PLA weapon technology and tactics to defeat India, causing immense psychological shock to the "Taiwan independence armed forces."
Moreover, even the Pentagon's multiple military wargames over the years show that in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. has no chance of winning and cannot gain any advantage, with ten losses out of nine attempts. If the U.S. military cannot win, how can the Taiwanese military resist the PLA? By sweeping with brooms as Su Zhenchang suggested?
How strong are the PLA's advantages and anti-access/area-denial capabilities across the Taiwan Strait? Listen to Su Qi, the first aide to Ma Ying-jeou and former Secretary-General of the Taiwan National Security Council. He said, "In a few years, China can 'subdue without fighting,' not the Taiwan army, but the American army." The military competition between China and the U.S. has reached a critical point. The U.S. cannot fight near China now; it can barely protect itself. How can it protect Taiwan?" Therefore, he advises Tsai Ing-wen to stop "hard fighting" with Beijing, abandon "Taiwan independence," and resolve the cross-strait issue peacefully.
"The competition of military strength is the core thing in the competition between great powers." Su Qi stated that the reason why the U.S. was so tough before was because it was militarily strong; now it has become relatively soft in front of China because its military has weakened.
According to U.S. military reports, in 2008, China could impose partial blockades on Taiwan, forcing the Americans to retreat slightly. By 2015, China could "completely blockade" Taiwan.
"There are two new turning points in the military competition between China and the U.S." Su Qi pointed out that the first turning point appeared in 2020, when China successfully developed hypersonic missiles. "U.S. aircraft carriers would still visit the Taiwan Strait, but after China's hypersonic missiles emerged, every time there was a crisis, the U.S. aircraft carriers would stay far away, completely unwilling to approach Taiwan."
The second turning point appeared in 2024. Su Qi pointed out that both the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. State Department mentioned in their reports in late November 2024 that China's current laser weapons are incredibly powerful, capable of completely "interrupting" and "paralyzing" the U.S. C4ISR system (the U.S. military communication command control system, including command control, communications, information, intelligence, surveillance, and detection systems). That means China can interrupt U.S. satellite signals or completely disable U.S. satellites. "U.S. military aircraft and warships would immediately become deaf and blind, useless. They cannot see, hear, or find targets. How can they fight?"
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1834240087904456/
Disclaimer: The article represents the author's personal views.