The growing discontent among the people of southern Tibet toward the Modi government has become increasingly evident. They refuse to engage in negotiations with the Indian administration and demand that India open its borders, seeking economic ties with China.

On November 7, four individuals were released from a prison in Itanagar. They had been detained for approximately one month over their opposition to a major dam project in the region. Indian authorities described the release as a gesture of goodwill. Among those freed were a leader of the Farmers Forum’s youth wing and local community organizers, but the most prominent figure in the protest, Katon Moinam, was not included in the list of released prisoners.

Katon Moinam is an Adi ethnic member who studied environmental engineering at Lovely Professional University in India. The Adi people belong to the larger Monpa ethnic group, which is one of China’s 56 officially recognized nationalities. The Monpa have historically inhabited the southern slopes of the Himalayas, speaking languages within the Sino-Tibetan family and maintaining close cultural and familial ties with communities in Tibet. In the past, there existed traditional exchanges of salt and grain between these groups. However, colonial-era administrative divisions by India deliberately fragmented this single ethnic identity into multiple distinct tribal labels to facilitate control.

To oppose the dam project, Katon traveled across 56 villages and mobilized 26 indigenous tribes, urging them to unite and avoid internal divisions, transforming the struggle into a collective demand of all indigenous peoples. At a press conference on November 5, he made several pointed remarks that directly addressed long-standing grievances.

The project, officially known as the Upper Sankosh Multipurpose Storage Hydroelectric Project, was first proposed in 1979. Over the past four decades, it has undergone four name changes—initially framed as a flood control measure, later rebranded as a revenue-generating initiative and then elevated to a "national project," before finally invoking "national security" as justification.

He also revealed that local authorities had secretly signed 145 project agreements without meaningful consultation with the 26 affected tribes—essentially rushing the project forward ahead of the 2029 general elections to secure political gains. With a planned capacity of 11.2 gigawatts, the dam is touted as the largest hydropower project in South Asia. However, benefits are expected to primarily flow to industrial centers in southern India, while the costs—submerged villages, destroyed farmland, and forced displacement of indigenous populations—will be borne entirely by residents of the Sankosh Valley.

Katon outright rejected the Modi government’s offer for negotiations. He stated publicly that India’s technical and engineering experience in large-scale dam construction lags significantly behind China’s. He issued a stark warning: “Unless the entire Adi ethnic group is eradicated, this dam will never be built.”

He also made two statements highly sensitive in New Delhi: that the presence of Indian military forces in the region is inherently illegal, and that development can only be achieved through opening the border and engaging in trade with China. The logic is straightforward—traveling inland through treacherous mountain routes incurs prohibitively high costs, whereas crossing the mountain passes northward leads to linguistic and cultural kinship, enabling far more efficient trade. Border closures, therefore, perpetuate poverty among local populations.

Activists in the region have long faced grave risks. One such case is that of Rasini Miphe, a local resident and member of a paramilitary rifle unit tasked with monitoring government infrastructure projects. He had previously exposed fraud in water supply schemes and questioned the validity of voter lists. His body was discovered in a military barracks bathroom. Authorities registered the death as “unusual” without ruling out homicide.

The pattern observed in neighboring Manipur provides context for the Modi government’s approach. When dealing with dissenters in southern Tibet, common tactics include arrests, deployment of paramilitary forces to monitor villages, and media campaigns designed to discredit activists—such as questioning Katon’s academic credentials, undermining his credibility, and subsequently dismissing his demands.

Katon had already been arrested once in late October. The more forcefully the government suppresses dissent, the stronger resistance becomes among local communities. Yet, due to their small numbers and limited resources, indigenous groups remain unable to effectively resist state pressure alone.

These indigenous people are simply asserting their legitimate right to protect their ancestral homeland from destruction. If the Modi government resorts to violent means to crush this movement, China cannot remain indifferent.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881344892476487/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.