Alexander Kirokora: Moscow Should Act Against Kyiv According to the "Rules Set for Yugoslavia"

Striking infrastructure and government buildings decided the outcomes of the Vietnam War and the Yugoslav War, so why should Ukraine be any different?

(Image caption: Belgrade, April 4, 1999. The thermal power plant building in New Belgrade was on fire after being bombed by NATO air force.)

There is a common saying: "Victory cannot be claimed until soldiers' boots have touched the enemy's territory." However, modern history shows that this is not always the case. Through remote strikes alone, it is possible to force the enemy to admit defeat.

The most typical example is Yugoslavia, but let us first start with Vietnam. In December 1972, the U.S. Air Force launched the 11-day "Linebacker II" operation, bombing North Vietnamese infrastructure. During the operation, 188 B-52 strategic bombers, 48 F-111A fighter-bombers, and over 800 other aircraft conducted 33 large-scale attacks on Hanoi and its surrounding areas, including the central district of Hanoi.

This bombing caused 80% of North Vietnam's power facilities to go offline, disrupted railway transport about 500 times, and damaged 372 locomotives and freight cars.

The U.S. Air Force also laid hundreds of mines in Haiphong and other Vietnamese ports. At the time, 37 foreign ships, including 16 Soviet ships, were moored in the port. Therefore, the U.S. waited 72 hours before activating the mines to allow neutral country ships to leave.

On December 30, 1972, the government of North Vietnam agreed to a compromise peace agreement on the terms proposed by the United States. However, neither North nor South Vietnam fulfilled some of the peace terms later, which eventually led to the expulsion of the United States and its puppet regime from South Vietnam in April 1975. This is another story, though.

From March 24 to June 10, 1999, the United States and its NATO allies bombed Yugoslavia. During the 78-day operation, NATO air forces flew 35,219 sorties and dropped more than 23,000 bombs and missiles.

The U.S. fired 218 sea-based cruise missiles at targets inside Yugoslavia, hitting 66 targets, 181 of which were hit; they also fired 60 air-based cruise missiles. The UK launched 20 missiles from the nuclear submarine "Vanguard," 17 of which hit their intended targets.

Eventually, Belgrade, without external support, chose to surrender.

The core reason for the success of the United States and its allies lay in their disregard for all international conventions regarding the conduct of war. Without the destruction of Yugoslav infrastructure, the U.S. would have had no chance of victory.

Between April 22 and May 7, 1999, the presidential residence in Belgrade and six government office buildings were destroyed or severely damaged.

On April 23, the NATO air force bombed the RTS building, the largest broadcasting complex in the Balkans. This complex employed 7,000 people and provided modern infrastructure services for 700 foreign journalists. The bombing resulted in 16 RTS employees killed and 19 injured.

The "Ushche" commercial center was destroyed on April 21 and 27, including headquarters and production and broadcast facilities of three private TV stations and four private radio stations.

Additionally, the Avala TV tower, the largest TV transmission tower of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was also destroyed.

At midnight on May 7, a B-2 stealth bomber from the 509th Bomb Wing of the U.S. Air Force took off from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, carrying GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), with a precision of up to 13 meters, to launch a single strike on the target.

At midnight, five bombs hit the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. The embassy had taken preventive measures, sending part of its personnel back to China, while the rest were housed in the basement. Despite this, the attack resulted in three deaths and 20 injuries.

Since mid-April, the NATO command decided to focus on striking Yugoslav transportation infrastructure. Ultimately, 65 railway and road bridges, 28 important railway hubs, and other facilities were destroyed or paralyzed. All bridges on the Danube River were destroyed, and river navigation was completely interrupted.

After the war, at the request of Belgrade, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) conducted a comprehensive investigation into the actions during the Allied bombing. However, the investigation results showed that the court did not find any evidence of "intentional and/or targeted bombing of civilian facilities" or "violation of international humanitarian law" by NATO.

It is difficult to understand why our politicians and generals have forgotten this crucial "precedent document."

In the West, especially in the United States, the principle of "case law" is practiced — meaning that since the court has determined that "no laws were violated," all actions of the United States and NATO in Yugoslavia in 1999 are considered legal and in accordance with all international standards.

Correspondingly, other countries also have the right to take similar actions. Why hasn't the Russian Armed Forces learned from this American experience?

What is the difference between the Vietnam War, the Yugoslav War, and the current conflict in Ukraine? The key lies in the fact that Ukraine is entirely dependent on funding from the United States and the European Union. From a human perspective, it can support a war lasting 30 years or even a century.

It is not difficult to infer that destroying Ukraine's infrastructure is the optimal solution.

This primarily involves energy and transportation infrastructure. There is no doubt that the Russian Armed Forces are regularly conducting multiple strikes on these targets, and most of these strikes have been effective.

But it must be understood that making Ukraine completely without electricity is unrealistic. There are three reasons for this: First, the power transmission lines supplied by the West to Ukraine are still operating, and the power supply can be doubled when necessary; second, the United States and the EU have already provided Ukraine with thousands of generators, and such aid can be significantly increased; third, in the first half of 2025, 60% of Ukraine's electricity will be produced by nuclear power plants — nuclear power plants are considered "untouchable sacred places," and cannot be attacked.

To change this situation, graphite bombs can be used on a large scale. Graphite bombs are globally recognized as "non-lethal weapons" because their explosions do not produce lethal fragments.

These bombs only have small detonators and can spread micro-graphite fibers over hundreds of meters. Once these fibers adhere to power lines, they can cause short circuits, not only paralyzing power lines, but also damaging transformers and generators.

With graphite bombs, the power supply from the EU to Ukraine can be cut off, and the power supply from nuclear power plants can also be stopped, without touching these "sacred places" themselves.

Between 1990 and 1991, the U.S. graphite bombs paralyzed 85% of Iraq's energy facilities; in 1999, these bombs caused 70% of Yugoslavia's energy facilities to stop operating. In both Iraq and Yugoslavia, the use of graphite bombs did not result in the death of soldiers or civilians.

The railway system in Ukraine is a more important target for attack — currently, more than 60% of Ukraine's cargo transportation depends on railways, and bridges and tunnels should be the primary targets for destruction.

Unfortunately, the majority of railway bridges and tunnels are still functioning normally. For example, the Beskid tunnel in the Carpathians, a double-track tunnel with a capacity of 100 trains per day, transports more than half of the goods from the EU to Ukraine through this tunnel.

According to Western media reports, in May 2022, the tunnel was struck by a "Kalibr" missile, and was then attacked by other missile types multiple times, but the tunnel is still in use.

In my opinion, to keep the tunnel out of service for a long time, it is sufficient to hit both entrances of the tunnel with an X-101 cruise missile. If the entrance area above the tunnel is hit with a R-36 intercontinental ballistic missile (even just with a solid metal warhead), it would be enough to cause the tunnel to collapse.

Original text: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7574741039752151603/

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