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Author | Nanping
Editor | Zhu Yilin
Reviewer | Jiang Yi
Image source: WeChat official account "Nanyang Fengyunlu"
India, as a neighbor of Myanmar, has expanded its geopolitical and economic influence in Myanmar through the Kaladan Multimodal Project. After the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, the Arakan Army (AA) rapidly rose to become a key force in Rakhine and Chin States, controlling large areas including the core node of the Kaladan project, Palaw. Faced with the decline of the Myanmar military government's control and the rise of local armed groups, India adopted a pragmatic strategy by courting the AA to secure its strategic interests.
I. Measures
India has adopted a multi-layered strategy in the complex geopolitical environment of Myanmar to ensure the smooth progress of the Kaladan project and protect its interests in Rakhine State. The specific measures taken by India to court the AA are as follows.
(1)
Informal Diplomatic Contacts and High-Level Dialogue
India has established contact with the AA through non-official channels to avoid the risk of direct support being labeled as a "terrorist organization" by the Myanmar military government. Indian think tanks with official backgrounds have quietly invited representatives of the AA, the National Unity Government, and the Chin National Front, among other anti-military government armed groups, to New Delhi for secret meetings. Topics discussed include the future situation in Myanmar, regional security, and border trade. Through these meetings, India clearly expressed its understanding of the political goals and demands of the AA and other local armed groups, and sought their support for the Kaladan project. The leader of the AA stated that they support the project, believing it can bring economic benefits to Rakhine and Chin States. This informal contact allows India to ensure the security guarantee of the AA for the project without openly offending the military government.
(2)
Economic Cooperation and Localization Strategy
India strengthens its economic ties with local forces by incorporating local enterprises in the areas controlled by the AA into the construction of the Kaladan project. In 2022, an Indian railway construction company took over the construction of a 109 km road from Palaw to Zolinpui and formed a joint venture with five local Burmese companies. This localization strategy not only reduces reliance on foreign contractors but also injects funds into the local economy by cooperating with enterprises in the areas controlled by the AA, thereby indirectly enhancing the AA's support for the project. For example, the operation of the Palaw port and the Kaladan River waterway facilities has created employment opportunities locally, aligning with the AA's goal of improving infrastructure and economic development.
(3)
Security Assurance and Coordination
The AA has provided security protection for the Kaladan project since 2021, especially after taking control of Palaw in early 2024, promising to ensure the project area is free from conflict. India ensures the safety of construction workers and supplies through coordination with the AA. For instance, in February 2025, the Indian ambassador to Myanmar visited Sittwe Port to assess the project's progress and coordinate with local forces in the AA-controlled areas. Such high-level visits not only demonstrate India's emphasis on the project but also consolidate its relationship with the AA through local dialogue.
(4)
Humanitarian Aid and Development Projects
India indirectly courts communities under the control of the AA by providing humanitarian aid and small-scale development projects. For example, India supports education, medical, and infrastructure projects in Rakhine and Chin States to improve the living standards of local residents. These initiatives have won the support of local communities and provide the AA with a platform to showcase its governance capabilities, thus increasing its favor towards India.
(5)
Balance and Formal Diplomatic Relations with the Military Government
Despite courting the AA, India has not completely abandoned cooperation with the Myanmar military government. To avoid diplomatic risks, India continues to maintain contact with the military government through formal channels, such as close communication between the Indian diplomatic community and the military government regarding the security situation and the prospects of Indian projects. This dual-track strategy allows India to maintain a balance between the AA and the military government, ensuring the continued progress of the Kaladan project amidst the complex situation. Although the Myanmar military government is aware of India's dual approach, it chooses to remain silent due to the growing strength of the anti-government armed forces and does not want to offend India's interests in Myanmar.
Image source: WeChat official account "Nanyang Fengyunlu"
II. Motives
Behind India's courting of the AA, there are both short-term considerations for the safety of the project and long-term geopolitical strategic goals.
(1)
Ensuring the Safety and Progress of the Kaladan Project
The Kaladan project is the core of India's "Look East Policy," aiming to connect Kolkata port with Mizoram in northeastern India through sea, river, and road transport, with an investment of about $500 million so far. However, the key node of the project, Palaw, has been controlled by the AA since early 2024, and India must cooperate with them to ensure the safety of construction and the smooth transportation of materials. The AA has promised to protect the project's interests and sees it as an opportunity to promote local economic development. By courting the AA, India ensures that this expensive project is not disrupted by internal conflicts, avoiding incidents like the kidnapping of engineering staff in 2019. Moreover, the AA, by controlling Rakhine and Chin States, attempts to gain more legitimacy on the international stage. India indirectly grants the AA a certain level of political recognition through economic cooperation and informal contacts, encouraging it to participate in regional affairs constructively. This strategy helps reduce the intensity of conflicts and creates a more favorable external environment for the Kaladan project.
(2)
Dealing with the Declining Control of the Myanmar Military Government
After the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military regime is experiencing internal divisions, with a group of soldiers known as "watermelon spies" who appear loyal to the military government but secretly support democratic resistance forces, providing them with critical intelligence that has helped them achieve significant progress in the war. According to a report by foreign media on December 19, 2024, anti-government armed forces have controlled about 42% of Myanmar's territory, while the military government controls only 21% of the country. UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Tom Andrews, pointed out that although the military still controls major cities, they are gradually losing territory. Most of Rakhine and Chin States are under the control of local armed groups like the AA. Air raids and ground conflicts by the military government (such as the 2024 Kyaukphyu air raid) have increased the uncertainty in the project area. Facing the instability of the military government, India must collaborate with the AA, which controls the actual territory, to ensure the stability and operability of the project area.
(3)
Countering China's Influence in Southeast Asia
The Kaladan project is a strategic response to China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (especially the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor). The Rakhine State, controlled by the AA, is a key area of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, including the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port, a Chinese investment project. The rise of the AA could weaken China's influence in Rakhine State. India, by courting the AA, indirectly constrains China's strategic layout in Myanmar and enhances its presence in the Indo-Pacific region.
(4)
Managing Border Security and Refugee Crisis
The unrest in Rakhine and Chin States has led to a large number of refugees entering India's Mizoram State. As of July 2025, approximately 33,000 Chin refugees have entered India's Mizoram State. For example, on July 2, 2025, the Chin National Defence Force (CNDF) and the Chinland Defence Force-Hualngoram (CDF-H) clashed fiercely over control of strategic locations in Chin State, directly leading to over 4,000 refugees crossing dense forests through border bridges and crossing the Tiau River to enter the third-largest town in Mizoram State - Champhai, specifically the villages of Zokhata and Wapai. Many refugees have relatives in Mizoram State, and most of them live with their relatives, while others reside in refugee camps in schools and community halls. Refugees are cared for by Indian villagers and some non-governmental organizations, but they also place a heavy burden on India's social stability and infrastructure capacity. This large-scale refugee influx is closely related to the geographical proximity of Chin State, cultural connections, and ongoing conflicts. The Chin people, as an ethnic group with unique culture and history, share cultural and linguistic bonds with the Mizo and Kuki people of Mizoram State, and most have relatives in the neighboring country. This transnational ethnic connection leads to more refugees preferring to enter India's Mizoram State rather than Thailand or Bangladesh. India seeks to stabilize the border areas and reduce refugee flows and potential security threats by collaborating with the AA. The AA's support helps maintain order in the project area, indirectly alleviating border pressure.
III. Insights
India's dual approach of courting both the AA and the military government aims to safeguard its interests amid complex circumstances. Other countries currently mainly rely on formal cooperation with the military government, but the military government's control is gradually declining. The AA already controls most of Rakhine State, and the safety of infrastructure projects in other countries' regions will inevitably be affected.
Other countries may consider adopting India's informal contact strategy to establish secret communication channels with local armed groups like the AA, ensuring the steady progress of local projects. For example, through economic cooperation, humanitarian aid, or even more substantial assistance, they can seek the AA's support and reduce threats to their infrastructure projects.
This strategy requires careful, low-key, and secret implementation to avoid provoking the Myanmar military government and to enhance the willingness of local forces to cooperate.
This article is reprinted from the WeChat official account "Nanyang Fengyunlu" on July 17, 2025, titled "India's Dual Strategy: Courting Local Armed Groups in Myanmar: Measures, Motives, and Insights."
Editor of this issue: Zhu Yilin
Reviewer of this issue: Jiang Yi
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559191695338832420/
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