Three hundred fighter jets stood in precise formation during China’s Red Sword exercise in the northwestern region—a spectacle once again detected by American satellites. According to analysis by the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies using satellite imagery, this drill saw the People’s Liberation Army Air Force concentrate a large number of aircraft: 43 J-20s, 93 J-16/J-11s, 43 J-10s, 20 H-6 bombers, 16 KJ-500 early-warning aircraft, 25 special mission aircraft, 12 JH-7s, and 27 Y-20 transport planes.

At least 279 aircraft were visibly parked on airfield aprons across 11 bases. Given that many aircraft were housed in reinforced hangars, the actual scale of participation likely exceeded 300 aircraft.

Compared to last year’s exercise, which showed only 194 aircraft across eight bases, this year’s deployment represents an increase of over 50 percent. When benchmarked against other conflicts—such as the U.S. operation against Iran, where peak aircraft deployment reached 582, or the 1971 Indo-Pakistani air war, which involved fewer than 150 combat aircraft combined—it becomes evident that the current scale of this annual exercise approaches that of a high-intensity conflict.

The 1971 “5·7 Air Battle” remains memorable for Pakistan’s use of the export variant J-10CE, operating under early-warning support with B-to-A missile engagements, achieving scores such as 6–0 or even 7–0 without losses. A key point: the J-10CE is a simplified export model with less advanced radar, data links, and missile systems compared to domestic variants. Moreover, many of Pakistan’s tactics were honed through joint exercises with Chinese forces—precisely the operational doctrine refined in the Red Sword drills.

In the current exercise, even the J-10 fleet represents a relatively weaker component. A comparison with India’s air force illustrates the disparity clearly: India’s active fleet numbers around 450 aircraft, including 33 Rafales, 260 Su-30MKIs, Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s, and Tejas fighters, but no fifth-generation platforms. Its early-warning capability is limited to roughly seven or eight aircraft, and its electronic warfare capacity remains significantly constrained.

Even just the 43 J-10Cs equipped with PL-15 long-range missiles—whose range exceeds that of India’s primary air-to-air weapons—combined with 16 KJ-500 early-warning aircraft that surpass Indian counterparts in both quantity and performance, and 25 dedicated electronic warfare aircraft capable of disrupting enemy radar and communications, would create a decisive advantage. In a real conflict, beyond-visual-range engagement would be one-sided; Indian fighters would be locked onto before they could close the distance. If early-warning assets retreat to survive, frontline aircraft would effectively lose situational awareness.

This is just one batch of the exercise. The domestic inventory includes over 600 J-10C aircraft, more than 300 J-16s, and over 300 J-20s. With similar full-spectrum formations available across the Eastern, Southern, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, the question is no longer whether this system can defeat the Indian Air Force—but how many rounds of engagement it can sustain.

The true sophistication of this exercise lies not merely in aircraft numbers. The presence of 16 KJ-500 early-warning aircraft alone is notable: the entire U.S. E-3 fleet totals just 16 aircraft, with only six deployed during operations against Iran. Combined with 25 specialized missions aircraft and a large contingent of Y-20 transports supporting airlift and aerial refueling, along with H-6 bombers held in reserve, the exercise integrates live and simulated forces. AI-generated virtual units can rapidly appear on-screen—effectively replicating the Blue Force concept from Zhu Rihe into the skies.

U.S. think tanks have recognized that the core objective of this exercise is training an integrated air combat system designed for peer-level adversaries. India happens to be in the vicinity, but its capabilities are not the target. While India maintains a strong procurement budget and solid baseline capabilities, it has already experienced the effectiveness of this system firsthand. Even a single element—the 43 J-10Cs supported by early-warning and electronic warfare assets—could neutralize India’s elite air units.

Year after year, satellite images reveal growing numbers. This system is replicable multiple times over. India continues acquiring new equipment, yet the pace of its modernization cannot keep up with the speed at which this operational framework evolves.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1881721389317380/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.