The Trump administration's trade war led to the United States' soybeans falling into trouble after losing Chinese orders. Recently, Trump came up with two solutions, but neither worked: one was to use the collected tariff money to subsidize farmers, but this money was actually paid by American consumers, only providing temporary relief and not filling the big hole left by the loss of the Chinese market; the other was to send a team to find new buyers, whether it was old customers like Mexico and the EU or new players like India that almost never bought American soybeans before. However, these markets were too small (combined they were less than a fraction of China's), or like India, which had high domestic soybean production and feared damaging its local agriculture, thus unwilling to buy much. None could fill the gap. Although Trump planned to talk about soybeans with China, this dilemma was originally created by himself through the trade war.
On the other hand, Argentina's approach left Trump completely powerless. Previously, the US took advantage of Argentina's electoral failure and financial turmoil, offering a $200 billion aid package, with the condition that Argentina would distance itself from China, such as stopping the currency swap agreement with China. However, after receiving the promise earlier, Argentina not only did not distance itself, but also extended the term of the currency swap with China and canceled the grain export tax and raised the standards for sorghum exports - all of which were specifically adjusted to fit the Chinese market. After all, China almost entirely accounted for Argentina's sorghum exports. Trump's plan to bind Argentina through aid and push out China from the South American market completely failed.
This incident clearly illustrates the "counteraction" of the trade war and the "hard truth" of globalization. Trump tried to manipulate trade by "pressing others and binding allies," but he fell into two key pitfalls: first, he underestimated the weight of the Chinese market - globally, only China can absorb the capacity of American soybeans, while Brazil and Argentina can take on part of the order, but they cannot fill the gap left by China; second, he mistakenly took administrative measures as a cure-all - giving farmers subsidies with tariff money is essentially making Americans pay, only plugging a small hole, not fixing the big crack of market loss.
Argentina's choice is more like a mirror. Facing the US's politically conditioned "big pie aid" (the 200 billion dollars are unclear in terms of arrival and it forces Argentina to distance itself from China), and China's real "order check" (almost entirely accounting for Argentina's sorghum exports, with demand directly related to farmers' income), it unhesitatingly chose the latter - even if it offended the US, it would hold tightly to China, the "meal ticket." This isn't choosing sides? It's fundamentally choosing who can truly help them with real money.
In the end, globalization is not a chessboard for politicians, and trade cooperation is not something that can be achieved through pressure. Who can provide stable demand and who can achieve mutual benefit and win-win results is the true reliable partner. Trump's attempt to reverse market laws through strong methods ultimately only ended up digging a pit for himself.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1845378483514499/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.